Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Future of Social Sciences and Humanities, 2024
Year: 2024
DOI:
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Operation Rolling Thunder: Thunder Alone Does Not Defeat an Enemy
Hou Zit Shum
ABSTRACT:
Operation Rolling Thunder is among the most well-known aerial operations in the Vietnam War, if not all of military history. However, that recognition originates more from infamy than achievement. The massive employment of ordinances, manpower, capital and military logistics did not yield the results desired by the American top brass, instead, the war in Vietnam only intensified with mounting American casualties and growing anti-war sentiments. This paper aims to analyze 1) how Operation Rolling Thunder was executed, 2) why it was conducted that way, and 3) what therein should be blamed for the disastrous results mentioned earlier. The objective of the paper is to provide relevant suggestions for the use of airpower based on the experiences of Operation Rolling Thunder. This paper dissects Operation Rolling Thunder by its context, execution, and efficacy to demonstrate the usefulness air power had in the war. The operation was poorly planned and done in almost all major aspects, and the results were similarly poor. Airpower failed to be an effective political tool in this case as it failed to bring the North Vietnamese government to the negotiating table. The key problem, this paper argues, is that airpower was utilized in the wrong manner. It must be used to its maximum magnitude and in cooperation with other forces of the military, especially ground troops. Neither of these steps was taken by the US military. To substantiate my claim, the paper draws support from established military doctrines, primary sources such as US governmental documents and secondary sources like scholarly discussions made after the conclusion of the war.
keywords: Aerial bombing; air force; guerilla war; military history; Vietnam War