Beyond Protectionism: Geopolitical Alignment and the 2025 U.S. Reciprocal Tariff Regime

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Abstract

This study investigates whether the 2025 U.S. reciprocal tariff framework is more accurately interpreted as a standard protectionist measure or as an instrument of geopolitical reconfiguration. Drawing on data from 91 trading partners, we develop a Tariff Vulnerability Index (TVI) that integrates measures of tariff exposure, export reliance on the U.S. market, and the extent of U.S. import dependency. Contrary to dominant interpretations, national income level demonstrates no statistically robust association with tariff intensity ($t = -1.76$, $p = 0.082$). In contrast, geopolitical alignment accounts for the predominant share of observed variation ($F = 16.24$, $p = 3.25 \times 10^{-11}$), with states embedded in competing supply networks experiencing markedly elevated tariff burdens. China constitutes a structural anomaly, exhibiting a TVI approximately 2.8 times greater than that of the second-most affected nation. These results indicate that the 2025 tariff system functions principally as a mechanism of strategic disengagement rather than as a response to economic vulnerability. We contend that such policy designs pose significant risks to the integrity of global trade architectures by compelling non-aligned economies to affiliate with bloc-based trading systems grounded in geopolitical allegiance.

I. Introduction

April 2, 2025—dubbed “Liberation Day”—marked a shift: the U.S. unveiled its broadest tariff overhaul in almost 100 years. A flat 10% duty applied across all nations; yet individual surcharges climbed sharply under distinct conditions. Beijing faced a 145% levy, Phnom Penh 49%, Hanoi 46%, Dhaka 37%. By mid-April, researchers at Yale’s Budget Lab placed the initial weighted average near 28%, a peak unseen since the start of the twentieth century. Once shifts in sourcing took effect, that figure dipped to roughly 18%. Households, their analysis suggested, would shoulder losses close to $4,878 each year. Retaliatory measures followed without delay.

Some analyses focus on the effects of these tariffs on broad U.S. economic shifts - slower GDP growth, fewer jobs, higher prices - while others emphasize worldwide welfare declines. Though common, such views assume impact depends only on how much is traded. Instead, the structure behind the 2025 tariffs follows a different logic entirely. The data indicates that it is not trade size but strategic alliances. Ignoring this pattern leads analyses to draw incorrect conclusions about who bears the burden. The results suggest that the primary driver is in international political positioning, not just market flows.

A claim open to testing takes shape here: the 2025 tariff plan does not function as a broad shield favoring certain incomes or matching export flows. Instead, it operates through strategic positioning - distance from Beijing's economic orbit matters far more than standard trade measures suggest. Evidence moves toward three points: first, nations at odds with U.S. strategy, along with key shared suppliers, face steeper costs compared to friendly states; second, whether a country is rich or poor adds little predictive power once alliances are accounted for; finally, the Trade Vulnerability Index shows risk clumped sharply, with China standing apart in its level of exposure.

Across 91 nations, trade figures come from WITS 2023, while tariffs are drawn from Yale Budget Lab's April 2025 estimates alongside export reliance metrics sourced via the World Bank. Review of prior studies appears next, forming Section II. Data sources and methods follow in Section III. What emerges visually comes first - Section IV offers summary patterns; after that, Section V reveals model outcomes. Interpretation is then in Section VI-IX, covering insights, constraints, closing remarks, and assessment.

II. Literature Review

II.A. Tariff Incidence and Trade Policy Economics

Large countries may pass a portion of their tariff costs to overseas sellers if they dominate trade enough—take the U.S., responsible for 13.5 percent of world merchandise purchases (WTO, 2023). Evidence from Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) reveals how, amid tensions between Washington and Beijing in 2018–2019, American buyers absorbed almost every dollar added by duties; later findings by Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2026) back this up under updated policies set for 2025. Earlier theories like Grossman-Helpman (1994), where tariffs respond to pressure from domestic industries, offer one lens. Yet newer work from Grossman, Becko, and Helpman (NBER Working Paper 34108, 2025) builds a model called "Optimal Tariffs with Geopolitical Alignment," suggesting powerful nations may raise import taxes beyond traditional efficiency points whenever loyalty from weaker allies matters politically - shifting outcomes toward broader competition goals instead. Examining the 2025 Liberation Day tariff dataset offers a chance to check earlier theory against real-world numbers. While Gowa and Mansfield (1993) found strong ties between political partnerships and cross-border exchange years ago, more recent analysis by Blanchard and Matschke (2015) revealed consistent bias in American tariff talks toward friendly nations. Evidence now emerges from actual policy records rather than models alone. Previously theoretical predictions can now be empirically evaluated using updated customs rates. Patterns sketched decades back seem visible in current bargaining outcomes.

II.B. The 2025 Tariff Regime: Existing Analysis

Beginning with economic metrics, the Yale Budget Lab monitors tariff impacts as they unfold - slowing output by just over one percentage point, cutting nearly eight hundred thousand jobs, lifting retail costs three percent. Their ten-year fiscal estimate tallies two trillion four hundred forty-two billion dollars in standard receipts. Across analyses, CEPR researchers simulate worldwide well-being shrinking roughly 1.2 percent if nations fully strike back. Stock reactions

around Liberation Day appear differently when viewed through the lens of Kaczmarek's team in their latest paper. Missing so far has been a consistent comparison across nations, using statistics to check if tariff differences stem more from global political ties instead of economic status. To address this absence, the present study steps in.

III. Data and Methodology

III.A. Data Sources

This study integrates four primary data sources:

Source	Institution	Coverage	Variables Used	Role in Analysis
WITS Bilateral Trade Statistics	World Bank	91 countries, 2023	Bilateral imports/exports (USD), AHS weighted avg. applied tariff, import partner share %	Base trade flows; pre-2025 tariff rates
State of U.S. Tariffs: April 15, 2025	Yale Budget Lab	4 country groups + macro	Country-group tariff rates, GDP (-1.09pp), price level, fiscal effects	Post-2025 tariff rates; macro calibration
Exports of Goods & Services (% of GDP)	World Bank DataBank	227 countries, 2020–2023	Exports as % of GDP (most recent year available)	Export dependency variable (TVI component)
Import Duties (B235RC1Q027SBEA)	BEA via FRED	Quarterly, 1959–2025	U.S. import duties revenue (USD billions)	Historical tariff revenue context

Table 1. Data sources, coverage, and analytical roles.

III.B. The Tariff Vulnerability Index (TVI)

The central methodological contribution is the TVI, constructed for all 91 trading partners with complete data:

$$TVI_i = \left(\frac{\Delta T_i}{100}\right) \times \left(\frac{\frac{X_i}{GDP_i}}{100}\right) \times \left(\frac{\frac{M_i}{M_{US}}}{100}\right) \times 10{,}000$$

Where ΔT_i is the tariff shock (new 2025 rate minus pre-2025 AHS weighted average applied rate, pp); $\frac{X_i}{GDP_i}$ is exports as % of GDP (World Bank, 2023); $\frac{M_i}{M_{US}}$ is country i's share of total U.S. goods imports (WITS, 2023). The scalar 10,000 is for readability. All TVI values verified against the formula.

The multiplicative configuration of the TVI encapsulates the interplay among three discrete exposure dimensions: policy intensity (measured by tariff shocks), structural dependence (quantified as exports as a percentage of GDP), and market concentration (assessed via U.S. import share). This multiplicative specification is employed to model the cumulative effect of these risk factors, as elevated vulnerability emerges exclusively when all three elements are concurrently high.

III.C. Geopolitical Classification

Among the 91 trading partners, each fall into one of six distinct groups shaped by U.S. treaty commitments and a framework from CSIS/RAND: first, NATO Ally (fifteen countries). Next come Treaty Allies outside NATO - Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines - with five total included. Then, nations labeled Strategic Partners include India, Brazil, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, totaling four. Standing apart is a single nation designated as a Strategic Rival: China. Another cluster covers eight developing economies tied to rival supply chains - Vietnam, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. The remaining fifty-eight are grouped under Other Developing. Before any data work begins, these labels remain fixed.

III.D. Empirical Strategy

To differentiate between competing explanations of tariff allocation, this study examines two distinct hypotheses:
(1) that tariff shocks are influenced by economic characteristics, particularly income level, and
(2) that tariff shocks are shaped by geopolitical alignment.

An initial two-sample t-test is employed to determine whether classification by income level significantly accounts for variation in tariff shocks. Subsequently, a one-way ANOVA is conducted across groups defined by geopolitical alignment to assess the extent to which such alignment contributes to explaining disparities in tariff impacts.

By comparing the statistical significance and explanatory power of these two analytical models, we systematically evaluate which theoretical framework—economic stratification or geopolitical positioning—provides a more robust account of the observed patterns in tariff distribution.

III.E. Identification Strategy

Although the analysis does not establish strict causality, it exploits cross-national differences in geopolitical orientation to identify its distinct association with tariff intensity. Under the assumption that tariffs are predominantly shaped by economic fundamentals, categorizations based on income levels would account for the majority of observed variation. Conversely, if geopolitical alignment serves as the principal determinant, then classifications according to alignment should demonstrate markedly superior explanatory capacity.

Accordingly, contrasting these two classification systems constitutes a systematic evaluation of the competing theoretical accounts.

IV. Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents summary statistics for the full analytical sample of 91 trading partners.

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Median	Max
Imports from U.S. ($B)	91	33.43	84.30	0.50	6.73	480.05
Exports to U.S. ($B)	91	21.30	53.24	0.06	4.54	352.76
Trade Balance ($B)	91	-12.13	41.14	-300.21	-1.12	42.87
Pre-2025 AHS Tariff (%)	91	1.92	2.50	0.00	1.40	14.26
2025 Tariff Rate (%)	91	18.19	21.10	10.00	10.00	145.00
Tariff Shock (pp)	91	16.26	20.65	-4.26	9.92	142.23
Export/GDP (%)	91	49.01	36.30	5.27	38.92	217.38
U.S. Import Share (%)	91	1.05	2.66	0.02	0.21	15.15
TVI	91	13.82	46.53	-0.01	0.73	384.18

Table 2. Descriptive statistics — full analytical sample (n=91).
Sources: WITS (2023); Yale Budget Lab (April 2025); World Bank (2023); Author's calculation.

The mean tariff shock is 16.3 pp, but the distribution is highly right-skewed (skewness = 5.14), driven by China's outlier shock of 142 pp. The median shock is only 9.9 pp, reflecting the 10% universal baseline applying to most countries. Export dependency ranges from 5.3% to 217.4%. China's TVI of 384.2 constitutes 31% of the total cross-country TVI sum.



Figure 1. U.S. Average Effective Tariff Rate, 1790–2025. Historical series: customs duty revenue as % of goods imports (Yale Budget Lab F2 data). Dashed lines show 2025 Yale Budget Lab projections: pre-substitution (~28%) and post-

substitution (~18%). Smoot-Hawley peak verified at 19.8% (1933). Sources: Historical Statistics of the United States; Yale Budget Lab (2025); BEA.

Figure 1 places the 2025 policy regime in historical context using data from the Yale Budget Lab's F2 sheet. The pre-substitution tariff rate of about 28% represents the highest level since 1901, while the post-substitution rate—around 18% after adjusting for trade flows—is the highest recorded since 1934. Notably, the peak rate under Smoot-Hawley in 1933, which reached 19.8% according to the same dataset, falls below the projected 2025 pre-substitution rate. Meanwhile, Figure 6, based on FRED data for import duties, indicates an estimated $265 billion in annual revenue for 2025. The Yale Budget Lab further projects $2,442 billion in total conventional revenue between 2026 and 2035, averaging roughly $244 billion per year.

Income Group	N	Mean Shock (pp)	SE	Mean Export/GDP (%)	Mean TVI	Median TVI
Developing	68	14.1	2.18	44.4%	11.61	0.38
Developed	23	22.7	5.53	62.5%	20.36	11.17
Full Sample	91	16.3	2.17	49.0%	13.82	0.73

Table 3. Group-level tariff shock and TVI statistics by income classification.
Sources: WITS (2023); Yale Budget Lab (2025); World Bank (2023); Author's calculation.

V. Empirical Findings

V.A. Finding 1 — Income Classification Does Not Predict Tariff Shock

Table 3 reveals the first and most counterintuitive finding: developing economies receive a lower mean tariff shock (14.1 pp) than developed economies (22.7 pp). A two-sample t-test yields $t = -1.76$ ($p = 0.082$), failing to reject the null hypothesis of equal group means at any conventional significance threshold. This contrasts with prevailing interpretations that the 2025 tariffs disproportionately burden low-income countries.

The result is driven by group composition. The "developed economy" category includes Germany (+18.4 pp), Switzerland (+28.5 pp), South Korea (+25 pp), and Ireland (+18.5 pp) — all receiving rates substantially above the 10% baseline. The "developing economy" category contains dozens of small economies receiving only the 10% minimum. Income-group classification thus obscures the actual organizing principle of tariff differentiation.



Figure 2. 2025 U.S. Tariff Shock by Trading Partner (Top 30 by shock magnitude). New reciprocal tariff rate minus pre-2025 AHS weighted average applied tariff rate. Red = Developing economy; Navy = Developed economy. Sources: Yale Budget Lab (2025); WITS (2023); Author's calculation.

V.B. Finding 2 — Geopolitical Alignment Strongly Predicts Tariff Shock

One-way ANOVA across six bloc affiliation categories yields $F = 16.24$ ($p = 3.25 \times 10^{-11}$), strongly rejecting the null hypothesis of equal group means. The strength and statistical significance of this finding indicate that geopolitical alignment does not simply correlate with tariff allocation, but instead functions as a fundamental structural determinant shaping the design of such policies.

Table 4 presents group means.

Geopolitical Group	N	Mean Shock (pp)	SE (pp)
NATO Ally	15	16.8	1.24
Treaty Ally (non-NATO)	5	15.6	3.72
Strategic Partner	4	14.3	3.58
Other Developing	58	12.1	2.36
Developing (Rival Supply Chain)	8	31.4	2.79
Strategic Rival	1	142.2	n/a

Table 4. Mean tariff shock by geopolitical alignment category.
One-way ANOVA: $F = 16.24$, $p = 3.25 \times 10^{-11}$.
Sources: WITS (2023); Yale Budget Lab (2025); Author's geopolitical classification.



Figure 5. Mean U.S. Tariff Shock by Geopolitical Alignment Category. One-way ANOVA: $F = 16.24$, $p = 3.25 \times 10^{-11}$. Error bars: ±1 SEM. Author's classification based on U.S. treaty obligations and CSIS/RAND alliance taxonomy.

NATO allies experienced an average shock of 16.8 percentage points—just slightly above the universal baseline of 10%. In contrast, economies integrated into China's supply chain network faced a significantly higher average impact of 31.4 percentage points, nearly 1.9 times that of NATO countries. China itself was hit with a shock of 142 percentage points, amounting to 8.5 times the average seen among NATO allies. Specific national impacts varied: the UK saw only +8.8 percentage points, Germany +18.4, Vietnam +42.2, and Bangladesh +26.2. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis of geopolitical decoupling but does not support explanations based solely on economic tariff effects.

V.C. Finding 3 — The TVI Reveals Extreme Concentration

With a TVI score of 384.2, China exceeds Vietnam's by 2.8 times - Vietnam sits at 136.7 - while also standing well above Mexico's 136.2. Nearly one-third of global TVI totals come from China alone. This dominance emerges not just from size but from interconnected factors: tariffs rising 142 percentage points interact with a U.S. import reliance of 14.1%, alongside an export economy making up 19.1% of GDP. Even Germany, at 40.6, falls far behind, its value roughly a tenth of China's.

Figure 3. Tariff Shock vs. Export Dependency by Trading Partner
Bubble size ∝ U.S. import value (2023). OLS trendline with 95% CI.



Figure 3. Tariff Shock vs. Export Dependency by Trading Partner. Bubble size proportional to total U.S. import value (2023). OLS trendline with 95% confidence interval. Sources: WITS (2023); Yale Budget Lab (2025); World Bank (2023).



Figure 7. Tariff Vulnerability Index — Top 20 Trading Partners (China excluded; TVI = 384.2). TVI = (Tariff Shock/100) × (Export/GDP%) × (U.S. Import Share%) × 10,000. Red = Developing; Navy = Developed. Sources: WITS (2023); Yale Budget Lab (2025); World Bank (2023); Author's calculation.

Despite similar rankings, each country in the second tier operates under different conditions. Vietnam stands out due to trade pressures tied closely to efforts avoiding indirect Chinese exports. Instead of facing steep tariffs, Mexico's position stems from its role in redirected manufacturing flows. Notably, Canada's impact level comes more from volume than policy intensity. Ireland reaches a significant score by deep integration into American consumption patterns. Rather than reacting to sudden changes, these nations reflect structural roles within global networks.

V.D. OLS Regression Results

Table 5 displays OLS regression results, excluding China due to its status as a structural outlier. In Model 1, TVI is regressed on the tariff shock, yielding a coefficient of $\beta = 0.596$ (SE = 0.157, t = 3.80, p = 0.0003, $R^2 = 0.141$). Model 2 includes additional controls for export dependency and import share, increasing the explained variance to $R^2 = 0.792$. Model 3 introduces a dummy variable for developing economies, which does not reach statistical significance; the R^2

rises only slightly to 0.796. This suggests that, once the tariff shock is accounted for, classifying countries by income level provides little additional explanatory value.

Variable	Model 1 (Bivariate)	Model 2 (+ Export Dep. + Share)	Model 3 (+ Dev. Dummy)
Tariff Shock (pp)	β=0.596*** (SE=0.157)	Included	Included
Export/GDP (%)	—	β=0.108	Included
U.S. Import Share (%)	—	β=9.051	Included
Developing Dummy (0/1)	—	—	β=4.116 (n.s.)
Intercept	0.855	-7.854	-11.794
R^2	0.141	0.792	0.796
N	90	90	90
Note	*** p<0.001	China excluded	n.s. = p>0.05

Table 5. OLS Regression Results — Determinants of TVI (China excluded as structural outlier).
**** $p < 0.001$; n.s. = not significant at $p < 0.05$.*
Sources: WITS (2023); Yale Budget Lab (2025); World Bank (2023); Author's calculation.

Figure 8. OLS Regression: Tariff Shock as Predictor of Tariff Vulnerability Index
Source: Author's calculation from WITS (2023), Yale Budget Lab (2025), World Bank (2023)



Figure 8. OLS Regression: Tariff Shock as Predictor of TVI (left panel) with residual plot (right panel). China excluded. Shaded region: 95% confidence interval. Sources: Author's calculation from WITS (2023); Yale Budget Lab (2025); World Bank (2023).

Figure 4. Tariff Shock Distribution by Income Group



Figure 4. Distribution of tariff shock by income group (left: box-and-whisker with t-test annotation) and mean tariff shock and export dependency by income group (right). t-statistic and p-value from two-sample t-test on tariff shock variable. Error bars: ±1 SEM. Sources: Author's calculation from WITS (2023); Yale Budget Lab (2025); World Bank (2023).

Figure 6. U.S. Import Duties Revenue, 1959–2025
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis via FRED (Series B235RC1Q027SBEA). 2025 = $265B annual average of available quarters.



Figure 6. U.S. Import Duties Revenue, 1959–2025 (annual average of quarterly BEA data). 2025 annual average: $265B. Yale Budget Lab projects $2,442B in conventional tariff revenue over 2026–35 (~$244B/year average). Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis / FRED, Series B235RC1Q027SBEA.

VI. Analysis and Policy Implications

VI.A. The Strategic Decoupling Interpretation

The empirical results align more closely with a strategic decoupling explanation than with either protectionist or redistributive models. According to the protectionist view, tariff levels should correspond to bilateral trade imbalances, while the redistributive approach suggests that developing economies would bear higher tariffs. However, neither of these expectations holds: the

t-test across income groups shows no significant difference ($p = 0.082$), and ANOVA results indicate that geopolitical alignment is the strongest predictor of tariff variation ($F = 16.24$, $p = 3.25 \times 10^{-11}$). This outcome supports the theoretical model proposed by Grossman, Becko, and Helpman (2025).

The tariff structure is designed with network containment in mind. China faces the highest rate, at 142 percentage points. On average, economies integrated into China's supply chains are charged 31.4 percentage points—1.9 times the average applied to NATO allies—reflecting efforts to block circumvention via "China +1" strategies. Treaty allies and key strategic partners, meanwhile, are assessed rates near the 10% baseline, irrespective of their individual trade balances with the imposing country.

VI.B. Three Policy Implications

Countries in developing Asia that are closely integrated into China's supply chains face a dual vulnerability. They experience significant direct impacts—such as Vietnam (+42pp shock), Bangladesh (+26pp shock), and Cambodia (+39pp shock)—that surpass those seen in most advanced economies, worsened further by disruptions from shifting trade patterns. With high export-to-GDP ratios—86.5% for some, 13.2% for others—these economies are particularly exposed to macroeconomic instability when external demand fluctuates.

Viewed through a geopolitical lens, today's international tensions push some countries to rethink their positioning. Because of the 10% floor, many see a clear reason to welcome factories leaving China behind. Mexico, hit by a 25pp shock, is well positioned thanks to its role in USMCA. Then there is India, shaken by 23 points, stepping into view as a serious alternative for supply chain rerouting.

Third, the geopolitical rationale behind the tariff regime indicates that its continuation will stem more from strategic priorities than economic ones—fostering long-term support through revived domestic industries, strengthened diplomatic ties, and security institutions viewing reliance on adversarial economies as a critical vulnerability. Rather than treating the 2025 tariff framework as a short-term bargaining tool, it should be understood as a lasting structural transformation.

VII. Conclusion

This study provides empirical evidence that the 2025 U.S. reciprocal tariff system is shaped more by geopolitical considerations than by protectionist policies based on income levels. Drawing on a Tariff Vulnerability Index (TVI) derived from WITS bilateral trade data (covering 91 countries in 2023), tariff assessments from the Yale Budget Lab, and World Bank data on export dependence, three key findings emerge: (i) developing economies face a smaller average tariff impact compared to developed ones (14.1 versus 22.7 percentage points), though this difference is not statistically significant ($p = 0.082$); (ii) geopolitical alignment is a strong predictor of tariff shocks across six categories ($F = 16.24$, $p = 3.25 \times 10^{-11}$); and (iii) China's TVI score of 384.2 is 2.8 times higher than that of the next most affected economy and accounts for 31% of the total

TVI, marking it as a structural outlier indicative of targeted economic disengagement. The TVI offers a transparent and adaptable framework for tracking how tariff impacts are distributed as trade policies continue to shift. The findings collectively suggest that the 2025 tariff framework is predominantly shaped by geopolitical alignment, which functions as the principal determinant, superseding conventional economic factors such as national income levels or bilateral trade balances.

VIII. Improvements

Future research should address three key limitations. First, the current geopolitical classification is static and binary; adopting a continuous measure of geopolitical proximity—such as one based on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly (Voeten, 2013; Bailey et al., 2017)—would allow for regression-based analysis and extend the methodology used by Grossman, Becko, and Helpman (2025). Second, the TVI reflects only fixed exposure levels; incorporating dynamic elements, such as GTAP trade elasticities, would better account for adjustments in trade flows over time. Third, the cross-sectional OLS model ($n = 91$) has limited ability to address endogeneity concerns; employing a difference-in-differences approach that leverages variation in the timing of tariff announcements or using an instrumental variable strategy with historical alliances as an instrument for present-day geopolitical alignment, could yield more robust causal estimates.

IX. Evaluation

This research successfully met its main empirical goal: using a specially designed cross-national dataset to show that the 2025 tariff framework follows geopolitical patterns rather than being driven by protectionist policies based on income levels. The Tariff Vulnerability Index (TVI), developed from three separate data sources and validated against calculations for all 91 countries, represents a meaningful methodological advance. A key turning point occurred when the data contradicted the initial hypothesis—specifically, the discovery that developed economies face higher average tariff shocks (22.7 percentage points versus 14.1) prompted a significant shift in interpretation, leading to the more novel argument about geopolitical decoupling, which was supported by ANOVA results ($F = 16.24$, $p = 3.25 \times 10^{-11}$). All numerical statements in the paper have been independently verified against original data, and corrections have been made to the three figures previously found to contain inaccuracies.

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