

Parallelism with Dual Subjectivity in Self-Awareness

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Abstract

The division or distinction between I: the self and You: other than the self is a conventional dichotomy. The self-other dichotomy has long been the basis of self-awareness and cogito. In cogito, the self-other dichotomy is evident in a limited sense only to refer to self-consciousness. It is likely that the dual division of self and others is accompanied by dichotomous bifurcation. However, this dichotomy is not compatible with the interaction/ relationship between the self and others. Intersubjective identification of the relationship between self and others inevitably entails the weight of correlation and interdependence higher than the duality of self and others. Self-awareness with embedded involvement of others transcends dichotomy, suggesting the possibility that does not necessarily come to self-other bifurcation.

This paper aims to address self-awareness incorporating self and internalized others as relational entities. The other, which is obtained through the independent evaluation of the relationship and interaction between the self and the other, is the subjectively attained other, we call the recognized other (Other), by the active action of the self. In self-awareness, the ego's "I" and the Other are two simultaneous subjects that function as dual subjectivity. They exchange subjectivity with each other and work parallelly in the appearance of the object "I". The other is not only perceived as an object, but is also involved as a subject in self-awareness through the functioning of the internalized other as the recognized other.

Keywords: self-other dichotomy, self-awareness, other

Self-awareness of cogito states that self-existence is innate and does not extend to others. The consciousness of the other extends beyond the realm of cogito from "where the self is" to "where he is" with other individuals. In cogito, the subject is limited to self-consciousness, however, in the area that extends to others, it targets the existence of the self-subject as an objectified self with others involved and focuses on the relationship with others. In understanding the relationship between self and others, the weight of correlation and interdependence is higher than the duality of self and others, and the identity of "relational self" (Herring, 2019, p.12) is formed.

In cogito's self-awareness, the self is identified by excluding others, and it is likely that the dual division of self and others is accompanied by dichotomous bifurcation.

The self as a subject (subject of experience) and as an object (object of experience) are objective and socially self-conscious, respectively from the perspective of others. Self-awareness that includes the involvement of others goes beyond dichotomy, suggesting the possibility that does not necessarily come to self-other bifurcation.

This study discusses a type of self-awareness that inevitably involves other individuals. It aims at introducing the concept of the recognized other (Other) as the internalized other, and clarifying that the Other functions as another subject in addition to the subject "I". Thereafter, while structurally maintaining the dichotomy, self-awareness, in which others and ego, both function as dual subjectivity exchanging subjects with each other, will be described in adequate detail. The gist of it is to reveal that others are involved in self-awareness subjectively rather than objectively.

The discussion starts from cogito, as the premise of this paper, with the intention of briefly exploring the relationship between oneself and others that entail involvement with self-awareness. Thereafter, referring to the papers of Mead and Rogers, based on the theory of self-formation through social experiences such as the relationship and interaction between the other and the self, simultaneous generation of the other as an extension of it will be clarified to introduce the concept of the recognized other (Other). The last section delves into a discussion of self-awareness, in which both "I" and the recognized other (Other) function as parallels of dual subjects.

Involvement of Others in Self-Awareness

Self-awareness of cogito is self-contained and does not mention the existence of or relationship with others. In solipsism, self-awareness is adequate as long as one is convinced of only one's spirit and stays in cogito and others do not exist in their consciousness. Others are placed out of consciousness with the dualism of consciousness and unconsciousness, and the self and others are divided into a bifurcated situation.

However, even if one's existence is independent of nothing, others are indispensable in the world, including the subject of cogito, and thus, self-awareness should be valid not only in cogito, but also in consciousness that includes others. The conscious space, including the ego and others, is not continuously derived from cogito, but is an unconnected space that does not intersect with the cogito and exceeds the targeted range.

Husserl defines the ego that is obtained by objectifying oneself based on the experience of others and the world beyond the self-awareness of the cogito as “transcendental Ego” (Husserl, 2013, p.26). The relationship between the self and the other, which is formed when the self and the other recognize each other as the subject, is empathic and is derived from inter-subjective experience. “Stated more precisely: If (as is in fact the case) there are transcendently constituted in me, transcendental ego, not only other egos but also(as constituted in turn by the transcendental intersubjectivity accruing to me thanks to the constitution in me of others) an objective world common to us all, then everything said up to now is true, not alone in the case of my de facto ego and in the case of this de facto intersubjectivity and world, which receive sense and existence-status in my subjectivity” (Husserl,2013, p.84).

The objective recognition of the ego and the world by the subject is premised on the spread of consciousness from "where the self is" to "where he is" with others. Consequently, transcendental ego is configured transcendently and transcendental intersubjectivity are posited.

The process by which an infant's consciousness gradually incorporates relationships with others shows the universality of the involvement of others in self-awareness of an individual. Stern argued that infant psychology develops through multiple coexisting areas. Two months after birth, an empirical sense of the core self develops based on interpersonal capacity. Through the interpersonal experience to operate in the domain of core-relatedness, an infant

recognizes that the mother and his/her own self are physically separate, establishing a subjective view of the self and others. Between 7th and 9th months, a second subjectivity develops that is aware of the existence of the minds of others. Others are no longer just physical beings, but qualitative beings that include subjective mental states, emotions, motives, and intentions, and the invisible but inferable mental states of others become the main element of relationships with others. The sense of a subjective self entails the possibility of intersubjectivity between the infant and parent and operates in “the domain of intersubjective relatedness” (Stern, 1985, p.27).

In the context of Nishida's “pure experience” (Nishida, 1992, p.3), the sense of fusion with a mother of a toddler is “a present consciousness of facts just as they are” (Nishida, 1992, p.4); however, gradually, the recognition of the existence of others obtained by distinguishing oneself from others is the beginning of the establishment of the ego and the subject-object dichotomy. It is noted that as infants grow up, they do not shift from a sense of integrated unity to the subject-object dichotomy. Stern states: rather than one domain [claiming] a preponderance and privileged status, all domains are constantly applied and remain active during the growth process and development.

Each domain is a precursor of the preceding domain, but it is a coexisting domain rather than a phase or stage that emerges from it as a result of growth, and a “distinct form of experiencing social life and self” (Stern, 1985, p.32). Domains, where a sense of fusion and subject-object dichotomy appear, are distinct from each other and “remain intact through life” (Stern, 1985, p.34). Such domains are equally accessible to all occasions, and are rooted in consciousness. In the intersubjective relationship of guesswork, resonance or refutation, the co-subjectivity of entrainment and synchronization transcends the self-other dichotomy, but the domain of intersubjective relatedness and the domain of core-relatedness coexists next to each other simultaneously.

In common with each domain, the other is involved with two aspects of the self, “I” and “Me” (James, 1890, p.371). That is, “I”: subject of experience (self as subject) is involved with others as an active subject of the doer / knower who perceives, executes, thinks, and remembers, and “Me”: object of experience (self as object) is perceived as a known object with physical, social, emotional, and intellectual attributes through evaluating the interaction with others. Self-

awareness in cogito is innate and inherent; however, James, in his study, points out the “empirical Me” (James, 1890, p296), the consciousness of others that infants acquire during their growth process or “Me,” which is conscious as an object of social experience by interacting with others, is an acquired self-awareness. Mead (1925) and Rogers (1989), among others, in their theories, stated that the object “Me” is obtained by social experience and learning. They also state that the existence of oneself depends on the relationship with others, and the self itself is socially formed as the object “Me.”

The Self as a Social Object

Self is formed by the social experience

An individual recognizes his/her own self especially in the relationship with others, while confirming the sociality shared with others. Mead states: “selves exist only in relation to others, as the organism as a physical object exists only in its relation to other physical objects” (Mead, 1925, p.262). In other words, there is no self that is naturally independent and isolated free from others. Based on the perspective of others learned through the experience of interacting with others, the self is formed by the recognition of social norms and collective consciousness shared by multiple others and the society.

Social existence precedes the existence of an individual, and the self consists of the “I” as the subject of the action that works on others, and the “me,” socially generated as an object of experience through interaction with others. Kierkegaard states that “to choose to be another than himself” (Rogers, 1989, p.110) is nothing more than a despair. That is, the true self of an individual cannot be imposed by others as “the goal for you” (Rogers, 1989, p.123), but is found through experience. Rather than being directed by others or aiming for goals one sets for oneself “as a result of interaction with the environment, and particularly as a result of evaluational interaction with others, the structure of the self is formed” (Rogers, 1951, p.498). Others’ expectations for the self are invoked as “the generalized other” (Mead, 1962, p.154), and social norms are conceptualized as codes of conduct that organize groups like the rules of games and give control to individuals. One’s sociality is shared by the community and society and is universal in nature as it disregards individual or specific circumstances. By interacting

with others, the self is formed, by ensuring eligibility as an accepted member of society.

Formation of the recognized other

Social experience provides recognition of the self that exists in relation to others. Others generate the concept of self within an individual. Simultaneously, the self recognizes others within its own individual self through interactions with others, along with it creating others. Subjective impressions and feelings toward others in interpersonal encounters are independent functions of ego. Through encounters with multiple others, the images of others are superimposed, and dramatic aspects and concreteness are diminished and multiple others are superimposed. Commonalities are far more emphasized than the differences and peculiarities, leaving an impression, which leads to the subjective generation of an abstract image of others. The image of others is an object to the self, and simultaneously, the subjective other, generated in the context of inferring how the self is viewed from the other, and the subject to objectify one's own self. Based on the reactions of others who are positive or negative to their own words and actions, the image of others is generated within the self through the subjective evaluation of the relationship and interaction between the other and the self. Not only is the self generated by the other, but the other is also generated by the self; therefore, it can be said that the self and the other are mutually generated. It is referred as "mutual generation" (Davis, 1872, p.355). The other generated from such independent actions and cognition by subjective evaluation will be called the recognized other (Other).

The recognized other is abstract, but subjective products that retain the remnants of the subjective traits and peculiarities of others, are self-specific and personal. While social self is generated in a way that meets the expectations of "generalized others" as sociality, the recognized other is generated inside the self as an abstract image of others subjectively understood through self's active involvement.

The subjective otherness of the recognized other

The recognized other is different from "absolute otherness" (Briaçon, 2019, p.42), such as "the absolutely other" (Levinas, 1996, p. 12) in their relationship with the self. Absolute others appear independent of self-consciousness, not by the self's active action or

subjectivity. That is, it is premised on the passive attitude of oneself and is irrelevant to the active action of the subject that generates recognized others. According to Levinas, the other is something that cannot be taken into the self, which is beyond the subjectivity and that which is incompatible with the self and cannot be identified: “It is other with an alterity constitutive of the very content of the other” (Levinas, 1979, p.39).

Absolute others are self-independent, absolute, and extrinsic, regardless of self, while the recognized other is subjective, self-dependent, relative, and inherent in one's consciousness, not deviating from the self's territory or scope. The recognized other is subjectively corrected and modified due to the interaction between the self and others, so it is subordinate to the self and has no independence from the self, like the absolute other. The recognized other is always based on one's own thoughts.

The recognized other in self-awareness

Mead states: “the self can not appear in consciousness as an ‘I,’ that it is always an object, *i.e.*, a ‘me,’” (Mead, 1913, p.374). The recognized other is generated by subjective imagination and reasoning about others and is different from real others.

In reading Mead, “I” works as “I” → “me” against the background of social experience, along with the appearance the object “me” appears. The consciousness that others turn to self is directed to the object, “me,” as expressions such as words, gestures, tone of voice, and gaze.

One's own habits and mental tendencies of criticism, rejection, approval, and acceptance subjectively modify the perspective of others to see the self, creating a collective image as the recognized other internalized in the self. The intentions and feelings of others associated with the actions of others “he / she” → “me” are imagined or interpreted by one's own guess and judgment, and are recognized subjectively as “other” → “me.” Thereafter, another subject, “I,” who considers subjective other as oneself becomes involved, with the appearance of “me” in the consciousness. The recognized other is generally abstracted and conceptualized through superimposition, integration of multiple personalities into a single personality, and the dilution of concrete and dramatic elements.

Apart from the other in reality, the recognized other (Other) is involved, and the self appears as an object “me.” Transformed is “he / she” from specific others to unspecified or from real

others to personally and subjectively perceived others, due to the increased number and the expansion of the range of interactions with “I.” Mead’s “generalized other” is exogenous, independent of self, and outside of self’s arbitrary interpretation, whereas the recognized other is self-dependent and endogenous.

The effects of the recognized other

The recognized other, recognized as a subjectively perceived other, observes the spectrum of strengths and weaknesses of the degree of subjectivity. Kimura argues that schizophrenia is the result of an imbalance between the noetic self and the noematic self: “One could say that a subjective self here accompanies another self no less subjective and observes it constantly ‘from behind.’ There is no objective, noematic self involved here; a sole noetic self splits into the simultaneous moments, which alternatively occupy the places of seeing and seen, and which nonetheless remain subjective-noetic” (Kimura, 1992, p.118).

It is extremely interesting to note that “There is no objective, noematic self-involved.” In James’s terminology, the patient experiences the subject “I” as the seeing self and the seen self simultaneously, without being conscious of making himself the object “me”. Even if the subject “I” exists as “the judging thought” (James, 1890, p.371), the object “me” as “the empirical person” (James, 1890, p.371) who is conscious of others’ viewpoint, or the recognized others does not appear. The patient is unable to integrate the subject “I” with the empirical object “me” of self-sensation, and the subject of the noetic self is split into the side of the seer and of the seen. The subject of patient splits into two parts: one is the self and the other, which is “rather alterity or otherness (das Andere), that appears as another self in self-consciousness of the patient” (Kimura 1992, p.127).

The dual subjectivity of self and other self corresponds to the simultaneous alternation of the subject in parallel subjectivity (described later), in which the subject “I” and the recognized other exchange subjectivity simultaneously. In the case of the patient, the noetic self, splits into a simultaneous dual subject without the involvement of the noematic self. Under normal conditions, the subject “I” and the object “me” are integrated as the self by action and in introspection. In the consciousness of the object “me” of the noematic self, the subject “I” exchanges the subjectivity simultaneously with the recognized others as another subject, “I.”

Mead states that the self not only accepts the self “me” as an object passively, but also makes subjective modifications to the other's view of the self, resulting in another “me” in introspection. He also states that “the action with reference to the others calls out responses in the individual himself – there is then another “me” criticizing approving, and suggesting, and consciously planning, i.e., the self” (Mead, 1913, p.376). The socially accepted “me” is neither interfered with nor remains statically immutable, but is modified by self’s critical or positive opinions, subjective intentions and wills, generating the recognized other. Thus, another “me” appears, with the recognized other as the subject “I.”

As “Bad Faith” (Sartre, 1992, p.86), Sartre cites the following case: The customer believes that the “waiter in the café” (Sartre, 1992, p.101) is neither more than nor less a waiter, and the waiter acts in the manner that the customer takes for granted of him as a waiter. He is conscious of his inherently free self, which differs from the conventional waiter. However, professional awareness of waiter himself as a waiter gives up what he must do, trying to become something other than his true self, as if he were neither more than nor less than a waiter. The recognized other of the waiter is almost without his subjectivity, and he also believes in the waiter image “me,” which is taken for granted by the customer. Sartre states of bad faith: “The true problem of bad faith stems evidently from the fact that bad faith is faith. It can not be either a cynical lie or certainty if certainty is the intuitive possession of the object. But if we take belief as meaning the adherence of being to its object when the object is not given or is given indistinctly, then bad faith is belief; and the essential problem of bad faith is a problem of bad faith is a problem of belief” (Sartre, 1992, p.112). In other words, the problem of bad faith is that the self believes in the customer's view of “me” from the perspective of others without confirmation.

The waiter might have been able to retain his self-image if he had not attached his identity with the customer. The customer sees the waiter only as a waiter, and the waiter also accepts the customer's view of the self as it is; the recognized other includes no subjectivity. As a result, the object “me” appears by considering recognized others as the subject “I.”


Parallelism in Self-Awareness

The “internal other” (Wallon, 1984, p.103) is an internalized other within the self. The internal

other is “he / she,” who is directly involved and self “me” appears. Contrarily, in the recognized other, “he / she” is indirectly involved through the self’s subjective understanding, analyzing, guessing, and imagining “his/her” actions with recognition of “his/her” gestures, tones, and words, and the self appears as an object “me.” According to Wallon, the “internal other” is “the essential stranger, the other” (Wallon, 1984, p.100) who have nothing in common with his identity, and “the distinction within themselves between his ego and its indispensable complement” (Wallon, 1984 p.100) exists.

The “internal other” has nothing in common with the ego, but by complementing the ego, it becomes a complete self for the first time. He emphasized that the relationship between the “internal other” and the ego is not “a mechanical carbon copy of the subject's habitual relation with real persons” (Wallon, 1984, p.100), but that relationship is important. Furthermore, “the relations between the ego and its indispensable complement—the internal other (*autre intime*) — can be used to explain or identify basic states or complexes of consciousness” (Wallon, 1984, p.103). The “internal other” is “always paired with the ego to express the duality of one's mentality” (Hamada, 1983, pp. 32-39). The “internal other” is the “ego's constant partner” (Wallon, 1984, p.100), who is within the self and responds to the ego's actions and returns the reactions to the ego. The dual relationship in which the subject alternates due to the intersection of the ego and the “internal other” is “mental duality” (Wallon, 1984, p.101), which is an important aspect of the consciousness structure.

The relationship between the ego and the “inner others” is extremely suggestive. Following Wallon, the relationship between the ego and the recognized other can be extended as follows: “Me” appears with “I” as the subject. The recognized other (Other) is another subjective subject that is different from the real other. Simultaneously as being others, the object “me” of known self or experienced self appears, acting as the subject “I” of the knower or experiencing self, based on subjective thoughts. As Mead says “a ‘me’ is inconceivable without an ‘I.’” (Mead, 1913, p.374), in two parallels, if there is no “I,” there is no “me” and at the same time without the recognized other (Other) there is no ‘me.’ In self-awareness, the ego of the ‘I’ is at the center, and simultaneously, the recognized other (Other) is at another center, and the parallelism of subjectivity is an extensional aspect of self-awareness.



The “I” of the ego and the recognized other “I” are not independent of each other, but are two simultaneous subjects that exchange their functions as subjects, and are related with each other as dual subjectivity, working parallelly in the appearance of “me.” The intensional meaning of self-awareness is the dichotomy between the self and the other, and at the same time, the relationship between the self and the recognized other. That is, the subject-object dichotomy of “I”: experiencing self and “me”: experienced self, and the self-other dichotomy of “I” of self and the recognized other (Other) are the structural relationships between the subject and the object in self-awareness, and the parallelism of “I” → “me” and “the recognized other (Other)” → “me” is a function of self-recognition and a way of how consciousness works.

Through the duality of the role-exchanged subject, in which the ego “I” as experiencing self and the recognized other alternately exchange the subject, with the object as the experienced self “me” appearing, the other engages in self-awareness.

It is a way for others to enter into the consciousness from the “outside” of self to the “inside” through a relationship different from the one between the ego and the actual other. It shows self-other unity as the overlap between the self and the other in the function of self-awareness.

Conclusion

In a consciousness that is discontinuous with cogito, others are involved whenever there is self-awareness. Self “me” appears as a social object by social self, relationships with others, and interdependence. The self is created by interaction with others, with a simultaneous creation of other. The other, which is obtained through the independent evaluation of the relationship and interaction between the self and the other, is the subjectively attained other, we call the recognized other (Other), by the active action of the self. In consciousness, the subject appears

as an object, “me,” and simultaneously, a self-consciousness “me” appears for another subject, the recognized other. The two subjects in the appearance of the two ways of self-consciousness “me” are exchanged in their role and are functioning as dual subjects. In self-awareness, the parallelism of the subjects, ego, and recognized other is a semantic extension of the self-awareness concept, and the center of consciousness is the recognized other as well as the ego. In this paper, we considered and explored the process of inclusion and involvement of others in self-awareness, starting with cogito. It has been clarified that the other is not only perceived as an object, but is also involved as a subject in self-awareness through the functioning of the internalized other as the recognized other.

A further detailed discussion on the subject of this paper is required to adequately grasp what the dual subjectivity is comprehensively and thoroughly meaning.

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