Education Battlefield Management System Policy in Education and Training the Ministry of Defense of the Republic Indonesia Collaborated with the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic Indonesia

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Abstract

The rapid progress in the field of Information Technology is also followed by its application in the military field. In this field, computers have been widely used in various ways to support existing activities, such as storing important data, satellite imagery, making digital maps, data processing and others. Education policy battlefield management system policy in education and training the ministry of defense of the republic Indonesia collaborated with the ministry of education and culture of the republic Indonesia in the process of integration between technologies able to provide a good solution so that the battle has enormous benefits for battle management training in the form of simulation or real. This study uses a qualitative method.

This research aims to develop a system that is designed and implemented in order to fulfill all the information needs required by the battle commander of the Indonesian National Army in managing a troop in certain combat situations. The existence of a decision support system or Decision Support System (DSS), was developed using the AHP method to assist commanders in making decisions between attacking, defending, delaying attacks, and withdrawing. The system requirements analysis was carried out by brainstorming with the military about what kind of Battlefield Management System (BMS) education would be designed, because prior to the development of the BMS system, the Republic of Indonesia national army already had its own battle simulation tool. Testing is done by observing several non-military people who act as simulation and testing tools for system functionality. The results of the system design can be used as a medium for the implementation of a BMS in the form of a battle simulation. the aim of the national army is to protect the entire nation and all the blood of Indonesia, promote public welfare, educate the nation's life, and participate in implementing world order based on independence, eternal peace and social justice. This
condition requires special handling in order to create joyful learning activities. One form of special handling that is the focus of research and which will be discussed in this paper is learning activities that utilize electronic media.

This research aims to expand access to quality education for just and inclusive students. Strengthening the quality and relevance of education that is centered on the development of students. Development of the potential of students with character. Preservation and promotion of culture, language and literature as well as their mainstreaming in education, and Strengthening educational and cultural governance systems that are participatory, transparent and accountable.

**Keywords**: Policy, Education, Battlefield management system, Decision Support System, and digital maps.

1. **Introduction**
   To improve mastery of technology for lecturers, Education policy battlefield management system policy in learning, namely the use of multimedia as a learning resource in order to get up to date and quality teaching materials, with the aim of providing KEMHAN employees who have skills in the use of multimedia as content. already have the knowledge and skills to produce more creative and innovative teaching materials in developing e-learning content so that they can optimize the use that has been built at the Badiklat Kemhan, further Kabadiklat Kemhan hopes that employees will immediately implement the knowledge that has been obtained in this Guidance to the maximum.

2. **Theories**
   **A. Policy**
   To do something “as a matter of policy” is to do it as a general rule. That is the distinction between “policy” and “administration” (Wilson 1887), between “legislating” (p. 900) policy and “executing” it (Locke 1690, ch. 12). Policy-makers of the most ambitious sort aspire to “make policy” in that general rule-setting way, envisioning administrators applying those general rules to particular cases in a minimally discretionary fashion (Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989). That and cognate aspirations toward taut control from the center combine to constitute a central trope of political high modernism.

   One aspect of that is the aspiration, or rather illusion, of total central control. All the great management tools of the last century were marshaled in support of that project: linear programming, operations research, cost–benefit analysis, management-by-objects, case-controlled random experiments, and so on (Rivlin 1971; Self 1975; Stokey and Zeckhauser 1978).

   One non-negligible problem with models of central control is that there is never any single, stable central authority that can be in complete control. For would-be totalitarians that
is a sad fact; for democratic pluralists it is something to celebrate. But whatever one’s attitude toward the fact, it remains a hard fact of political life that the notional “center” is always actually occupied by many competing authorities. A Congressional Budget Office will always spring up to challenge the monolithic power of an Executive Branch General Accounting Office, just as double sets of books will always be kept in all the line departments of the most tightly planned economy.

In any case, total central control is always a fraud or a fiction. In the terms of the old Soviet joke, “They pretend to set quotas, and we pretend to meet them.” The illusion of planning was preserved even when producers wildly exceeded their targets, which surely must, in truth, have indicated a failure of planning, just as much as missing their targets in the other direction would have been (Wildavsky 1973). Every bureaucrat, whether on the street or in some branch office, knows well the important gap between “what they think we’re doing, back in central office” and “what actually happens around here.” And any new recruit incapable of mastering that distinction quickly will not be long for that bureau’s world—just as any landless peasant who supposes that some entitlement will be enforced merely because it is written down somewhere in a statute book will soon be sadly disappointed (Galanter 1974).

One solution is of course to abandon central planning altogether and marke-terize everything (Self 1993). The “shock treatment” to which the formerly planned economies of Central Europe were subjected at the end of the cold war often seemed to amount to something like that (Sacks 1995; World Bank 1996). But as we have seen above, even the more moderate ambitions of privatization and creating managed markets in the established capitalist democracies, led to anything but a more decentralized world: They created their own powerful incentives to monitor and control.

More modestly, there are new modes of more decentralized planning and control that are more sensitive to those realities. “Indicative planning” loosens up the planning process: Instead of setting taut and unchanging targets, it merely points in certain desired directions and recalibrates future targets in light of what past practice has shown to be realistic aspirations (Meade 1970).

More generally, policy-makers can rely more heavily on “loose” laws and regulations. Instead of tightly specifying exact performance requirements (in ways that are bound to leave some things unspecified), the laws and regulations can be written in more general and vaguely aspirational terms (Goodin 1982, 59–72). Hard-headed political realists might think the latter pure folly, trusting too much to people’s goodwill (or alternatively, putting too much power in the hands of administrators charged with interpreting and applying loose laws and regulations). But it has been shown that, for example, nursing homes achieve higher levels of performance in countries regulating them in that “looser” way than in countries that try to write the regulations in a more detailed way (Braithwaite et al. 1993).

Another aspect of “political high modernism” is the illusion of instrumental rationality completely governing the policy process. That is the illusion that policymakers begin with a full set of ends (values, goals) that are to be pursued, full information about the means
available for pursuing them, and full information about the constraints (material, social, and political resources) available for pursuing them.

The failure of instrumental reason in the “full information” domain is unsurprising. Its failure in the other two domains is perhaps more so. Policy-makers can never be sure exactly what resources are, or will be, available for pursuing any set of aims. It is not only Soviet-style planners who faced “soft budget constraints” (Kornai, Maskin, and Roland 1993). So do policy-makers worldwide. In the literal sense of financial budgets, they often do not know how much they have to spend or how much they are actually committing themselves to spending. Legislating an “entitlement” program is to write a blank check, giving rise to spending that is “uncontrollable” (p. 902) (Derthick 1975)—uncontrollable, anyway, without a subsequent change in the legislation, for which political resources might be lacking, given the political interests coalesced around entitlements thus created (Pierson 1994). In a more diffuse sense of social support, policy-makers again often do not know how much they have or need for any given policy. Sometimes they manage to garner more support for programs once under way than could ever have been imagined, initially; and conversely, programs that began with vast public support sometimes lose it precipitously and unpredictably. In short: perfect means–ends fitters, in “high modernist” mode, would maximize goal satisfaction within the constraints of the resources available to them; but public policy-makers, in practice, often do not have much of a clue what resources really will ultimately be available.

Policy-makers also often do not have a clear sense of the full range of instruments available to them. Policies are intentions, the product of creative human imagination. Policy-making can proceed in a more or less inventive way: by deliberately engaging in brainstorming and free association, rather than just rummaging around to see what “solutions looking for problems” are lying at the bottom of the existing “garbage can” of the policy universe (Olsen 1972a; March 1976; March and Olsen 1976). But creative though they may be, policy-makers will always inevitably fail the high modernist ambition to some greater or lesser degree because of their inevitably limited knowledge of all the possible means by which goals might be pursued in policy.

Perhaps most surprising of all, policy-makers fail the “high modernist” ambition of perfect instrumental rationality in not even having any clear, settled idea what all the ends (values, goals) of policy are. Much is inevitably part of the taken-for-granted background in all intentional action. It might never occur to us to specify that we value some outcome that we always enjoyed until some new policy intervention suddenly threatens it: wilderness and species diversity, or the climate, or stable families, or whatever. We often do not know what we want until we see what we get, not because our preferences are irrationally adaptive (or perhaps counter-adaptive) but merely because our capacities to imagine and catalogue all good things are themselves strictly limited (March 1976).

The limits to instrumental rationality strengthen the case made in this chapter for policy studies as a persuasive vocation, for they strengthen the case that policy is best made, and developed, as a kind of journey of self-discovery, in which we have experientially to learn what we actually want. And what we learn to want is in part a product of what we already have and know—which is to say, is in part a product of what policy has been hitherto.
Recognizing the limits to instrumental rationality also strengthens the case for a self-conscious eclecticism in choice of the “tools of government” (Hood 1983; Salamon 2002). These “tools” are social technologies and thus their use and effectiveness are highly contingent on the setting in which they are employed. That setting is also in part a product of what has gone before. In other words, policy legacies are a key factor in policy choice—and to these we now turn.

**Education Battlefield Management System.**

Law No. 20 of 2003 concerning the National Education System (Sisdiknas) which states that the state realizes the right of the people to get quality and free 9 (nine) years of basic education by supporting efforts to develop alternative education, especially for areas affected by disasters, remote areas, as well as for groups with special needs (Depdiknas, 2003).

According to (Carl W. Lickteig, 1988), the Battlefield Management System (BMS) is a system intended to integrate information obtained and then processed so that it can be used to improve command control capabilities of military units. A system consisting of many subsystems is expected to be able to obtain various information which can then become supporting data.

Computers have the ability to run processes at very high speeds, namely in processing including image rendering, location detection, data transferring, etc. to executing several program commands. The advantage of this war simulation is that it can be tried to apply several war theories and strategies without having to have real enemies. Besides being able to function as a battle simulator, the computer is used as a medium for the commander to control troops, one concrete example that can be applied is to see the real troop movements via a computer, then convey the flow of command through a tool owned by each soldier or battalion commander in the field. A function like this is what the system can then call a Battlefield Management System (BMS). Basically, the BMS is a system that can integrate information obtained by the commander, then processed until it becomes an order given to troops in the field. All forms of events or activities that exist must be visible on the BMS, such as intelligent data, a map of the location around the battle, the number of troops remaining, whoever dies, and the detection of enemy troop positions. Unlike the BMS, the simulator is only a simulation. Data can also be made in such a way that it can be adjusted according to the needs of the battle simulation to be carried out. The purpose of this research is to design a (BMS) that can facilitate the commander of the battle in giving orders to his troops, as well as to develop and test a system prototype based on the design that has been developed. BMS is a system designed to meet all the needs required by the commander to organize an army in certain combat situations to achieve an expected goal. The problem faced in this study is how to design and implement a BMS so that the war commander can organize a strategy in a battle. The research methodology is carried out in several stages, namely: - brainstorming the military regarding BMS in the form of war simulators that are commonly used, - make BMS designs that have been adapted to the needs of the military, - modify and make several subsystems of the existing battle engine, namely the GLEST Engine, - test BMS functionality.
According to (Efrain Turban, 2001) the decision is, a process of choosing among alternative courses of action for the purpose of attaining a goal or goals. Decision is a process of selecting several alternative actions for the sake of achieving a goal. According to (Kadarsah Suryadi, 2000), the decision making process model formulated by Simon is as follows. a. Intelligence, this stage is the process of tracing and checking the scope of the problem as well as the process of identifying problems. b. Design, this stage is the process of finding, developing, and analyzing alternative actions that can be taken. c. Choice, at this stage the process of selecting among various alternative actions that may be carried out is carried out. d. Implementation, at this stage, problem solving is carried out according to the choice at the choice stage. Decision Support System (DSS) is a methodology to support decision making. DSS uses a computer-based information system (Computer Based Information System) that is interactive, flexible, adaptable, and specially built to support semi-structured management problem solving. The main components of a DSS can be seen in the following figure.

Figure 1. DSS Architecture and Components

SWOT Analysis is a structured planning method used to evaluate Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, and Threats. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is usually used to make multi-criteria decisions according to (Saaty, T. L. 1980) AHP calculation is done by comparing all factors using eigenvalues calculation. The purpose of using AHP within the framework of SWOT analysis has been applied in several areas, one of which is in the military sector (Kandakoglu et al., 2007) Can systematically evaluate SWOT factors and equalize the intensity of each of these factors. The stages of the SWOT-AHP calculation that will be used in the DSS in this BMS are as follows.

1. Situational Assessment (SWOT Analysis), defining the four SWOT elements based on brainstorming with the Ministry of Defense as follows.

Table 1. Criteria of Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Criteria of Strength</th>
<th>Weight (1 to 9)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Strong intelelgent information</td>
<td>S1</td>
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Table 2. Criteria of Weakness

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<th>No</th>
<th>Criteria of Weakness</th>
<th>Weight (1 to 9)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Intelligent information is not accurate</td>
<td>W1 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The number of troops was insufficient and not according to doctrine</td>
<td>W2 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Not mastering strategy</td>
<td>W3 5</td>
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Table 3. Criteria of Opportunity

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<th>Criteria of Opportunity</th>
<th>Weight (1 to 9)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Support from the community</td>
<td>Q1 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sufficient numbers of troops and weapons</td>
<td>Q2 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>There is weaponry support</td>
<td>Q3 7</td>
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Table 4. Criteria of Threats

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<th>No</th>
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2. Hierarchical Structure, A hierarchical structure used in the study of what SWOT factors exist in the military. In a military context, there are four prioritized issues, namely attack, defend, delay, withdraw.

3. Determining the Priority Weights Factor Value of SWOT with AHP, at this stage the priority weights value of SWOT is grouped and each factor is obtained by the AHP method using pair-comparison.

4. Strategy Development for Operational Achievement, attacks are used by military units to carry out attack operations, defend is used so that military units stop making movements and start installing a form of defense at that location. Delay is used directly by the military to trade space from the time the battle occurred. Withdraw strategy is used directly by the military to withdraw troops, this type of strategy is to avoid armed contact with enemy soldiers.

5. Estimated Value of the Proposed Strategy, to calculate the weight value of each strategy the following formula can be used.

6. Expanding the Discussion on the Results of the SWOT-AHP Study, the output values obtained indicate that this structured and quantifiable method of SWOT analysis can provide an important foundation for the formulation of a successful strategy.

The method used in analyzing system requirements is done by brainstorming with the army and viewing video documentation during the simulation. The initial discussion was about what kind of battle simulation has been implemented in the army, or hereinafter referred to as the Battle Simulation Center (Pusimpur). The following in the figure shows the GLAPOS Simpur organizational structure with the Palagan system according to (Pusimpur, 2006). Figure 2. Simpur Organizational Structure.
Operators consist of: a. controller, consisting of 1 pamen whose task is to control the simulation, b. appraisers, consisting of 11 pamen who are assigned to provide an assessment of the combat commander, c. dal merah, consisting of 1 PA in charge of managing the red team, d. computer operator, consisting of 18 BAs who are in charge of being the operator of each computer. An overview of the dynamics of the palagan ops gun system can be seen in the following figure.

Some of the advantages of Simpur Palagan are as follows. a. The results of combat casualties are more applicable and realistic based on the activities of the blue and red actors at the time of contact and are influenced by the ability to apply tactics, techniques, use of weapons, number of bullets / munitions, direction / coordinates of shots, and so on. b. The speed of movement of the tactical sign corresponds to the speed of the Infantry troop's marching and is influenced by the contour conditions of the map and the Ran used. c. The results of combat casualties every time there is contact and the overall results of combat casualties can be printed. The following is a simulation view of the Palagan system which has tactical alerts and has action options.

Figure 4. Zipur Tactical Marking That Has Action Options

It can be seen from the previous tactical sign images, that the battle simulations owned by pusimpur represent each type of troop. As a result of brainstorming with the military and army, the system must be able to meet the following needs. Displays the simulation in 3 dimensions, so you can see the surface view of the battlefield. Displays realtime battle
simulation information, such as intelligent data, data on many initial and remaining troops consisting of infantry, cavalry, and SLT, and others.

The system can change the map view from 2 dimensions to 3 dimensions. Can do communication between the commander of the troops and the troops themselves in the Battlefield Management System to coordinate battles. In terms of technology, the touchscreen table is applied for the purposes of war commanders as a strategy map.

III. Methodology
Qualitative research is a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. The process of research involves emerging questions and procedures. Data typically collected in the participant’s setting, data analysis inductively building from particulars to general themes, and the researcher making interpretations of the meaning of the data. The final written report has a flexible structure. Those who engage in this form of inquiry support a way of looking at research that honors an inductive style, a focus on individual meaning, and the importance of rendering the complexity of a situation [Creswell, 2013].

Informants
1. Head of the Indonesian Ministry of Defense’s Education and Training Agency

IV. Research Results, And Research Discussion
1. Education policy battlefield management system policy in education and training the ministry of defense of the republic Indonesia collaborated with the ministry of education and culture of the republic Indonesia.

Education policy battlefield management system policy in education and training the ministry of defense of the republic Indonesia collaborated with the ministry of education and culture of the republic Indonesia system that runs in PUSIMPUR, the design of the BMS scheme in this study consists of: GIS Admin Education, the person in charge of the battle venue which will be used as a battle simulation site, in charge of receiving orders for capturing in certain areas of the earth. Then, retrieve data for an altitude map from a server on google via google maps. As well as converting with an algorithm that can convert conventional maps into simulated maps, then save them in the database.

Battlefield Admin education, serves as an operator to make battle simulation arrangements. The business process that is carried out is to receive orders to share how many teams of own and enemy troops will be included in the battle simulation, as well as
determining the continuity of the simulation, create simulation and abort simulation. Commander Education, regulates the overall movement of troops based on the information provided by the system, includes a GIS map showing the presence of troops and war statistics including real-time data, such as many initial troops, intelligent data, and others. View system features such as the statistics screen and DSS in consideration of the commands to be given to troops. The Blue Team (Client) and the Red Team (PC Client), this section functions as in control of the troops. The blue team received orders from the war commander to move forward or retreat, then reported the situation in the battle simulation area. For the red team as the enemy in the simulation. The red team can be replaced by AI (Artificial Intelligence).

Observer, although only in the form of a battle simulation, there must still be several parties who are classified as experienced from each troop (infantry, cavalry, and SLT) to assess the appropriateness of the command of the war commander for each of these troops. seen in the following image.

Figure 5. BMS Architectural Design
The following are the results of the BMS policy that has been developed in this study. a. GIS admin, capturing locations from google maps. After that, convert it into a map that can be used on BMS.

Figure 6. Capturing Locations for Simulation
Battlefield admin education, arranging the initial plan for the BMS simulation, determining the type and number of red-blue team troops, along with determining the location.
Commander education, complemented by a DSS page which includes SWOT-AHP calculations, realtime data for many troops in detail, using both graphs and quantitative data. In addition, the commander is equipped with a touchscreen map.

PC Client (Red Team) and Client (Blue Team), one computer can only manage one type of troop, infantry, cavalry, or SLT only. The view is 3D and also displays individual military units. The client only interacts with the mouse to control the actions of each troop unit. Following are the results of the evaluation of the BMS testing that has been developed. a. able to convert 2-dimensional display maps to 3-dimensional, even though there are deficiencies in the accuracy of the contours of the earth's surface, b. provide real-time information related to data and statistical information during the simulation, c. features that are trying to design, function well in functionality testing, d. The database can be accessed as a function of storing, sending, updating, and deleting data. The weaknesses and shortcomings encountered during the implementation of the BMS simulation from the test results are as follows. a. The level of accuracy of the converted map is not good, the size of the mountains on the map is actually not very visible like the mountains in the simulation, so the size warriors are not proportional to the size of the earth's surface.
2. Barriers to education policy battlefield management system policy in education and training the ministry of defense of the republic Indonesia collaborated with the ministry of education and culture of the republic Indonesia.

Barriers to education policy battlefield management system policy in education and training the ministry of defense of the republic Indonesia collaborated with the ministry of education and culture of the republic Indonesia barriers to students who already have difficulty accessing education, so the diversification of delivery media other than the internet needs to be considered. Options could be radio programming or using postal services for areas with low connectivity. This disruption to the traditional education system has disadvantaged students from underprivileged families and those in rural areas. These are students who, even under normal conditions, already face barriers to accessing education. Now they need to face additional barriers that arise from inequality in accessing technology infrastructure. The topography of Indonesia which consists of islands and mountains requires the provision of internet and cellular telecommunications. However, 4G coverage is mostly concentrated in Java Island because of cellular telecommunication service providers, which are very market dependent, naturally prioritizing urban areas over rural areas with smaller populations. unequal distribution of household internet in all existing areas. This gap in connectivity makes students who come from underprivileged families in rural areas outside Java at a very disadvantage. The sudden shift from face-to-face in the classroom to distance learning at home also shows the need for increased teacher capacity. Several studies have shown that the information, communication, and technology (ICT) competencies of Indonesian teachers are not evenly distributed across the region. Moreover, there are gaps in the quality of education across regions in Indonesia, especially between Java and outside Java, and between conditions. socio-economic. Unequal internet access, gaps in teacher qualifications, and quality of education, as well as a lack of ICT skills are vulnerabilities in distance learning initiatives in Indonesia.

3. Efforts to education policy battlefield management system policy in education and training the ministry of defense of the republic Indonesia collaborated with the ministry of education and culture of the republic Indonesia.

Efforts to education policy battlefield management system policy in education and training the ministry of defense of the republic Indonesia collaborated with the ministry of education and culture of the republic Indonesia shows a large-scale need for state-private partnerships between relevant ministries (Ministry of Education and Culture and Ministry of Religion and Ministry of Information) and providers of telecommunications services and hardware. The partnership can use the existing infrastructure to expand the education policy battlefield management system policy in education and training the ministry of defense of the republic Indonesia collaborated with the ministry of education and culture of the republic Indonesia learning across Indonesia.

V. Conclusion

Based on the results of research and discussions regarding of education policy battlefield management system policy in education and training the ministry of defense of the republic Indonesia collaborated with the ministry of education and culture of the republic Indonesia.

After testing the results of the education policy battlefield management system policy in education and training the ministry of defense of the republic Indonesia collaborated with the
ministry of education and culture of the republic Indonesia. It can be seen that the Battlefield Management System is summarized as follows. Design education with the proposed architecture can create a well-integrated system to carry out a battle simulation. of education policy battlefield management system policy in education and training the ministry of defense of the republic Indonesia collaborated with the ministry of education and culture of the republic Indonesia the system functions well and is useful for supporting decisions / orders from war commanders. With the application of converting two-dimensional maps to three dimensions as designed, it is possible to simulate combat anywhere with a real map.

This research aims to develop a system that is designed and implemented in order to fulfill all the information needs required by the battle commander of the Indonesian National Army in managing a troop in certain combat situations. The existence of a decision support system or Decision Support System (DSS), was developed using the AHP method to assist commanders in making decisions between attacking, defending, delaying attacks, and withdrawing. The system requirements analysis was carried out by brainstorming with the military about what kind of Battlefield Management System (BMS) education would be designed, because prior to the development of the BMS system, the Republic of Indonesia national army already had its own battle simulation tool. Testing is done by observing several non-military people who act as simulation and testing tools for system functionality. The results of the system design can be used as a medium for the implementation of a BMS in the form of a battle simulation. the aim of the national army is to protect the entire nation and all the blood of Indonesia, promote public welfare, educate the nation’s life, and participate in implementing world order based on independence, eternal peace and social justice. This condition requires special handling in order to create joyful learning activities. One form of special handling that is the focus of research and which will be discussed in this paper is learning activities that utilize electronic media.

This research aims to expand access to quality education for just and inclusive students. Strengthening the quality and relevance of education that is centered on the development of students. Development of the potential of students with character. Preservation and promotion of culture, language and literature as well as their mainstreaming in education. and Strengthening educational and cultural governance systems that are participatory, transparent and accountable.

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Edited Books

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