

The Peace Diplomacy, Negotiation, and National Security issues in Sri Lanka (2002-2009)

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Abstract

There are threats to national security on the devastation caused by terrorist conflicts. Conflict over the 2002 ceasefire agreement between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE and the subsequent failed peace process has been exacerbated during the civil war. The conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) lasted close to 30 years and is one of the longest civil wars in Asia. The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) that was contracted in February 2002 and the peace process that it ushered in was the result of several components. As mentioned by many commentators the peace process emerged out of a mutually hurting stalemate as neither the religious doctrine, nor the LTTE was able to make a strategic victory over the other and found themselves in a precarious politico-economic state of affairs. The main objective of this research is to study the issues about Sri Lanka's diplomatic negotiations, peace, diplomatic negotiations during the civil war, and its impact of the Sri Lanka civil war and to study the problematic points of diplomatic peace talks and the peace process during 2002 and 2009. The data triangulation method was used to gather secondary data from multiple electronic and print sources, including books, journals, the Web, reports, historical documents, and treaties. Qualitative content analysis was used as a literature review and content analysis assesses the texts of the documents and tests the theoretical relevance for a more complete and scientific understanding of the data. It will test dominant theories in different contexts by comparing categories for different parameters. According to the research, the international impact on the peace diplomacy process in Sri Lanka is significant. Research can confirm national security dilemmas and security strategy issues, the impact of diplomatic peace talks, and the strengths and weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement. Also, the ongoing political conflicts have affected the maintenance of peace and national security. The negative response to the political conflict and the negative impact of diplomacy and the media have had a direct and indirect effect on national security and peace.

Keywords: The peace diplomacy, negotiation, national security issues, Sri Lankan Civil War

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01. Introduction

The 2002 cease-fire between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) rebels broke down. Since January 2006, more than 2,500 people have been killed, including many civilians, and more than 200,000 have been relocated from their homes. At a time when the fighting has intensified, human rights abuses have also intensified, including the kidnappings, sass nations and massacres of civilians. The humanitarian situation in the north of the island has become intense. Sri Lanka has been wracked by conflict for most of the past 25 years, suffering at least 100,000 violent deaths in conflicts in both the north and south. 1 Successive attempts to resolve the ethnic difference of opinion between the Tamils, who have traditionally inhabited the northern and eastern regions, and the Sinhalese, concentrated in the central and southern regions, have been stressed since the 1950s, when the new political structures of independence exacerbated tensions. Since the mid-1980s, the state, dominated by Sinhalese politicians unwilling to get substantial grants to the minority Tamils, has faced a brutal but very effective militant movement, which seeks self-determination for the Sri Lankan Tamils. Even in its most conciliatory times, the government has never offered such a narrow devolution. The gap between the LTTE's aspirations and the government remains large. The two communities largely have distinct religious affiliations the Sinhalese are predominantly Buddhist, the Tamils mainly Hindu (with a small Christian minority) but the confrontation is based largely on Etna-political rather than religious differences, although Buddhist clergy have played a key role at times in mobilising support for Sinhalese nationalist positions. Each community is divided in terms of castes, classes and regional affiliations. Sometimes these internal divisions proved to be greater than the ethnic divide. Progress towards a political settlement has been regularly undermined by differences within individual communities, especially among Sinhalese politicians.

In the arena of conflict resolution the idea of negotiation has gained currency given a bit of successful cases where differences have been squared off or terminated through talks or discussions among parties involved. In everyday language, negotiations often involve a set of communication processes by which individuals or groups attempt to resolve mutual differences. In the context of conflict termination, even so, negotiations primarily aim at modifying the behaviour of conflicting parties so as to generate a conflict settlement, which in turn can pave the way for conflict solution. Unmatchable of the leading theoreticians in the playing area, William Zartman, defines negotiation 'a process of combining conflicting positions into a common position', under 'a decision rule of unanimity', a phenomenon in which the final result is limited by the procedure.

Ethnic conflicts present a measure of intractability that challenges the exercise of negotiating a peace setting. Creating conditions for effective peace among groups is a formidable task in

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serious ethnic conflicts. In this context, the Sri Lankan case is both enlightening and interesting to grasp the complexities of conflict negotiations.

The conflict in Sri Lanka is one of the most researched cases of prolonged ethnic conflict. It gets together a mixture of competing ethnic identity and nationalisms interspersed with attempts at conflict management and resolution through both indigenous political accommodation, engagement and external efforts at facilitation and mediation. Linking the experience of negotiating peace in Sri Lanka are certain recurring variables, which have informed spoiler behavior, and thwarted attempts at a decisive settlement of the ethnic conflict. While a number of factors influence the outcome of the negotiations, three major variables have had the greatest influence on the process. Foremost, the unresolved or competing nationalisms in the nation-building project in Sri Lanka; second, the ruinous practice of ethnic outbidding practiced by the two major Sinhalese parties; and third, the overbearing character of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which prospers on a rationale of war and terror. The three variables studied are first explained by an analysis of the negotiations that took place in Sri Lanka and domestic political dynamics.

The peace process facilitated by Norway was the last peaceful effort during the 26-year armed conflict between the Sri Lankan military and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. Since a number of previous military and peaceful attempts had failed disastrously, many felt that the solution lay in this final effort, which was also the only international mediation. Thus, the peace effort continued after the signing of a formal ceasefire agreement (CFA) on 22 February 2002 between the GOSL and LTTE until it was repealed in 2008 by the government, realizing it as an obstruction to the successful close of military offensives. Sri Lanka considered the LTTE an impediment to peace-building in the country and declared a general military offensive.

The intent was to eliminate LTTE militarily first and to later see a resolution to the ethnic issue by calling for all sections of the Sri Lankan polity, including those side-lined during negotiations. Sri Lanka concluded victorious military operations and re-established state governance throughout the country after eliminating virtually all LTTE leaders.

In attempts at internal political accommodation and external mediation, the main operational variables appear to be the contested theory of nationalism and the ruinous practice of ethnic overbidding. In terms of the more recent phase of negotiations in 2002-2003 and after the Geneva talks in 2006, while all three variables work in tandem, internal political competition between the two main Sinhalese parties proved most critical in undermining substantive negotiations. The current return to hostilities, of course, can be largely attributed to the 2004 break-up of the LTTE ranks. Its authoritarian and repeat approach of consolidating legitimacy and control over the North and the East has triggered another bloody military commitment that, as in the past, will be undecided. Against this backdrop, one of the burning questions is the outlook of a negotiated settlement in Sri Lanka, and in this context, a survey of past negotiation failures is likely to offer valuable lessons. They indicate the presence of some unresolved

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tensions that are embedded in Sri Lanka's political body. Since they come from within, they must be addressed.

Research Objectives

The main objective of this research is to study the issues pertaining to Sri Lanka's diplomatic negotiations, peace, diplomatic negotiations during the civil war and its impact of the Sri Lanka civil war and to study the problematic points of diplomatic peace talks and the peace process during 2002 and 2009.

Research Methodology

The data triangulation method was used to collect secondary data from multiple electronic and print sources, including books, magazines, the Web, reports, historical documents and treaties. Qualitative content analysis was utilized as a literature review and content analysis assesses the texts of the documents and tests the theoretical relevance for a more perfect and scientific understanding of the data.

This research systematically avoided any Sinhala or Tamil media resources so as to avoid any ethnic bias. For example, the documents in Section Four are mainly based on western newspaper articles where the 2000-2009 peace negotiations are being examined. The political ideology of newspapers, however, differs and may have some impact on evaluations and opinions of the Sri Lankan conflict.

02. Literature Review

For the average Sri Lankan, the conceptualization and re-conceptualization of conflict, warfare and public security in Sri Lanka does not seem to matter to the extent that it matters to the various factions in the governing class. As a result, this has become primarily the task of the Sinhala faction of the ruling class and its various political alliances that are the primary beneficiaries. As a consequence, there is a propensity of using of the above trio by country's ruling class politics and to shift the discourses of the above trio essentially into a narrow political arena associated with securing political legitimacy, hegemony, political force and land power. Such politically constructed notions can prevail as long as the political forces in the narrow are able to harmonize the conflicts of the kernel with various struggles of the communities living in the fringe. The discourses and debates around them are displaced and displaced over time by the ruling class characterized by deep clashes of factions. They are readily available for use by society at large in national political debates. Thus, under different governments lead different political parties and political alliances, the issues of conflict, warfare and peace can be expressed differently and sometimes quite contradictory, yet still represent a ruling class status. For example, in the 1980s, conflict and war in Sri Lanka were defined strictly under the ethnic Iron Law (Bandarage 2009:5). In the 1990s, the war in Sri Lanka was defined on the basis of scarce resources as advocated by the world discourse of greed and grievances (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2003: 108). Finally, in the 2000s, conflict,

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war and peace were defined through the global narrative of terrorism. These periodic shifts in discourse coincide with local electoral cycles and the prevailing processes of world political discourse. Their impact on the nature of societal engagement with this trio of war, peace and conflict and the effects of this can be traced through political and electoral decision making in local residential areas. In other words, the direct impact of society's involvement is often reflected in electoral results. This trend has been visible since the early nineties. Thus, the impact of such changes amongst the public, influenced by local and global political winds of change, is to divert attention from the deeper issues embedded in state relations in society. Rather than treating conflict, warfare and peace as structure-process-agency matters, by conveniently brushing aside the complex nature of multiple conflicts embedded in politics and state-in-society relations, they are being often offered as technical and apolitical events.

While exploring ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, some academics have focused their attention on analyzing Sri Lanka's national security dilemmas. Gunaratna (1998) in his book on Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis & National Security gives a detailed historical background of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, regional and international cooperation and the broader network of the LTTE. In his opinion, the LTTE receives shelter, funding, arms and training from various governments, non-governmental organizations and individuals. In a word, he points out that Sri Lanka's national security is gravely vulnerable to the ongoing ethnic conflict.

Apart from this, de Silva (1995) in *Regional Powers & Small State Security: Indian & Sri Lanka* analyses the nature of security issues of India and Sri Lanka and the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka from the historical position and regional power perspective. According to de Silva, the involvement of India in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka in the period from 1987 to 1991 has resulted in internationalization of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, he adds that the prolonged ethnic conflict has severely affected the survival and well-being of Sri Lanka as a small independent state.

Security Dilemma of a Small State: Sri Lanka in the South Asian Context, ed. P. V. J. Jayasekera analyses in 1992 the political and geostrategic aspect of Sri Lanka's security dilemma at the beginning of the 1980s. The chapters of this book apply the notion of security, including colonial heritage, political, defence and foreign policy factors, but not excluding the social, economic and cultural vulnerability, of Sri Lanka. Moreover, it dispenses with the security dilemma of Sri Lanka, with the primary concern being as to how Sri Lanka could accommodate its security demands within the requirements of the regional power. The book on *Security Dilemma of a Small State: Internal Crises and External Intervention in Sri Lanka* edited by Jayasekera and Werake (1995) analyses the national crises of Sri Lanka and their implications, leading to direct external involvement after 1983. These two books examine the issues facing the postcolonial state and society and the various dimensions of the crisis. In addition, the authors of both books have also been interested in India's involvement in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.

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This study is another classic example of the breadth of Indian participation in Sri Lanka's internal affairs. In accession to this, Bandarage (2009) in *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy*, provides a detailed historical based analysis of the origin, development and potential resolution of the civil conflict in Sri Lanka to establish a separate nation. It contends that the Sri Lankan conflict cannot be understood merely as a primary ethnic conflict between the Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority. Bandarage's work is a major scholarly exploration that defies the orthodox views of the Sri Lankan conflict. With an institutionalised rationalization of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, Sahadevan and DeVotta's (2006) in their book on *Politics of Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka* analyses the Sinhalese-Tamil divisions that were exacerbated due to linguistic nationalism, and evaluates the extent to which the political structure of the island encouraged ethnocentrism. In addition, it clearly demonstrates how such ethnocentrism has contributed to illiberal democracy and political decadence. The survey indicates that Sri Lanka as an illustrative example of international promotion of liberal peace and also of the tensions between internationalized and elitist crafting of peace and contextual power relations and political dynamics in conflict situations.

In 2009, Amita Shastri published an article on the Norwegian-led peace process initiated in 2002 with the support of the international community. In her book *Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Changing Dynamics*, Jayadeva Uyangoda discusses the conundrum of conflict and peace in Sri Lanka (Uyangoda, 2007). He argues that prolonged war has redefined the central question of state power as a question with no negotiable options. According to Uyangoda, the circumstances of the political commitment were not enough to move the main parties to the conflict towards a credible compromise. It also stresses that mediation, facilitation and negotiations were necessary but insufficient to actually change the path of conflict.

Clearly, there are many studies about ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Even though the cultural conflict in Sri Lanka is one of the most widely researched conflicts of the world today the existing literature has paid less attention to the analysis of the kinship between the national security dilemmas of Sri Lanka and the ethnic conflict. Instead, the literature dealing exclusively with ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka does not provide a full theoretical perspective on the national security dilemma in Sri Lanka. From this position, the present work is an effort to satisfy the above research gap by analysing the relationship between the national security dilemmas of Sri Lanka and the ethnic conflict.

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03. Finding and Discussion

03.1 Nature of Political Security

Conceptual considerations of political security are reflected in the 1994 United Nations Human Development Report. Even though the report clearly does not represent the first use of the concept in general, the strength of its impact on the global discussion is indisputable. The famous UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 is based on the premise that the large-scale geopolitical concept of security is not adequate. The Cold War model as well as the post-Cold War model builds upon a central assumption that the wide-ranging threat to the global political order is the most important threat to the welfare of all souls. In this wider context, the main components of the concept of political security can be summed up as follows:

1. Security of the right to participation in politics.
2. Securing the right to peaceful assembly, association and expression.
3. Safety of the right to independent institutions.
4. Security of the right to be informed.

One of the most important aspects of non-traditional security is that people should be allowed to live in a society that honors their political security, including their fundamental rights. Political security is the right through which citizens have a part in the political life of the community, including the administration of government. Entitlements to political participation contribute to political security. Political participation can take many forms, most notably the right to vote. Political security also encompasses the right to join a political party; the right to stick out as a campaigner in an election; the right to take part in a demonstration; and freedom of affiliation. Security at peaceful assembly, association and expression is the ultimate subdivision of the concept of political security. It has to do with the safety of the associations. A citizen ought to be free to prohibit anyone from holding a meeting in the public interest. Independent institutions are vital to political security. Together with the legislative, executive and judiciary, they provide for a sophisticated system of checks and balances, reinforcing accountability and mitigating unwarranted political influence. The security of the right to information makes it possible to access information that is relevant to citizens under the control of the government. Moreover, the notion of political security implies that the security of the right to information favours transparency and accountability in the functioning of each public authority.

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03.2 Sri Lankan Civil War

Civil war in Sri Lanka was a civil war carried out in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009. Starting July 23, 1983, there was an intermittent insurgency against the government by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam led by Velupillai Prabhakaran (LTTE). The LTTE fought to make an autonomous Tamil state called Tamil Eelam in the NE of the island, [18] due to the continuous discrimination and violent persecution against Sri Lankan Tamils by the Sinhalese dominated Sri Lankan Government.

Violent persecutions erupted in the form of the 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983 anti-Tamil pogroms, as well as the 1981 fire at the Jaffna Public Library. These were accomplished by the majority of Sinhalese crowds often with state support, in the years following Sri Lanka's independence from Britain in 1948. After a 26-year military campaign, the Sri Lankan army defeated the Tamil Tigers in May 2009, terminating the civil war.

For more than 25 years, the war has caused considerable hardship to the nation's population, environment and economy, with an initial estimate of 80,000 to 100,000 people killed along the way. At 2013, the UN panel estimated additional deaths during the final stage of the war: "Around 40,000 died, while other independent reports estimated the figure of civilians dead to exceed 100,000." At the beginning of the conflict, Sri Lankan forces tried to take back the areas captured by the LTTE. The tactics used by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam against the activities of Government forces resulted in their listing as a terrorist organization in 32 nations, including the United States, India, Canada and the member states of the European Union. The Sri Lankan government forces have likewise been accused of human rights abuses, systematic impunity for grave human rights violations, lack of respect for habeas corpus in arbitrary detentions, and forced disappearances.

After two decades of fighting and four failed tries at peace talks, including the deployment of the Indian Army, the Indian Peace Keeping Force from 1987 to 1990, a lasting negotiated settlement to the conflict appeared possible when a truce was declared in December 2001, and a ceasefire agreement signed with international mediation in 2002. However, limited hostilities renewed in late 2005 and the conflict began to intensify until the regime launched a bit of major military offensives against the LTTE beginning in July 2006, driving the LTTE out of the entire Eastern province of the island. The LTTE then declared that they would "resume their struggle for liberty in order to become a state".

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In 2007, the government shifted its offensive to the north of the country, and formally announced its secession from the ceasefire agreement on 2 January 2008, alleging that the LTTE violated the agreement over 10,000 times. Since then, aided by the destruction of a number of large arms smuggling vessels that belonged to the LTTE, and an international crackdown on the funding for the Tamil Tigers, the government took control of the entire area previously controlled by the Tamil Tigers, including their de facto capital Kilinochchi, main military base Mullaitivu and the entire A9 highway, leading the LTTE to finally admit defeat on 17 May 2009. As a result of the defeat of the LTTE, the pro-TLET Tamil National Alliance abandoned its demand for a separate state in favour of a federal solution. In May 2010, Mahinda Rajapaksa, the then president of Sri Lanka, appointed the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) to assess the difference between the time of the ceasefire agreement in 2002 and the defeat of the LTTE in 2009.

Since the close of the civil war, the Sri Lankan state has been subject to much global criticism for breaking human rights as a consequence of committing war crimes through bombing civilian targets, usage of heavy arms, the abduction and massacre of Sri Lankan Tamils and sexual violence. The LTTE gained notoriety in carrying out numerous heinous attacks against civilians of all ethnicities, especially those of Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Muslim ethnicity, assassinations of politicians, and the use of suicide bombings primarily against military targets. The British mercenaries involved were also investigated for war crimes, as they were SAS members who supported the Sri Lankan army.

03.3 Sri Lanka Peace Negotiations: Charting the Variables.

From a historical position, internal political accommodation to settle the ethnic problem was started at once after the Sinhala Only Act was postponed by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) government headed by Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike (1899-1959) in 1956. Several agreements or elite compacts were signed beginning with the pact between SWRD Bandarnaike and Samual James Velupillai Chelvanayagam (1898- 1977), leader of the Tamil Arasu Katchi (Federal Party) in 1957. The pact, known as the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam pact, had a triple order of business, namely, devolution of state power through regional councils, recognition of Tamil as a national minority language and slowing down Sinhalese resettlement in the north and east. It provoked a Sinhalese nationalist reaction, and mob attacks against the Tamils in the southern provinces were launched. As a result of a march against the actions of Buddhist monks and prominent members of the political opposition in Kandy's Sinhala Buddhist stronghold, Bandaranaike repudiated the pact.

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The next pact was signed in 1965, between the then Prime Minister and leader of the United National Party (UNP), Dudley Senanayake (1911- 1973) and the leader of the Federal Party, S.J.V Chelvanayagam. Senanyake was anxious to obtain his support in a new national government. The Senanayake-Chelvanayagam Pact agreed to implement a Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Regulation, envisaged the organization of district councils, and decided on according preference to the Tamils in resettlement schemes in the northward and east. Most provisions in the treaty were not implemented, and four years later, on 9 April 1969, the Tamil leadership withdrew their backing for the regime. The failure of the Sinhalese elite to implement these negotiated agreements has contributed to a significant hardening of the Tamil position on the cultural question. The adoption of an extremist ideological stance, in the context of a relatively moderate TULF, was explicitly stated for the first time in the famous Vaddukoddai resolution (1976). It laid out the demand for a separate homeland, or Tamil Eelam, based on an inalienable right of self-determination for the Tamil people.

During the seventies and early eighties, the gap between the two communities widened. Tamil leaders have started to take an increasingly activist stance and target people who are opposed to their views. The widespread anti-Tamil riots in 1977, the burning of the library in Jaffna in 1981, and the riots in July 1983 in response to the landmine attack on an army convoy by the Tamil militants, which killed soldiers, in a way, signaled the intransigent position of the two residential areas. The possibility of internal accommodation was also rejected when the 1984 Multiparty Conferences (CPA) found no solution to the crisis. The Sri Lankan government led by the UNP could only accept the establishment of district councils in a decentralized political structure. The opposition FLPS disagreed with the proposals. They have also been rejected by TULF.

External participation has become imperative in such circumstances. Indeed, India had begun to facilitate the internal accommodation process by encouraging Tamils to participate in the CAP. But when the CPA failed, India made its first attempt to negotiate a settlement negotiated in August 1985 in Thimpu, Bhutan. There are several factors that have driven this proactive role. Sri Lanka's strategic location, dictates of foreign policy priorities together with the sensitivities generated by the Sri Lankan ethnic riots in the southern state of Tamilnadu, defined the context of India's mediation.

In Thimpu, the delegation of the Sri Lankan government tabled a bill for the devolution of powers. These proposals were only marginally different from those rejected by the 1984 PAC and the TULF. The Tamil delegation, naturally, was not prepared to negotiate on proposals already rejected by the TULF. As a result, the Thimpu talks were the first explicit articulation of the Tamil extremist stance. Three cardinal principles were enshrined in the joint declarations of the Tamil delegation, notably the LTTE and the TULF:

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- the re-organization of the Sri Lankan state;
- recognizing the existence of a Tamil homeland made up of the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka;
- Recognizing the right of self-determination of Sri Lankan Tamils.

Since any solution based on the Thimpu principles would have resulted in a vivisection of Sri Lanka, the talks were destined to fail. Furthermore, there was no conjunction of views; the proposals of the government and the principles of Thimpu functioned at two totally different ideological and conceptual levels.

After the failure of the Thimpu peace talks, India developed a draft framework of modalities and agreements. This was accepted by Colombo as a starting point for future negotiations. As a result of the draft agreement, 'proximity talks' began. Both sides to the conflict were in contact with India as a mediator, but have not engaged in direct face-to-face discussions. That laid the groundwork for the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in the summer of 1987. It brought the deployment of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the north and east of Sri Lanka to maintain peace between the armed Tamil groups and the Sri Lankan armed forces and oversee the execution of the Indo-Lanka accord. Under the agreement, the Sri Lankan government pledged to reform the state by establishing institutions of regional self-government in exchange for the end of the secessionist insurgency.

Political resistance in the south slowly pushed the government out of its position. President Junius Jayawardene (1906-1996) who had signed the agreement did not attach much importance to it. In 1989, following the rising cost of the fight against the Tigers and the opposition of Jayawardene's successor, President Ranasinghe Premadasa (1924-1993), India decided to terminate its forces in Sri Lanka. The IPKF withdrew in March 1990. It was the failure of the third serious effort to negotiate peace. Focused solely on the subject of withdrawal of the IPKF, and the disintegration of the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) led North East Provincial Council (NEPC), the Premadasa-LTTE Talks 1989-90 had a political mandate and quite expectedly produced no settlement outcome. The parties went back to war in 1990 after the withdrawal of the IPKF, reproducing a cycle of unsuccessful peace attempts leading to war with greater intensity.

In analysing the IPKF's failure, it becomes evident that despite India's efforts to broker peace, the 1987 Accord had certain loopholes, which undermined its salience as a base for a definitive settlement of the ethnic dispute. The LTTE, along with other Tamil organizations, did not co-sign the peace agreement. The process itself relied heavily on "grassroots discussions" rather than direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict. Moreover, the principle of neutrality, often stressed as essential in the context of external mediation, ironically did not seem to exist between the two parties in conflict in the case of India. India ended up under suspicion by the LTTE and the Sinhalese parties, and inevitably became the third party to the conflict.

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A fourth peace effort took place in 1994-95 in the context of a regime change in Colombo. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga was the liberal face of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), and won the election on a peace program. Kumaratunga immediately started talks with the LTTE. She put forth a lot of proposals for devolution of powers to the regions, which stood for the boldest effort to correct the unbalance in the relationship between the different cultural groups. Sadly, history has been repeated and its proposals and constitutional reform initiatives in parliament have been hotly contested by the opposition of the United National Party (UNP). After four rounds of talks, the peace initiative also collapsed in April 1995, resulting in another phase of war. President Kumaratunga and the Sri Lankan armed forces felt that if they could shoot down the LTTE militarily, a durable peace with the Tamil polity, excluding the LTTE, could be negotiated and set in position. The military campaign, however, proved equally long, and lethal terrorist tactics forced Sri Lankan forces and the government to reconsider their offensive policy. The culmination was the fall of the Elephant Pass, the gateway to the Jaffna Peninsula, in December 1999. That was accompanied by the crushing of Operation Agnikhela by Sri Lankan forces in April 2001. This is when the UNP led by Ranil Wickramasinghe defeated the SLFP in the legislative elections. Wickramasinghe was elected premier and Chandrika Kumaratunga of the SLFP remained as president. So there were two centres of power at the table. But Wickramasinghe tried to reach a peace agreement with the LTTE as soon as he took power.

03.4 The Peace Process (2002-2009)

During the 30 years of civil war between the government and the LTTE, peace negotiations with Norway were another important attempt to secure peace in Sri Lanka. The Norwegian government's role as facilitator included building information, minimizing misunderstandings and creating an atmosphere conducive to advancing the peace process. In 1999, President Kumaratunga invited Norway to be the mediator of peace in the context of the 18-year war in Sri Lanka. However, the government of President Kumaratunga lost its parliamentary majority and the government of the Palestinian Authority was beaten in the February 2001 parliamentary elections. The UNP allied itself with minority parties as the United National Front (FNU) and came to power with a narrow margin of victory under the leadership of Premier Ranil Wickremasinghe.

Thus, Norway mediated the peace dialogue with the new government by coordinating communication between the two parties and arranging logistics during the peace negotiation. As the LTTE unilaterally agreed to a ceasefire with the UNF government, Norway facilitated the signing of the ceasefire agreement (CFA) between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE on 21st February 2001. CFA mediation by the Norwegian government was one of the primary attempts to advance the peace process in Sri Lanka.

Information, minimizing mistakes and creating an ambiance conducive to It took seven years of acute and concentrated war for the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE to sign another ceasefire agreement and begin a peace operation. This third ceasefire, facilitated by Norwegian

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intermediaries, has proven to be the longest period of 'no war' or 'negative peace' that the island has seen to date. The Norwegian facilitation initiated by Chandrika Kumaratunga and the People's Alliance Government in 1998 paved the way for a Memorandum of Understanding (MOA) negotiated and officially signed on 22 February 2002. The MoU formalised a bilateral cease-fire between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the LTTE and attempted essentially at fostering an atmosphere of trust and confidence on both sides conducive to productive negotiations. It marked the beginning of the Track One phase of negotiations relating to process issues and was seen as the overture to the next phase (Track Two), which would address 'core issues' of substance in resolving the dispute. The GoSL formally banned the LTTE as a pre-condition to participation in the peace talks. Six rounds of talks took place between September 2002 and April 2003, when the LTTE unilaterally withdrew from the talks while reaffirming their commitment to maintaining the Ceasefire Agreement.

In those six rounds, the third round in Oslo in December 2002 marked a high point, and there is a suspicion of an apparent convergence of negotiating positions. In Oslo, the LTTE created a substantial difference from the Thimpu principles and expressed its willingness to explore a solution based on the principle of internal self-determination, and established on a federal structure within a unified Sri Lanka.

03.5 Reconciling the Positions

Resumption of Peace Talks (2005-2006)

President Mahinda Rajapakswas was sworn in as the country's 5th Executive President in November 2005. He quickly relaunched talks with the LTTE, as Norway was ready to continue to facilitate peace talks. There were three rounds of peace talks, the first in Geneva in February 2006, the second in Oslo in June 2006 and the third one in Geneva again, in October 2006.⁶⁰ Although the LTTE delegation flew to Oslo for negotiations in June 2006, they refused to continue the talks after stating that they were not satisfied with the composition of the government delegation. In the last round in October 2006, the LTTE had once again refused to agree to meet certain conditions.⁶¹ However, during the ceasefire the LTTE had violated the CFA 3,830 times compared with just 351 violations by the government security forces. The resumption of peace talks by the two parties collapsed with the growing mistrust between them; in the end, the government declared that it was not going to continue with the peace negotiations because of the rising number of violent actions carried out by the LTTE throughout the state. The last attempt to negotiate peace with the LTTE was in October 2006. Thus, in the history of the conflict in Sri Lanka, a peaceful settlement could not be reached during the 30 years of separatist struggle. Referable to the negative attitude expressed by the LTTE for peaceful negotiations, which was evident throughout the conflict, the government could justifiably claim that the LTTE did not hold a positive attitude toward peaceful power devolution. Rather, their goal was to implement their political agenda through fair or faulty means and to work for a separate state for Tamils. As noted earlier in this chapter, the Eelam War IV created the background for the government to launch extensive military operations to

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fight the LTTE as a lasting solution to cease their terror activities and restore public security in the land.

Go along with the peace dialogue with the Sri Lankan delegation until the government. It is manifest from the above analysis that while several attempts at negotiating a political settlement to the Sri Lankan conflict have been realised, either the Sinhalese parties or the LTTE have played spoilsport at one period in time or other. However, despite the LTTE's commitment to a prolonged military campaign against the State, and the State's inclination to defeat LTTE by force, there have been four major peace processes between them thus far. In each of these instances, however, both sides were reluctant to abandon their core positions.

After accepting a united Sri Lanka in 2002, the LTTE returned to its strategy of reaching its goal of a Tamil Eelam through armed struggle. Similarly, the government sought to weaken the LTTE's ability by orchestrating divisions within its ranks and militarily weakening the LTTE through heavy counterattacks. The incipient rivalry between the two major political parties in Sri Lanka engendered by nature of competitive democratic politics, and exacerbated by the tactic of ethnic outbidding employed by both of them has been a primary hurdle for achieving a consensus on a substantive peace proposal from the Sinhala South.

The common denominator among these disparate strands is of course the thesis of nationalist competition. Instrumentalist and institutionalist understandings of the genesis of ethnic conflicts emphasise the purpose of discrimination, racial policies and systematic abdication of negotiated compacts as the primary ingredient fuelling militancy and armed conflict by the Tamils. These variables continued as unresolved tensions in the state-building project and must be resolved first if Sri Lanka is to see successful negotiations between its conflicting groups.

The failure of the current negotiations will not exclude the possibility of a negotiated settlement in the future. In addition, any failed attempt at peace simply redefines the conflict in new terms. A prolonged civil war requires the completion of a long peace process. A negotiated political settlement of the island's ethnic conflict is only possible if new political conditions are created to respond to the democratically-emancipatory impulses of the pluralistic Sri Lankan state.

A majority system, especially in multi-ethnic contexts, should ideally encourage a policy of consensus and thus alleviate the fears of minorities. Today, moderate sections of the Sinhala political and intelligentsia are adopting revisionist versions of Unitarianism in terms of devolution of power. This has fostered a linkage of the argument of democratic pluralism. So far, the Sinhalese nationalist project has shown a degree of exclusion, which has been the root cause of the conflict. However, given that pluralism is a reality in Sri Lanka's demographic make-up, the best way to accommodate pluralism will be to overhaul the current state apparatus. The opposition of Sinhalese chauvinists who endorse the unitary end of the federalist-unitary continuum, however, makes this task extremely difficult. Their insistence on a unitary Westphalian State structure, with non-negotiable sovereign powers, linked to exclusive territorial jurisdiction contends with the reality of a de facto Tamil state in the North

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and East with institutions of taxation, judiciary and police. This needs to be recognized in the enduring debate on patriotism and sovereignty.

Mahinda Rajapakse's failure to persuade the various parties to participate in his multi-party conference (PCA) initiative to seek consensus on devolution is a concern. The movement cannot go far unless the major opposition party, the UNP, is enthusiastic about it. The incipient rivalry between the two Sinhalese parties has been an abiding spoiler in efforts at achieving any substantial agreement and asks to be overcome if a resolution is to arrive close to.

In this context, it may be pertinent to wonder if Eelam can be realized. The Tigers' tenacity and determination and their recurrence make this an important issue with implications for the future. Given world realities, achieving Eelam will be difficult, if not impossible. No world power will succumb to the separatist project of a terrorist movement in a post-11/9 world, where international relations are directed against terrorism. In addition, any future autonomous Tamil region under LTTE control will invariably experience a democratic deficit. As a result, the path to peace in Sri Lanka will probably remain tortuous and bogged down in contradictions for the foreseeable future. It will require a significant reorientation of the country's political culture and the integration of neglected voices and stakeholders to create a peaceful environment.

03.6 The 2002–2006 Peace Process

Cease-fire is under way

In late 2001, however, the LTTE began to express its willingness to explore measures for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. One of the reasons for this action may have been the fear of international pressure and the direct support of the US to the Sri Lankan government in the context of the "war against terrorism". In addition, the covert operations of the Sri Lankan Army's Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) have had a profound impact on the Tiger command structure.^{98]} During this period, Vaithilingam Sornalingam alias Shankar, who had been considered the right-hand man of LTTE leader Prabhakaran, and several other high-profile leaders were hunted down and killed by LRRP units.

In the south, the government was increasingly criticized for its "war for peace" strategy, peace anywhere in view and the economy in tatters. After losing a vote of no confidence, President Kumaratunga was forced to dissolve parliament and demand new elections. The elections, held on 5 December 2001, saw a sweeping triumph for the United National Front, led by Ranil Wickremasinghe, who campaigned on a pro-peace platform and pledged to find a negotiated resolution to the dispute.

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On 19 December, amidst efforts by Norway to bring the government and the Tamil Tigers to the negotiating table, the LTTE announced a 30-day cease-fire with the Sri Lankan government and pledged to stop all attacks against regime military units. The new government welcomed this decision and responded two days later, announcing a one-month cease-fire and agreeing to lift a longstanding economic embargo on rebel-held territory.

The ceasefire was totally unacceptable to everybody. The Buddhist monks started to burn the Norwegian flags and agitated against the ceasefire and finally formed a political party, Jathika Hela Urumaya, with extremist views.

Both parties formalised a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 22 February 2002 and signed a permanent cease-fire agreement (CFA). Norway was appointed mediator, and it was decided that they, together with the other Nordic countries, would monitor the ceasefire through a committee of experts called the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. In August, the government agreed to remove the LTTE ban and paved the way for the resumption of direct negotiations with the LTTE.

03.7 LTTE Sea Tiger boat patrolling during the peace

Following the signing of the ceasefire agreement, commercial air flights to Jaffna began and the LTTE opened the key A9 highway, which linked the government-controlled area in the south with Jaffna and ran through LTTE territory, allowing civilian traffic through the Vanni region for the first time in many years (but only after paying a tax to the LTTE). Many foreign countries also offered substantial financial support if peace was achieved and optimism rose that the end of decades of conflict was in sight.

The long-awaited peace talks started in Phuket, Thailand, followed by more rounds in Thailand, Norway, Germany and Japan. During the talks, both sides accepted the principle of a federal solution and the Tigers abandoned their longstanding demand for a separate state. It was a major compromise by the LTTE, which had always advocated an independent Tamil state. It was also a compromise on the part of the government, which had seldom accepted more than a modicum of devolution. Both sides also exchanged prisoners of war for the foremost time.

03.8 Sri Lanka's peace diplomacy

The period after 1983, Sri Lanka had to cooperate and distance with States time and time overwining and sustain numerous expectations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) as a State delegate becomes responsible for official foreign representativity generally known as Track I diplomacy. The coordination of the peace strategy for the resolution of the civil war was promoted and negotiated internationally by MoFA with the presence of leaders and representatives. Former (last) Minister of Foreign Affairs Lakshman Kadirgamar, who was a respected visionary leader for a focused FP, was in favour of a peaceful resolution. He was a great supporter of democracy. For instance, in many high-profile speeches, he clearly expressed Sri Lanka's national interest in strengthening security and stability.

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Minister Kadirgamar dismissed the categorical view of peace with dedicated diplomatic efforts. The diplomatic turnover observed during the 2002-2009 peace process suggested that Sri Lanka was committed to building trust and other types of cooperation, including: safeguard internal security and economic assistance. In that period, peace diplomacy took a dualistic approach. First, there is peace by negotiation and peace by military means. The third was the blend of the two. These approaches evolved in accordance with the dynamics of war. In short, among the few known countries that were interested in negotiations - the US, India, Norway, Japan and organisations like the UN and the EU admired Sri Lanka's responsibility for peace. Few other bilateral partner states, such as China, Russia, Pakistan and Israel, have championed commercial war objectives by safeguarding bilateral objectives.

The orientation of the obvious peace diplomacy since 2009 can be easily identified as the most complex and thoughtful period of the Sri Lankan CP. The PF's path is not the same as before – and expectations for peace are skyrocketing. Sri Lanka was interrogated inside and out to seek peace through peaceful means – no option criteria were added to reclaim lost opportunities. Leadership and policies had to think about “new peace diplomacy” to cooperate with regional geopolitical strategies and changing global interests. Some of the added concerns of the financial planner are, for example: comprehensive security including economic and geopolitical advancement, therefore expanding the scope of peace diplomacy and its continuity.

03.9 Political changes in the South

After the 2001 elections, for the first time in the history of Sri Lanka, the President and the Prime Minister came from two different parties. This co-habitation was uneasy, especially since Prime Minister Wickremasinghe and the UNP favoured a federal solution to the conflict, while hard-line elements within President Kumaratunga's party and other Sinhala nationalist groups allied to her opposed one, as they did not trust the LTTE, which continued to levy taxes, strengthen itself by smuggling in arms and ammunition, recruit child soldiers and engage in killings of members of rival Tamil groups and government intelligence agents following the Millennium City incident. During this period, the LTTE also successfully established a series of vital bases around Trincomalee Harbour and the eastern region.

The talks broke down on 21 April 2003 when the Tamil Tigers announced that they were suspending all further dialogue because of their "discontent" with some "critical issues". Among the reasons the Tigers gave were their exclusion from reconstruction talks in Washington, DC, on 14 April and a more general insinuation that they were not getting the full economic rewards of public security. They cited the failure, as they saw it, of peace dividends to transfer to security withdrawals on the land and the disparity, as they viewed it, between the relative equanimity of the government-held northeast and continuing violence in Tiger-controlled regions. However, the LTTE maintained its commitment to resolving the conflict that has been ongoing for two decades, but stated that progress must be made on the ground before settlement continues.

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On October 31, the LTTE issued its own peace proposal, requesting an interim governmental authority (ISGA). The ISGA would be fully contained by the LTTE and would have full powers in the northward and east (see the entire text of the proposals) This provoked a strong backlash among the hard-line elements in the south, who accused Prime Minister Wickremasinghe of handing the north and east to the LTTE. Under pressure from within her own party to strike action, Kumaratunga declared a state of emergency and called for three key government ministries, the Ministry of Mass Media, the Interior Ministry and the crucial Defence Ministry. She then made an alliance with the JVP, called the United People's Freedom Alliance, fought to the ISGA and advocating a harder line on the LTTE, and called for new elections. The elections, held on 8 April 2004, resulted in a PUFA victory with the appointment of Mahinda Rajapakse as Prime Minister.

03.10 Split of the LTTE

In the meantime, in March 2004, a major separation had occurred between the north and east wings of the LTTE. Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Col. Karuna, the Eastern commander of the LTTE and one of Prabhakaran's trusted lieutenants, pulled 5,000 eastern cadres out of the LTTE, claiming insufficient resources and power were being given to Tamils of the easterly portion of the island. It was the greatest expression of dissension in the history of the LTTE and a confrontation within the LTTE appeared imminent. After the parliamentary elections, brief fighting south of Trincomalee led to a rapid retreat and capitulation of Karuna's group, their leaders eventually going into hiding including Karuna himself, who was helped to escape by Seyed Ali Zahir Moulana, a political leader from the governing party. However, the "Karuna faction" maintained a significant presence in the East and continued their attacks on the LTTE. The LTTE accused the army of covertly backing the breakaway group, which later formed a political party named the TamilEela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) and hope to contest in future elections.

The cease-fire largely held through all this tumult, with over 3000 infractions by the LTTE and some 300 by the SLA recorded by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) by 2005. The situation was further compounded by allegations that both parties were conducting secret operations against each other. The government alleged that the LTTE killed political opponents, recruited children, imported weapons, and killed government security and intelligence officers. The rebels accused the government of supporting the paramilitaries against them, particularly the Karuna group.

03.11 Tsunami and aftermath

On 26 December 2004, the tsunami in the Indian Ocean hit Sri Lanka, killing over 35,000 people and leaving far more homeless. Much of the aid came from around the world, but there was immediate disagreement on how it should be distributed to the Tamil areas under the control of the LTTE. On 24 June, the government and the LTTE agreed on the post-Tsunami operational management structure (P-TOMS), but the JVP, which left the government to

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protest, was highly critical of it. P-TOMS' legality was also contested before the courts. President Kumaratunga finally had to eliminate P-TOMS, which led to widespread criticism that sufficient aid was not reaching the northern and eastern parts of the country. However, right after the tsunami there was a marked decline in violence in the north.

Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, a Tamil who was extremely valued by foreign diplomats and who had been sharply critical of the LTTE, was assassinated at his house on 12 August 2005, allegedly by an LTTE sniper. This is the reason for the silence of the international community when the Sri Lankan government took military action against the LTTE in 2006, when the LTTE closed the Mavil aru lock.

Other political changes occurred when the Sri Lankan Supreme Court declared President Kumaratunga's second and final term and ordered him to hold another presidential election. The principal candidates for the election, which was taken in November, were UNF candidate, former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, who recommended the reopening of talks with the LTTE, and the UPFA candidate Prime Minister Rajapaksa, who visited for a tougher line against the LTTE and a renegotiation of the armistice. The LTTE has publicly called for a Tamil boycott of the election. Many of them had to vote for Wickremasinghe, and the loss of their votes proved fatal to his chances, as Rajapakse achieved a close win. Conforming to the election, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran stated in his annual address that the Tigers would "renew their struggle" in 2006 if the government did not take serious moves toward peace.

03.12 Indian intervention

Involvement of Indians (1987-1990)

Sri Lanka

Coat of arms of Sri Lanka, showing a lion having a blade in its right forepaw surrounded by a band constructed from blue lotus petals which is located on top of a green vase sprouting rice grain to encircle it. A Dharmacakra is above while a sun and moon are at the bottom of each side of the vase.

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This research is part of a series on the policy and government of Sri Lanka Constitution Government Elections Administrative geography External relations Related matters Flag of Sri Lanka. Svg Sri Lanka portal Other countries vote See also: Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War and Research and Analysis Wing Involvement was particularly potent in the Indian province of Tamil Nadu, where ethnic kinship led to secure musical accompaniment for the independence of Sri Lankan Tamils. Throughout the dispute, Indian central and state governments supported both parties in different ways. From August 1983 until May 1987 the Indian government, through its intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), provided arms, training and monetary support to six Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups, including LTTE, Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA). The increase in the LTTE is largely attributed to the initial support they received from NRF. It is believed that by supporting various militant groups, the Indian government hoped to keep the Tamil independence movement divided and be in a position to exercise clear control over it.

India got more actively involved in the late 1980s, and on 5 June 1987 the Indian Air Force airdropped food parcels to Jaffna while it was under siege by Sri Lankan forces. At a time when the Sri Lankan government said it was close to voting out the LTTE, India dropped 25 tons of food and medicine by parachute into areas controlled by the LTTE in a direct move of financial backing to the mavericks. Negotiations have taken place and the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Agreement was signed on 29 July 1987 by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lanka President Jayewardene. Under this accord the Sri Lankan government made a number of concessions to Tamil demands, including devolution of power to the provinces, a merger—subject to later referendum—of the northern and eastern provinces into a single province, and official status for the Tamil language (this was enacted as the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka). India has agreed to establish order in the north and east through the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) and to stop helping Tamil insurgents. Militant groups, including the LTTE, although initially reluctant, agreed to surrender their weapons to the IPKF, which initially oversaw a ceasefire and modest disarmament of militant groups.

The signature of the Indo-Lanka Agreement, so soon after J.R. Jayawardene's declaration that he would fight the Indians to the last bullet, caused unrest in the south. The reaching of the IPKF to take mastery of most regions in the north of the land enabled the Sri Lanka government to reposition its forces to the south to quell the objections. This led to an uprising by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in the south, who was slaughtered with blood during the following two years.

While most Tamil activist groups laid down their weapons and agreed to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the LTTE refused to disarm its fighters. Keen to ensure the success

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of the accord, the IPKF then tried to demobilize the LTTE by force and ended up in full-scale conflict with them.

During the 1970s, India's external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) helped to train and arm the LTTE, but later the group's terrorist activities grew in the 1980s--including its alliances with separatist groups in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu--RAW withdrew this support. In 1987, India entered into a pact with the Sri Lankan government to send peace-keeping troops to the island. Indian forces were not able to stop the conflict, but rather began to fight with the LTTE. Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa forced India out of the country in 1990. Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India when the peacekeeping forces were deployed, was killed by an LTTE kamikaze in 1991. Premadasa went through a similar spell in 1993.

India has been cautious about intervening in Sri Lanka since, but trade between the two countries has increased. Bilateral trade increased from \$658 million in 2000 to \$3.2 billion in 2008, and India continues to be a major foreign investor. Also in talks to form a partnership (Bloomberg) with India's National Stock Exchange, which may include offering India a stake in Sri Lanka's bourse. The Asian Development Bank in 2008 said the rise in violence had not yet had an impact on growth (PDF), which has been driven by strong domestic demand and a robust private sector. But he says the escalation of the conflict could put a damper on economic growth. Statistics from the 2008 UN Development Programme show that Sri Lanka ranks 104 out of 179 countries in the Human Development Index, which measures education, living standards and life expectancy.

India remains concerned about the situation of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, fueling protests and tensions within its own Tamil population in the south. In February 2009, India's foreign minister expressed concern over the safety of civilians in Sri Lanka and said the only way forward would be the devolution of power from the midpoint to the responsibilities. Under the 1987 accord with India, which was accompanied by the thirteenth amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution, Colombo agreed to devolve some authority to the states and make Tamil an official language of the country. But no government has fully implemented these measures, say experts.

The conflict, which lasted three years, was also marked by the fact that the IPKF was accused of various violations by numerous human rights groups and by certain Indian media. The IPKF also quickly met with strong opposition on the part of the Tamils. Simultaneously, nationalist sentiment led many Sinhala to oppose India's continued presence in Sri Lanka. These led to the Sri Lankan government's call for India to quit the island, and the government allegedly entered into a private bargain with the LTTE that culminated in a truce. However, frequent confrontations continued between the LTTE and the IPKF. In April 1989 the Ranasinghe Premadasa government ordered the Sri Lanka army to clandestinely hand over arms consignments to the LTTE to fight the IPKF and its proxy Tamil National Army (TNA). Although casualties among the IPKF mounted, and cries for the secession of the IPKF both

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sides of the Sri Lankan conflict grew, Gandhi refused to withdraw the IPKF from Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, conforming to his defeat in Indian parliamentary elections in December 1989, new Prime Minister V.P. Singh ordered the pulling out of the IPKF, and their last ship left Sri Lanka on 24 March 1990. The 32-month presence of the IPKF in Sri Lanka resulted in the deaths of 1200 Indian soldiers and over 5000 Sri Lankans. The cost to the Government of India was estimated at over €10.3 billion.

03.13 The assassination of Rajvi Gandhi

Support for the LTTE in India fell dramatically in 1991, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a suicide bomber, Thenmozhi Rajaratnam. The Indian press subsequently reported that Prabhakaran decided to eliminate Gandhi, as he saw the ex-Prime Minister to be against the Tamil liberation struggle and feared that he might re-induct the IPKF, which Prabhakaran termed the "satanic force", if he won the 1991 Indian general election. In 1998 a tribunal in India presided over by Special Judge V. Navaneetham found the LTTE and its commander Velupillai Prabhakaran responsible for the killing. In an interview granted in 2006, LTTE ideologist Anton Balasingham expressed his regret about the murder, although he did not accept responsibility. India remained a post-assassination external observer of the conflict.

The intervention was disastrous. India was before long at odds with the LTTE, a group which it had funded and trained but which turned out to be far more adept than the Indians at fighting a classic guerilla warfare in the jungles of the Wannu region. If the IPKF had remained in office, it might eventually have prevailed, but anti-Indian sentiment was widespread in the south and had fuelled another bloody uprising, by the leftist and Sinhalese nationalist JVP, which removed thousands of friends of the ruling UNP in a crusade against the agreement. President Ranasinghe Premadasa ordered the IPKF to depart; it acted so in some disarray, allowing a great deal of the territory it had controlled to the LTTE, which also captured armaments from the IPKF and its Tamil allies. Premadasa naively thought that he was about to conclude a peace agreement with the LTTE and in fact allied himself with the rebels to oust the Indians. Even so, the LTTE outsmarted the government; instead of continuing peace talks, it launched an orgy of violence against the security forces, massacring hundreds of policemen in the east, bombing political leaders in the south and killing rival Tamil leaders in both Sri Lanka and India. Soon he had taken control of most of the Jaffna Peninsula as well as vast tracts of land in the north and east.

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03.14 Role of the china

During the concluding phases of the war in early 2009, when reports of tens of thousands civilians trapped in the war zone began filtering out despite a ban on the media, UN security council members Austria, Mexico and Costa Rica, backed by the united nations and Britain, called for an informal briefing on the humanitarian crisis. China, supported by Russia, blocked the decision to declare this a “domestic issue” for Sri Lanka and not a threat to international security. China's decision has increased its impact on Sri Lanka. In an endeavour to renovate its us\$40 billion economy, Sri Lanka granted china an exclusive economic zone in its first postwar drive to attract more foreign direct investment and also threw a green light to an us\$891 million power project, even as the united states warned its citizens against going to Sri Lanka. With the united states ending direct military aid to Sri Lanka over its questionable human rights record, china agreed to sell significant quantities of arms (worth us\$37.6 million) including Jian-7 fighter jets, anti-aircraft guns, sophisticated Jy-11 3D air surveillance radars and other military hardware and munitions that helped tip the balance against the insurgents. In 2007 Beijing moved to secure its maritime strategic goals through brokering a us\$1 billion deal with Colombo to develop a deepwater port in the southern town of Hambantota into a major transshipment hub with a container port, a bunkering system, an oil refinery, an airport and other installations. Hambantota, at the southern tip of Sri Lanka, is only six nautical miles from the main east-west trade road crossing the Indian Ocean. About 70 percent of China's oil imports flow through this waterway, which extends from the Middle East through the Strait of Malacca to Chinese ports. China has expanded its navy to prevent potential vulnerability in conflict situations, especially with the United States. China also has been getting a “chain of pearls,” a phrase coined by defence contractor Booz Allen Hamilton to describe the transport routes along strategic sea lines to secure a regular provision of oil by developing port facilities across the south china sea through the strait of Malacca and across the Indian ocean, and on to the Arabian gulf. The U.S. gave us \$7.4 million, while the U.K. gave us \$2 million.

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03.15 Human security situation in 2007

Because of the heavy military operation and its relative activities in the East the government of Sri Lanka had successfully freed the entire east from the LTTE declared by President Mahinda Rajapakse on January 19, 2007. Meanwhile, even after the liberation of the East, there were large-scale human rights violations in 2007 by many armed groups in both the North and especially in the East of the island. Agreeing to the Minority Rights Group International 2007 report, human rights in Sri Lanka had become a crisis point' in 2007, with various amounts of reports of extra-judicial killings, disappearances, and abductions particularly in the Eastern province where the events were taking place highly even after the so-called —liberation. The Sri Lanka human rights group clearly stated that some 662 people were killed and 540 disappeared between January and August 2007. The vast majority of these were Tamils, while others were Muslim. The UNHCR office in Sri Lanka reported on 26 October that 190,669 people out of 51,908 families had been displaced in 2007 because of ethnic conflict. Kilinochi district had the largest number of trips, with 48,512 people. 38,230 IDPs in Batticaloa district and 32,323 IDPs in Mullaitivu district. Likewise, the South Asia Watch group on the role of small arms revealed, on October 28, that there were over 1.3 million illegal weapons in use in Sri Lanka, adding that the availability of illegal small arms had let to the escalation of the pace of violence in the island. Eventually the issues of human security have been highly created in 2008 by escalating the ongoing war and human rights violation in future in the North and the East of the island.

03.16 Political Security Issues of Sri Lanka

This study on non-traditional security issues of small states draws on the case study of Sri Lanka. According to the literature, there are clearly not enough studies on political security issues in Sri Lanka. Rather, the literature does not offer a complete theoretical perspective on political security issues in Sri Lanka. From this point of view, this study is an attempt to contemplate the above-mentioned crack by analyzing political security in Sri Lanka.

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03.17 Balance of Defence

Much of the military strategy rests on the notion that the.

The LTTE has been severely weakened as a result of:

1. Government air strikes and offensives since July 2006;
2. Karuna's defection in 2004 and the ensuing alliance with government forces; and
3. Increased international pressure on the LTTE, including their funding and weapons purchases.

The LTTE has certainly incurred significant losses since mid-2006. One author suggests more than 1,000 may have been shot down or severely wounded, a substantial proportion of an estimated 10,000-strong armed force, but granted the nature of its tactics, far from fatal.

04. Conclusion

The Norwegian peace effort failed because of its own inadequacy and the evident duplicity of the LTTE in its own use of wartime mobilization. Moreover, there was no space for a powerful mediating role in the Sri Lankan context, as the island nation and its neighbours were both disinterested, disagreeing and suspected of such attempts. In this context, there was little for Norway as a weak third-party mediator could offer to solve the dispute. The LTTE leadership has been selfish and misunderstood the regional and international strategic context, placing the terrorist organization at an even greater disadvantage despite its military achievements and international ties.

The Sri Lankan experience is significant in that a non-state actor with ethnic roots has been defeated by conventional military means and a supporting political-military strategy. The lessons learned for counterinsurgency warfare are many and it will be valuable to consider this strategy as a potential model applied to similar situations where isolation of the battleground is possible though it is hard.

To tally up the stem causes of the polarisation of the Sinhala – Tamil political relations, it is necessary to study the changes that took seat in the political, economic and social spheres since the country's independence. Some of these changes were the root causes that directly influenced the request for a general devolution model for Tamil-majority regions of the country. In this sense, the requirement for a federal system can be identified as the primary cause of the conflict, which has become a demand for a distinct Tamil homeland. The Tamil demand for a distinct Tamil homeland in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka then became a protracted war. This political unrest for Eelam had created a sharp divide in ethnopolitical relations in Sri Lanka.

firmly believe that we can complete the war in the near future. While hoping that the government will solve the LTTE's issues first, and we think that the government will guarantee

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a sustainable peace and human security over the rural area in future. We therefore agree to military victories against the Tamil Tigers. Therefore, it is our hope that military victories can help the country achieve peace and human security. Once, with the release of the Eastern Province in 2007, Sri Lankans might think that some of the LTTE's problems are over in the region. Afterwards it would proceed to smash the remainder of the LTTE in North of the country in before the national day in February 4th 2009. The peace process was a courageous endeavour to smash through an apparently intractable conflict. The 2002-2009 interlude brought some normalization to the lives of people in the north and east for the first time in over a decade. But the conflict is extremely complex, and the peace process has failed to address many of the difficult issues. It was forever functioning to be difficult to get together a fictionalized Sinhalese polity with a semi-totalitarian armed movement in the north and make a political settlement respectful of democracy and human rights. It was clear that a ceasefire agreement would include the two parties that controlled the means of violence; in this sense, the bilateral approach was unavoidable. As soon as we started talking about a political settlement, all the excluded political players began to make their presence felt and to undermine the progress of a political settlement. And as soon as the gleam of a political settlement appeared, the problems of allowing any territory to be dominated by the LTTE – which indicated no sign of embracing democratic values – became rapidly apparent.

At the same time, the shift after December 2005, the increasing influence of chauvinist and militarist elements of government policy and the appalling human rights abuses that have become apparent in 2006, severely undermined any confidence in the country to protect minority rights. As usual, it is civilians – Tamil, Sinhalese and Muslim – caught between the oppression of the LTTE and the brutality of the security forces, who bear the weight of the violence.

Many ideologists who have seized power with President Rajapakse believe that military power will inevitably weaken the LTTE. This resulted in a renewed conflict and a disastrous year for the long-suffering Sri Lankan civilians. But a lot of the obligation for the failure of the procedure must also rest with the LTTE, which was apparently incapable of compromising its goals and preferred renewed fighting to any negotiated resolution. The hardliners are in the ascendancy on both positions. Until there is a way to change the political attitudes on both sides, the conflict will only worsen. This and other key questions will be discussed in subsequent Crisis Group reports.

The peace process was a courageous attempt to get out of an apparently intractable conflict. The 2002-2009 interlude brought some normalization to the lives of people in the north and east for the first time in over a decade. But the conflict is extremely complex, and the peace process has failed to address many of the difficult issues. It was forever functioning to be difficult to get together a fictionalized Sinhalese polity with a semi-totalitarian armed movement in the north and make a political settlement respectful of democracy and human rights. It was clear that a ceasefire agreement would include the two parties that controlled the

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means of violence; in this sense, the bilateral approach was unavoidable. As soon as we started talking about a political settlement, all the excluded political players began to make their presence felt and to undermine the progress of a political settlement. And as soon as the gleam of a political settlement appeared, the problems of allowing any territory to be dominated by the LTTE – which indicated no sign of embracing democratic values became rapidly apparent. At the same time, a quarter past December 2005, the increasing influence of chauvinist and militarist elements of government policy and the appalling human rights abuses that have become apparent in 2006, severely undermined any confidence in the country to protect minority rights. As usual, it has been civilians Tamil, Sinhalese and Muslims caught between LTTE oppression and security force brutality, who bear the brunt of the violence. There were times in the process when more progress could have been achieved through a broader government initiative. There are definitely areas where LTTE flexibility could have kept the process on track. But in 2004, the interest of the rebels appeared to diminish. They no longer trusted the process to achieve an acceptable political outcome, and military inactivity undermined their cohesiveness and limited funding to the diaspora. Karuna's defection was a double blow, weakening their military capacity and strengthening those who attended the talks as a "peace trap", as well as encouraging Sinhalese politicians who believed peace was only possible by the military victory. Many ideologists who have seized power with President Rajapakse believe that military power will inevitably weaken the LTTE. This resulted in a renewed conflict and a disastrous year for the long-suffering Sri Lankan civilians. But a lot of the obligation for the failure of the procedure must also rest with the LTTE, which was apparently incapable of compromising its goals and preferred renewed fighting to any negotiated resolution.

Hardliners are rising in both directions. Until there is a way to change the political attitudes on both sides, the conflict will only worsen. This and other key questions will be discussed in subsequent Crisis Group reports. Farther, this paper discussed the two attacks made to make a negotiated solution, first with the help of India and then with Norwegian help. The India-Lanka peace accord implemented the provincial council system, but this did not achieve a long lasting solution to the conflict since both the LTTE and some groups among the Sinhalese and the Muslims were not agreeable to this. The Indian solution was implemented directly in Sri Lanka as a top-down solution by the Indian government, but without the consent of the parties involved in the conflict. This was the principal deficiency in Indian mediation.

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