Abstract:
Resilience in response for crises has become a priority for the EU in its humanitarian and development policy along its foreign policy including the 2015 European Neighbourhood Policy review (ENP). The EU seeks to build state and societal resilience of the Union as a whole, its members and the EU’s neighbours including Jordan, a strategic southern partner of the EU. In this regard, the EU Building resilience in Jordan in response for crises as the Syrian refugee crisis seems workable with a little impact, thus the EU needs to foster it. Hence, this paper’s question is How can the EU foster resilience in the EU’s neighbourhood after it has become a priority in the 2015 (ENP) review in case of Jordan? While many scholars like David Chandler argues that the EU could foster resilience in its neighbouring countries by making it a local self-governing project and not an external imposed project where the EU has the mission of monitoring and assessment, in this paper, based on document analysis for the EU and Jordan official bilateral and multilateral agreements along reports and annual reviews about these agreements with textual analysis of the current literature on building resilience, I argue that fostering resilience requires both presenting resilience as a self-governing project with a greater engagement of the Jordanian government, local community and its civil society. At the same time, it needs a greater role of the EU at helping Jordan to establish the best institutional design that could foster state and societal resilience in Jordan with better monitoring mechanisms.

Keywords: European Neighborhood Policy, Resilience, The Syrian Refugee Crisis.
1. Introduction

In the commission's Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2015, the commission integrated the resilience of its Southern and Eastern partners as a goal that aims to secure as emphasized in its joint communication “The measures set out in this Joint Communication seek to offer ways to strengthen the resilience of the EU’s partners in the face of external pressures and their ability to make their own sovereign choices” (European Commission, 2015, p. 4). At the same time, resilience has been described by the commission in the 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) as the EU’s own interest and its citizens’ interest. “It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, resilience – the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises – benefits us” (European Union External Action, 2016, p. 9). Thus, both of the 2015 ENP review and the 2016 EUGS reflect the EU’s new approach toward its southern and eastern partners and the shift from the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and the First ENP.

Unlike the normative approach, which the EU adopted in the 2003 ESS and the first ENP, and its aim to promote the EU’s universal value of democracy, rule of law and human rights, the new approach illustrated by building resilience was described by authors like Tocci as a pragmatist approach that the EU’s internal and external crises including, not restrictively, the Brexit, the hostility with Russia due to Crimea annexation, or the Arab uprisings in 2011 forced the EU to adopt in face of these crises (Tocci, 2020).

This pragmatist approach requires new strategy for the EU in tackling these crises and helping its neighbours in tackling them, since the normative approach seems unworkable in the south as the region is full of turmoil, or to the east where also the instability is extremely needed. Thus, the EU’s main priority became stabilization and preserving the stability of its eastern and southern neighbours including Jordan. For this reason, state and societal resilience became the new strategy for the EU in dealing with its neighbours including Jordan to ensure this goal.

As Jordan is a significant partner of the EU at the global and regional level, and due to its important role in promoting stability, moderation and inter-faith tolerance in the Middle East, the EU acknowledges the significant role of Jordan as a source of stability in the region, and the importance of increasing its support for such a crucial actor in the region. Hence, the EU has sought for the advancement of its relation with Jordan and enhancing its cooperation with it on different levels and across different sectors.

Moreover, as Jordan is covered by the first ENP and its 2015 review, the EU is committed to support Jordan and building its resilience in response for its internal and external crises and they are many; including poverty, unemployment, lack of natural resources and the influx of refugees where Jordan is the home of millions of refugees, Palestinian, Iraqis and lately the Syrians. The EU’s building resilience in Jordan seems workable and essential. In response for the Syrian refugee crisis, for instance, as Jordan is hosting almost 1.4 million Syrian refugees with only 661 thousand of those refugees registered within the UN (The United Nations High Commission for Refugees,
the EU has pledged almost 2.1 billion dollars since the beginning of the on-going Syrian civil war as a contribution at building the resilience of the hosting communities and the Syrian refugees in the country. This financial assistance was essential for building the economic resilience in the county and hence preserving its stability. For this reason, the EU building resilience in response for crises in Jordan seems workable, but the question is what can be done to foster it and increases its efficiency. Thus, this paper’s main question is:

**How can the EU foster resilience in the EU’s neighbourhood after it has become a priority in the 2015 (ENP) review in case of Jordan?**

In order to answer this question, the paper will proceed as follows: the first section addresses the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of 2004, its 2011, analyze them in light of their goals, priorities and mechanism and trace the new principles which were introduced in 2011 to increase its efficiency in light of the new circumstances including the Arab uprisings. Next, the paper proceeds to map resilience in the EU’s foreign and security policy within the context of the EU’s Jordan relation in light of the 2015 ENP review. This section aims to illustrate the shift in the EU approach in term of its relations with its southern neighbours including Jordan, this shift that moves from the normative approach to the pragmatist approach as illustrated in building resilience within its 2015 ENP review. The third section conceptualizes resilience, traces its origin and clarifies its characteristics as they appear in the EU’s humanitarian and development policy. Then, the following section provides empirical insights on the EU’s building resilience in Jordan and its efficiency. Finally, the conclusion, implications for policy makers and the upcoming research in regard of resilience in Jordan to foster it and increases its efficiency.

**Methodology**

As for the methodology of this paper, it’s a descriptive methodology builds primarily upon textual analysis of secondary data of various texts from official European and Jordanian websites, their reports, NEWS reports, and scholarly literature, as well as document analysis for different EU-Jordan official policies including their bilateral and multilateral agreements within the first ENP, its 2011 and 2015 ENP reviews to trace the goals for Jordan and the EU within these policies ,the shift towards resilience as a priority for the EU, and the new mechanisms and tools the EU uses to build resilience in Jordan.

The analysis is built upon drawing a comparison between the ENP of 2004 and Its reviews of 2011 and 2015 in light of their goals, principles, and mechanisms as they appear in the EU-Jordan context with the shift towards building resilience specially as a response to the Syrian crisis and its drastic impact on both Jordan and the EU and analyze the EU role as a main international donor to the country and its role in promoting Jordan’s economic stability.
Results

The paper finds that the EU’s role in building resilience in Jordan has a positive but with a little impact in response for the Syrian refugee crisis or building economic resilience. Moreover, it finds that the EU can foster resilience through fostering Jordan economic stability. On this regard, beside the financial assistance, which is crucial to preserve Jordan economic stability, the EU should support Jordan to compile with its commitment to implement economic reforms which are essential for sustainable development, economic growth and job creation. In that respect, monitoring and assessment mechanisms for the EU might need a different strategy and a different engagement from the EU. Since Jordan has commitments under the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities to enhance reforms, Jordan should work to improve the climate investment in order to increase the Foreign Direct Investment. Yet, it still has a long way on this track and it is not benefitting of its comparative advantage due to its stability in the region. In addition, the EU can play a greater role in fighting political corruption which is a main barrier in front of any economic or political reforms. Moreover, enhancing the role of civil society’s organization in Jordan is crucial since resilience is presented as a local project. Though, the EU is trying to support civil society in Jordan, but there are many limitations that affect their role in Jordan. Hence, the EU can also emphasize Jordan’s commitment to remove all the barriers in front of them by making the necessary legal political reforms.

2. Discussion

2.1 The 2004 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and its 2011 Review

The 2004 ENP is a new framework for the EU relations with its southern and eastern neighbours. The changes that accompanied the 2004 enlargement and its implication on the EU strategy and security as a result of the changing of its external borders required new policy to respond to such changes. Hence, the 2004 European Neighbourhood Policy was the response for the new circumstances. Essentially, it was designed to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. This new policy represents a new phase in the EU relations with these neighbours and offers them the chance to take part in numerous EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation (European Commission, 2004).

The ENP regulates the EU’s relations with 16 of the its closest Eastern and Southern neighbours to the south: Algeria; Egypt; Israel; Jordan; Lebanon; Libya; Morocco; Palestine; Syria; and Tunisia. To the east: Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Georgia; Moldova; and Ukraine (European Commission, 2004).

In parallel to the EU 2003 Security Strategy, the ENP’s goal is to promote security, stability and prosperity as this is the main task of the EU as demonstrated by the commission in the ENP Strategy Paper. Achieving these goals requires greater cooperation between the EU and its southern and eastern neighbours in different aspects. Accordingly, enhancing political dialogue, greater economic integration, the
emphasis on the EU fundamental values and enhancing the neighbours’ commitment to these values is crucial (European Commission, 2004).

In that respect the ENP can be seen as an alternative for the Union's enlargement that has previously been the main instrument for the Union's normative power in Europe (Haukkala, 2008). As the EU believes that fundamental shared-values upon which the EU is built on like liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights are the essence of its stability and prosperity, it has the task of sharing them with these neighbours as the path for stabilizing and resolving the conflicts of its southern and eastern neighbours.

As for the implementation of the ENP’s goals, the existing legal instruments which regulate the EU relations with its southern and eastern neighbours, both on the bilateral or multilateral level, would be the main mechanism for implementation. For eastern neighbours, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements are the basis for contractual relations and for the southern neighbours, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (the “Barcelona Process”) provides a regional framework for co-operation along a network of Association Agreements (European Commission, 2004).

In addition, the EU concluded joint Action Plans, plans of political, economic or social reforms. The essence of these Action Plans is that they are based on joint partnership which means the awareness of shared values and common interests. Hence, the Action Plans' success depends on the recognition and implementation of a set of priority issues. No pre-determined priorities can be imposed on any partner. These will be defined by common consent and will thus vary from a partner to another based on the differentiation principle that distinguishes between the needs and capacities of each partner (European Commission, 2004).

As for monitoring and evaluations, there would be committees and sub-committees established under the agreements to do this task. Then, the Commission gives periodic reports on progress and on areas need further efforts, with consideration for assessments taken by the authorities of the partner country. Each Action Plan is reviewed and may be adapted in the light of progress towards meeting the priorities for action (Stivachtis, 2018).

After three years of this policy, the EU thought of harmonizing the ENP funding instruments since there was not one harmonized financial instrument till 2007, before that the financial support was through existing assistance program to third countries through Regional Indicatives Program, including those presently covered by TACIS and MEDA. The total level of funding for the period 2004-06 under external assistance instruments was €255 million (€ 75 million for Taccis, €90 million for Phare, € 45 million for CARDS and €45 million for MEDA (European Commission, 2004).

Harmonizing the financial support under one instrument for the ENP and improving the lending capacities for the member states were essential for helping partners compile with their legal commitments. Yet, despite of this, the ENP and the EU expectations of following its normative approach, as it did through the 2004 enlargement with the logic of conditionality applied to the CEEs to promote democracy, human rights, economic reform and development in its neighbours failed to achieve its aspirations. One main
reason for such inadequacy, specially, for the southern partners, was the EU’s tendency to ignore partnership and instead provide ‘lessons,’ thereby jeopardizing the application of the “joint ownership” principle, thus, the EU appeared as simply interested in exporting its institutional model and value system and not dealing with partners (Stivachtis, 2018).

For this reason, the inefficiency of the 2004 ENP to deliver all its goals along the new circumstances in the eastern and southern partners and within the EU itself required a review for the ENP in 2011. To the south, the starting of what is known of the Arab Spring by the overthrowing of long-standing authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Tunisia; the ongoing military conflict in Libya, the civil war in in Syria represented a new phase in the region. Moreover, the long-lasting Arab Israeli conflict in the region required a different look at the EU’s relationship with its neighbours. To the east, continued oppression in Belarus and the encouraging progress made by other partners like Moldova in its reform efforts or Ukraine in the talks of the Association Agreement needed support by the EU. The same support was also applied to Morocco and Jordan in their announcement of constitutional reforms. More importantly, the terrorist attacks within the EU like London or Madrid attacks and Lisbon Treaty were considered as an opportunity for the EU to strengthen the delivery of its foreign policy or broadened its co-operation with neighbouring countries to cover the full range of issues in an integrated and more effective manner.

All these circumstances made the 2011 review more compelling. The aim of this review was to support the changes in the region whether they were witnessing a fast regime change or a prolonged process of reform and democratic consolidation. As the EU supported these changes as it believes they promote the shared values of the EU, it emphasized in this review on different mechanism and approaches to support these changes. In addition to the emphasis on a more differentiation and flexible approach considering the needs and capacities of each partner, the EU pursued a new approach supporting entail a greater degree of alignment with EU policies and rules leading progressively to democratic consolidation and economic integration in the EU Internal Market (European Commission, 2011).

The EU introduced the new approach known with “more for more and less for less” and is built on a greater conditionality. According to it, increased EU support is conditional and depends on progress in building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law. More and faster progresses in the country’s internal reforms, simply means more support it gets from the EU. This support comes in different forms, including either more funding for social and economic development, larger programmes for comprehensive institution-building (CIB), greater market access, more financing in support of investments; or greater facilitation of mobility. On the other hand, The EU will pursue policy of reducing relations with partners involved in violations of human rights and democracy standards through making use of targeted sanctions or other policy measures (European Commission, 2011).

In addition, the EU invested in new instruments represented by the European Endowment for Democracy and a Civil Society Facility (CSF) to support the changes within these regions.
Nevertheless, according to many partners, especially the southern ones, the more for more principle seemed unattractive. It continued to depend on neoliberal capitalist market economy recipes with its belief in liberalization and privatization. Moreover, according to this principle, any partner which engages in “deep and sustainable democracy” will be rewarded. Yet, it is questionable whether those southern partners were ready or willing to accept and fully implement external recipes even in exchange for rewards (Khader, 2013). Even the European Endowment for Democracy and a Civil Society Facility were criticized, as in the recent past EU-directed financial support was insufficient, there were discouraging bureaucratic burdens and disbursement were very slow. Moreover, the selection of civil society organizations to be funded has often been unsuitable and sometimes arbitrary, as the EU engaged more with civil society organizations believed to be more agreeable and acceptable than others with a real social base (Khader, 2013).

For this reason, the 2011 seemed ineffective and failed to achieve its aims, especially with the southern partners where the full democratic transition could not be achieved, despite of all the EU supports. Moreover, the EU believed that in a region full of turmoil, this goal cannot be pursued without stabilizing the region first. Hence, the EU launched the 2015 review with a more pragmatist approach to enhance the ENP goals, as will be illustrated in the following section along illustration for the EU-Jordan relation and the shift to resilience in parallel to the adoption of the 2015 ENP review.

2.2 Resilience in the Context of the EU's- Jordan Relation in line of 2015 ENP Review

When it comes to the EU-Jordan relation, the EU has always looked at Jordan as a strategic partner and an actor of stability, due to its role in promoting stability, moderation and inter-faith/tolerance in a region full of turmoil. For this reason, the EU has always sought to support Jordan in response of different crises including the influx of refugees where Jordan is the home of different waves of refugees; Palestinians, Iraqis and lately the Syrians (Alougili, 2019).

The history of the Jordan-EU relation is not something new and it has developed on the multilateral and bilateral level. On the multilateral level, the history of Jordan-EU relation goes back to the 1970s, when the founders of the EU (the European Economic Community and the European Community) started to design various processes to guide their relationships with Mediterranean countries, including Jordan. These processes were implemented through several policy frameworks including the Global Mediterranean Policy of 1972, the Euro-Arab Dialogue of 1973, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) Barcelona Process of 1995, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of 2003/2004 and its reviewed policy of 2011 and 2015, as well as the Union for the Mediterranean (UFM) of 2008 (Youngs, 2015).

As for their relation on the bilateral level, the EU and Jordan signed an Association Agreement in 2002, it is the main block for their bilateral relationship, this agreement has linked them together and created a strong partnership across many sectors. In October 2010, the EU-Jordan Association Council agreed on an Advanced Status' Partnership which has resulted in an increase in the scope of political cooperation,
greater integration, an approximation of economic legislation and the reduction of trade barriers. Jordan-EU strategic partnership can be demonstrated through this agreement, since Jordan was the first Mediterranean country to conclude such an agreement. The EU-Jordan Action-Plan, which governed their cooperation from 2012-2016, strengthened this advanced status. In 2014, the EU-Jordan Association Council negotiated and signed a Mobility Partnership that aims to improve the management of mobility and migration (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2019).

In parallel to the 2015 European Neighbourhood Policy review, the EU and Jordan have adopted the EU-Jordan Partnership Priorities. Under the Partnership Priorities, their collaboration is designed to foster these objectives mutually: i) macro-economic stability, sustainable and knowledge-based growth; ii) reinforcing democratic governance, the rule of law and human rights; and iii) regional stability and security, including counter terrorism. Further, as will be illustrated in the following section, Jordan signed the 2016 Jordan -EU compact, after London conference 2016 for supporting Syria and the Region. The compact aims at improving the living conditions of refugees and their host communities and building resilience of the refugees and the hosting communities.

The EU-Jordan bilateral relationship has also been revised within the context of the second review of the ENP in 2015. The ineffectiveness of the 2011 revised ENP to accommodate the promise of the Arab uprisings along with the outbreak of new conflicts in the Southern neighbouring countries made this review also compelling (Badarin & Schumacher, 2020).

The significance of the 2015 ENP review is its implication in term of the EU foreign and security policy in regard of its eastern and southern partners including Jordan. It became a turning point for the EU-neighbourhood relations that showed the de facto abolition of the EU’s long-standing ambition of pursuing a values-based agenda in favour of democracy promotion in the EU southern neighbourhood (Delcour, 2015). Moreover, the 2015 ENP review integrated building resilience for the first time into the realm of EU foreign policy towards the southern neighbours, though vaguely and abruptly (Badarin & Schumacher, 2020).

In addition, the latest ENP review was concluded in November 2015, eight months before the adoption of the 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS). In that respect, it was closely designed with the deliberations leading to the EUGS. The Global Strategy was presented in June 2016, after a comprehensive review of the EU’s external policies. In the EUGS, resilience is emphasized as a strategic priority out of the five priorities for the EU. The EUGS mentions the commitment to state and societal resilience, to the East and South neighbours, as the main objective of EU external action (European Union Extrenal Action, 2016). However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss resilience in the EUGS, though the 2015 ENP paved the way for this significance foreign and security policy when it comes to resilience.

Indeed, the European Union’s policy towards its southern neighbourhood has witnessed different changes. Starting from the ‘Barcelona Process’ of the 1990s and the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, the EUs’ policy frameworks portrayed the EU as a
normative power. The EU, reflecting on itself, saw the usefulness of its norms and values, consequently, wanted to export them to its southern neighbours as a common interest for both (Manners, 2003). Thus, as the South was seen by the EU as unstable and a source of dominant threat, both the ESS and ENP aimed to present a fit-sized policy to stabilize the EU southern neighbours by exporting EU’s norms. This narrative of duty-responsibility dominated the EU foreign policy discourse even during the initial response to the Arab uprisings, as emphasized by the first review of the 2011 ENP and its so called “strategic option” that emphasize its support to the Arab risings (European Commission, 2011).

However, the second review of the 2015 ENP implies the significance of supporting its partners in the region. More than ever, stabilization has become the main principal guiding the EU’s new strategy for security and prosperity, the EU emphasized that the new ENP seeks to work on conflict prevention through early warning, in line with early preventive measures, and increases partners’ capacity in this respect. For this reason, the measures set out through the 2015 ENP offer ways to strengthen the resilience of the EU’s partners in the face of external pressures and their ability to make their own sovereign choices (European Commission, 2015).

Thus, stabilization and building resilience were reflected as the new 2015 ENP review goals. Achieving this required more differentiation and a greater mutual ownership approach that considers the needs and capability of each member partner, flexibility and greater engagement of the EU members to support the eastern and southern partners (European Commission, 2015).

Moreover, this new shift cannot be separated from the EU’s view about itself. the EU’s optimistic view of Europe itself with the ESS opening assertion that ‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free’ (Council of the European Union, 2003, p. 3) has been transformed in 2015 ENP review with the acknowledgment of Europe insecurity and the various crises within and beyond the European Union that reflect the need for the change in the EU policies (European Commission, 2015).

This shift in the EU’s view about itself, the neighbouring and the whole world; the need to embrace insecurity narrative and the inevitability of shocks and crisis transformed the EU duty-responsibility to threat-responsibility narrative (Reid & Evans, 2014). As a result, building state and societal resilience of the EU, the southern and eastern neighbouring states became the priority of the EU foreign and security policy and the path to stability and security.

Yet, this shift does not mean that the EU has simply abandoned its normative agenda, rather, the EU pragmatically faces the reality that this agenda is insufficient to an unstable region. Thus, building resilience is like a middle ground between over-ambitious liberal peacebuilding and under-ambitious stability (Anholt & Wagner, 2016). In other words, in order to achieve these goals and to spread the EU’s norm, building resilience is essential. Now, before proceeding to see the EU role in Jordan, clarifying resilience as a concept as understood from the EU foreign policy is crucial. Hence, the following section will address resilience as a concept and its integration into the EU foreign and security policy.
2.3 Conceptualizing Resilience

Resilience as a word stems from the Latin word “resilire,” “Salire” means literally to leap or jump; the suffix “re” indicates repetition, or backward motion. Regarding its origin, it is often traced back and attributed to the ecologist Holling who used the concept to refer to the ecological systems' ability to absorb change and disruption (Holling, 1973). Others have emphasized the important contributions from psychology, where resilience indicates a shift in the focus from vulnerability and deficits to protective factors and adaptive capacities (Bourbeau, 2018).

As for the EU, resilience has been integrated into the EU humanitarian and development policy by the EU Commission from 2012 with the publication of The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises in 2012. In this document, the Commission has illustrated that resilience is the ability of the states, societies, communities and individuals to manage, tackle, adapt, and recover from shocks and crises confirming that resilience-based approach is the base to reduce vulnerability (Tocci, 2020).

Since then, the concept has been used in the following humanitarian and development policy including the Conclusion of the Council of the European Union on The EU Approach to Resilience in 2013 or the Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries, designed to reinforce the momentum of the resilience agenda (Tocci, 2020).

The importance of these policy documents or other EUs humanitarian and development policy is that they clarify the three characteristics of the EU building resilience. As Tocci confirms that these characteristics are clearly notable in the 2013 Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries. She sums them up in the following: First, resilience requires all EU actors (humanitarian, developmental, political) working differently and more effectively together to achieve resilience objectives. Second, the EU asserts the need for integrating resilience in national policies and planning for development since it's the local government responsibility to achieve resilience. In addition, the EU emphasizes that a resilience approach has to be sustainable, multi-sectoral, multi-level, multi-partner, and jointly planned by the people, communities, or governments at risk (Tocci, 2020).

Finally, a resilience approach is characterized as people-centred and focused on the most vulnerable groups. In addition, resilience does not only aim to increase the people ability to absorb shocks and to cope with stresses, but it also constitutes an opportunity for transformation, adaptation, and improving livelihoods and economic opportunities (Tocci, 2020). These characteristics can also be seen within the EU's foreign and security policy represented by the ENP 2105 and more clearly within the 2016 EUGS.

These characteristics can be seen in the Jordanian case in response the Syrian refugee crisis with its emphasis that the refugees can be seen as a development tool to contribute to the advancement of the local communities as will be illustrated later. The following section will shed the lights on some evidences from the EU building resilience in Jordan, these evidences include the EU building resilience in response for the Syrian refugee’s crisis in the broader scope of building economic resilience.
2.4 Building Resilience in Response for the Syrian Crisis

The impact of the on-going Syrian civil war cannot be restricted to Syria only, but it extends to the whole region including Jordan. According to the United Nation High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), there are over 5.6 million Syrian registered refugees distributed in the region mainly in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt (The United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2020). Jordan is the third largest host for those refugees with a total number of refugees estimated with about 1.4 million Syrian refugees (Alougili, 2019). As of April 2020, there were 661,213 registered Syrian refugees and asylum seekers in Jordan by the (UNHCR), which means that more than 50% of the Syrian refugees in Jordan are unregistered. The majority of the 656,213 Syrian refugees in Jordan live in the local communities rather than refugee camps. Out of the registered Syrian refugees, only (123,366) live in the official camps for the Syrian refugees in Jordan Zaatari, Margeeb Alfhoud, and Azraq- consisting representing 16% of the total Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR.

The sudden influx of refugees has maximized the country's own problems; as Jordan is a middle-low class country with a very limited resources, an increasing rate of poverty and a high rate of unemployment, the Syrian refugee crisis has burdened the country politically, economically and socially.

As Jordan is a strategic partner to the EU, it realizes the importance of supporting Jordan to tackle the crisis. This was in different aspects, on the financial level, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the European Union is a leading donor for supporting Jordan to deal with the impact of the Syrian crisis. It has pledged since then almost €2.1 billion through different instruments; bilateral assistance instrument to support Jordan macroeconomic stability, humanitarian aid which provides services such as healthcare, basic needs assistance and shelter both for the refugees and includes the vulnerable Jordanian families. Finally, the resilience assistance that tackles longer term resilience and recovery needs including education, protection, energy, water and sanitation as the chart shows.

Table 1: EU Financial Support to Jordan in Response for the Crisis since 2011 in millions€

![Graph showing EU financial support](chart.png)

Source: (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2019).
As the chart illustrates the EU contribution financially. At the same time, the EU established a special instrument in response to the Syrian crisis, the Regional Trust Fund ‘MADAD Fund’ which was established in 2014, mainly to tackle longer term resilience and recovery needs of the Syrian refugees in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. Through this fund, the EU has committed €300 million as a resilience support for Jordan in line with Jordan Response Plan (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2019). The aim of this fund by focusing on recovery needs like education and livelihood, is helping refugees and the vulnerable Jordanian families to enable them to live in dignity as much as possible.

In addition, there is the Macro- Financial Assistance (MFA) instrument which aims to support Jordan's economic recovery and its economic reforms. The programme is provided in a form of low-interest and long-term loans that aim to support the country’s economic growth and create more jobs. The EU signed the first MFA in March 2014 in a programme of €180 million, the MFA II was renewed in September 2017 to pledge additional €200 million, and finally the Commission proposed MFA III programme worth €500 million in September 2019 and came into force as of January 2020 (European Commission, 2019).

Beside to the financial support, there is also the political support. The EU has co-hosted the 2017,2018, and 2019 Brussels Conferences for Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region. From the first conference, the EU's strong commitment to build resilience was emphasized. First, it has designed a financial tracking system to confirm that it has delivered on its pledges committed through the 2016 EU-Jordan compact. Second, in order to ensure the development of host communities, it has funded projects that have linked refugee aid to the establishment of new local institutions, for instance, the implementation of an Election Observation mission in Jordan (Briefing European Parliamentary Research Service, 2017).

Above all, the 2016 EU-Jordan compact represents a great shift in the EU-Jordan thinking about building resilience. Through this compact, they seize to instrumentalize the refugees as a development opportunity for Jordan. This compact was signed in February 2016, it aims at linking humanitarian and development funding through multi-year grants and concessional loans. Under this agreement,

the EU is committed to pledge $700 million through annual grant loans for three years, and concessional loans of $1.9 billion. Moreover, the EU is committed to relax trade regulations to improve exports from 18 designated economic zones and areas, stimulate economic growth and jobs creation. In return, Jordan is required to meet certain targets when it comes to those refugees. One of these targets is related to formal labour market access. As the refugees faced different restrictions in front of their access to the Jordanian labour market prior to the compact, Jordan now has to issue 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees in specified sectors. In addition, Jordan must employ certain quotas for the Syrian refugees in different businesses, improve the investment environment, and legitimize Syrian businesses in the country. In addition, Jordan commits to provide school places to all Syrian children, and some work training opportunities (Rosanne & Giulia, 2019).
The significance of this framework stems from different reasons. First, it shifts the nature of the response to the crisis from the humanitarian into the development pillar by extending the access of refugees into the labour market. This in turn, contributes to their humanitarian security and the development of the host communities.

Second, simplifying rules of origin incentivizes Jordanian companies to diversify their products and create new jobs for Jordanians and Syrians. As a result, according to the EU delegation in Jordan, 15 companies have applied to gain benefits from the agreement, 13 have been authorized to export to the EU, with 6 exporting a value of €19.26 million since July 2016 (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2019).

Third, the compact has resulted in a considerable progress in education and labour market access for the Syrian refugees. When it comes to education, Jordan is committed to pledge $97.6 million to have an additional 102 double shift schools, schools with the first morning shift for the Jordanian student, and the afternoon shift attended mainly by the Syrian refugees’ children. In addition, there is a commitment to increase the enrolment of the Syrian children at Jordan’s schools. Thus, in 2019/2020 school year, a total of 136,437 Syrians aged 5-17 were enrolled in schools from the 232,127 constituting 59% of the whole registered children as the chart illustrates.

![Table 2: Syrian children enrollment at Jordanian School 2019](chart.png)

**Source:** (Education Sector Working Group in response to the Syria crisis, 2019)

The chart illustrates the increase in the Syrian Children at all levels in different schools’ types. Though it might indicate that Jordan does not compile with its commitment, yet it does not seem the case. According to the 2015 Education Sector Working Group, less than 45% of Syrian children (43,791 girls and 41,740 boys) were in schools (Barbelet, Hagen-Zanker, & Mansour-Ille, 2018). This means that Jordan has made a considerable progress despite of all its challenges and it is trying to fulfil its commitment.

As for the labour sector, the compact has also made some progress. Prior to the compact, Syrian refugees were treated as labour migrants, who pay almost € 900
annually for a work permit. The high fees and administration procedures meant that only around 3,000 permits were issued to Syrians before. However, by the compact, the government commits to facilitate the regulations and reduce the high fees, Syrians are recently required to pay only JD10 (12 €) administration fees. Moreover, as of July 2018, the government had taken the needed steps to open formal employment opportunities for Syrians. In addition, while in 2017, 46,000 work permits were granted, as of January 2020, there were 179,445 issued to Syrian refugees (Barbelet, Hagen-Zanker, & Mansour-Ille, 2018).

By no means, this does not indicate that the compact is flawless or it is the best solution possible. Yet, there are some advantages too. First, the government is always taking more steps to make it workable. More importantly, this compact is the first inclusive response to tackle the refugee’s crisis in Jordan, it’s a more sustainable and a longer-term solution (Barbelet, Hagen-Zanker, & Mansour-Ille, 2018). Further, it is a clear evidence of shifting towards building resilience in response for the crisis and the EU commitment to make it works to support Jordan in any way possible.

All these efforts contribute to preserve Jordan's macro-economic stability and support Jordan’s economic and political stability. In addition, there is the endless support of the European Investment Bank (EIB), the lending arm of the EU. This support that extends for decades and witnessed a significance increase after the EU-Jordan 2016 compact. Moreover, to support Jordan’s economic resilience, the bank planned to extend USD 1 billion of loans and grants during 2019-2020 in favour of priority projects in different sectors including water, energy efficiency and SMEs, as emphasized by the President of the European Investment Bank During the Jordan Growth and Opportunity conference organized in London February 2019 (Baarah, 2019).

The EIP's support is crucial to improve the socio-economic infrastructure, and there are different examples of vital projects that have been financed by the EIB including, not restrictively, Tafila windfarm, the first commercial utility-scale wind power in the Middle East, the Amman Ring Road, which improved traffic management in the capital, and the Arab Potash company, the eighth largest potash producer worldwide (Baarah, 2019).

Furthermore, the EIP’s support for economic resilience in Jordan is part of the Economic Resilience Initiative (ERI) that was established in 2016 to enhance the EU Southern Neighbourhood countries’ ability to withstand shocks and improve the long-term economic resilience. In that respect, several projects were financed through this instrument. In the field of water and sanitation, for instance, in 2019, the EIB has signed the EUR 65 million financing agreement with the Jordanian government for the improvement of water supply systems in the “Deir Alla and Al-Karamah” in the Jordan valley. This project could benefit almost more than 85,000 people in the Jordan Valley (Baarah, 2019).

Having a green and sufficient energy is at the heart of the EU’s thinking to support Jordan, since the country is suffering from a high energy bill. For this reason, supporting Jordanian municipalities and reducing their energy bill is crucial to boost resilience and sustainable economic growth. In that respect, the EIB’s last loan in 2019 provided EUR 45 million to Cities and Villages Development Bank (CVDB). This loan
supports municipalities’ investments in energy efficiency infrastructure. When it comes to the public lighting component, for instance, the funding is expected to decrease energy consumption by half, which represents a significant energy savings (Elnimr, 2019).

In parallel to this endless support, main emphasis is on supporting small and medium enterprises (SME) and the private sector, as they are essential for a lasting, inclusive and sustainable growth. For this reason, the EU has funded many projects supporting SMEs. One of these projects is Jordanian Action for Development of Enterprises’ (JADE) which is a 3 years project that was launched in 2017. The project's goal is to support over 160 SMEs, start-ups and entrepreneurs and create new employment opportunities for Jordanians (Jordanian Action for Development of Enterprises, 2017). Through the EIB along with such projects, like Jade, the EU is committed to boost economic resilience.

2.5 The Impact of the EU Building Resilience in Jordan

Since the adoption of resilience in the EU foreign policy, the EU is investing a lot at building resilience in its partners including Jordan. However, the efficiency of such attribution varies from one partner to another according to local the context.

The EU contribution through its Regional Trust Fund in response to the Syrian Crisis is essential in providing public services. This fund supports 33 projects in Jordan, benefiting both Syrians and Jordanians in different sectors; in the education sector, 53,408 girls & boys have access to primary education; 69,265 Syrians & Jordanians have access to improved water services & infrastructure; 60,384 Syrians & Jordanians are benefiting from livelihoods & resilience support; 34,800 Syrians & Jordanians are benefiting from protection services; 125,624 Syrians and Jordanians have access to medical care & health services; 1,305 young women & men have access to higher education or vocational training through higher education sector and 175,096 Syrians and Jordanians have access to social cohesion services (European Commission, 2020).

In turn, this contribution contributes in preserving the social cohesion, stability and avoidance of politicizing the refugees since it contributes in decreasing the tension between the refugees and host communities. As for the Labour sector, through the 2016 compact, for instance, the EU helps in decreasing a greater competition between the Jordanian and Syrian through a certain quota for the refugees in certain sectors and special economic zones.

The EU is also playing a role in preserving the economic stability in Jordan, through the financial assistance, as illustrated in the previous section, the EU is a main international donor for Jordan. In response to the Syrian refugee crisis, the EU is one of the top five main donors. In addition, along with the financial assistance, the EU is committed to support Jordan to implement economic reforms necessary to create inclusive and sustainable growth and jobs.

To help Jordan in implementing these reforms, Jordan is benefitting from different EU instruments that provide technical assistance. One of these instruments is TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument of the European
Commission). This instrument helps public administrations with regard to the approximation and enforcement of EU law as well as assisting in sharing of EU best practices. Other instrument is the Twinning instrument which is the EU instrument for institutional cooperation between Public Administrations of EU Member States and of partner countries like Jordan. It supports the public sector by bringing together EU expertise with Jordan expertise to improve their performance in the public sector administration (Press and information team of the Delegation to Jordan, 2019). By improving the public sector administration, reducing the public debts and decreasing the public consumption the EU is boosting economic growth in Jordan.

3. Conclusion

Drawing on the analysis of this paper, one conclusion is that the EU’s role in building resilience in Jordan seems workable, has a positive but limited impact to preserve Jordan stability specially in response for crises. Hence, the EU can increase the efficiency of its role and here are some recommendations in order to achieve that.

One way in fostering Jordan’s resilience is implementing economic reforms that promote inclusive and sustainable growth. However, one main challenge in front of this is political corruption and the overly personalized, informal and non-transparent nature of Jordan’s political system and its negative impact on the country’s socio-economic reform efforts. Thus, the EU can play a greater role in fighting corruption.

One instrument the EU can use is Political Economy Analysis (PEA) that could help the EU to identify more targeted incentives and leverages to enhance the cooperation with currently unhelpful political institutions in Jordan when preparing and implementing development plans.

Moreover, enhancing the efficiency of political institutions is crucial. In that respect, the EU can support the Institutional Performance and Policy Development Directorate to prepare regulatory impact assessment as an instrument for establishing evidence-based policy-making. This can help decision makers to make well-informed decisions based on evidence from research. In return, this will prevent wasting time, efforts or resources in wrong decisions in the country.

In addition, the EU can increase the technical assistance for Jordan to help it improving its climate investment. This will be essential for increasing the Foreign Direct Investment, as they represent a corner stone for sustainable growth and Jobs creation, especially as Jordan can be regarded as a stable county in comparison with other countries in the region.

More importantly, fostering resilience in Jordan requires a greater engagement of the local community and a greater role for the civil society. Though the EU is committed to support civil society in Jordan through its funded programme, EU Support to Jordanian Democratic Institutions and Development, there are still many restrictions in front of these institutions that hinder it from its role in Jordan. Thus, the EU should put more efforts pushing Jordan to remove all the barriers in front of the civil society institutions.
Finally, the EU’s role in building resilience in Jordan seems effective and contributes in preserving Jordan's stability. Nevertheless, the EU can instrumentalize different tools to foster this resilience, and more importantly, it all relies on Jordan's willingness and preparedness to get advantage of all the EU is offering it to promote its economic and political reforms which are the main drivers for preserving its political and economic stability.

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