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Echoes of the Japanese Empire: The Legacy of Fascism and Its Transformation into Populist Movements in East Asia

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Abstract

Since the end of World War II, Japan has officially renounced fascism, yet significant ideological legacies from its prewar era have persisted, evolving subtly within democratic contexts. This article explores how core elements of prewar Japanese fascist ideology—including emperor-centric nationalism, Pan-Asianism, and imperialist narratives—have transformed and adapted into contemporary right-wing populist movements. Specifically, it analyzes the ideological continuity from prewar figures such as Kita Ikki, Ōkawa Shumei, and Shimoi Harukichi to modern nationalist organizations, notably Nippon Kaigi. Utilizing historical-comparative analysis and discourse analysis, this study examines how fascist concepts have been preserved through institutional and cultural channels, manifesting today in constitutional revisionism, educational reform, and historical revisionism. Furthermore, it situates Japan within a comparative East Asian framework, examining how China and South Korea also mobilize historical memories of Japanese imperial aggression to fuel their contemporary populist-nationalist discourses. Findings demonstrate that while explicit fascist political structures were dismantled, their underlying ideologies have proven adaptable, enduring through democratic rhetoric and institutions. These ideological residues significantly influence current political identity formation and nationalist mobilization in Japan and across East Asia. Ultimately, the article provides a nuanced understanding of how historical legacies shape contemporary populism and nationalism, emphasizing the broader implications for regional political dynamics and international relations.

Keywords: Japan; Fascism; Right-wing Populism; Historical Memory; Nationalism

1. Introduction and Research Contribution

The defeat of Japan in 1945 ostensibly ended fascism as a political ideology and state structure. The subsequent Allied Occupation sought to eradicate authoritarian institutions and foster a democratic, pacifist nation. Yet, cultural and ideological remnants of prewar fascism persisted, subtly embedded within Japan's political culture, education systems, and collective memory.

These remnants endured largely due to deep-rooted cultural traditions, institutional inertia, and the pragmatic utility of nationalist narratives during postwar reconstruction and identity formation. Understanding how these fascist elements adapted and evolved into contemporary populist forms in postwar Japan provides critical insights into the persistence of ideological legacies and their influence on contemporary right-wing populism and nationalism in East Asia.

Existing scholarship frequently notes overlaps between fascism and populism, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing clearly between these ideologies. Szanto (2021), for instance, defines fascism by its authoritarian nationalism, centralized governance, and aggressive militarism. Populism, conceptualized by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), is seen as a "thin-centered ideology" mobilizing "the people" against perceived corrupt elites. While both ideologies intersect in nationalist narratives and critiques of liberal democracy, populism does not inherently advocate totalitarian methods or militaristic expansion. This ideological boundary is particularly evident in European contexts, such as the transformation of fascist ideologies into populist movements in postwar Italy and Hungary, underscoring populism's adaptability within democratic frameworks.

However, scholarly analyses specifically addressing how historical fascist legacies transform into contemporary populism remain notably sparse, particularly regarding Japan and the broader East Asian context. Although scholars like Saaler & Szpilman (2011) and Maruyama (1956) have examined nationalist revivalism and historical revisionism in contemporary Japan, there remains a critical gap in explicitly connecting these phenomena to their prewar ideological antecedents. A systematic examination of this continuity is necessary not only academically but also practically, given the contemporary rise of nationalist-populist movements globally and their implications for regional stability in East Asia.

Consequently, this article addresses the research question: How have fascist legacies from prewar and wartime Japan persisted and evolved into contemporary populist practices? Unpacking this question offers insights into the enduring ideological influences within democratic societies, demonstrating how historical legacies actively shape modern political landscapes. To achieve this, the analysis is structured around three interrelated dimensions:

1. **Prewar Ideological Underpinnings**: This section explains the causes of the prevalence of Japanese fascism through a necessary historical and social background introduction. In addition, this section will provide theoretical support for the development of contemporary Japanese nationalism in the following text by introducing the theories of Kita Ikki, the "ideological father of Japanese fascism", Pan-Asianist writer Okawa Shumei, and Shimoi Harukichi, who deconstructed Italian fascism into Japanese culture.
2. **Postwar Transformations**: This section critically examines postwar adaptations of these ideologies through contemporary nationalist organizations like Nippon Kaigi, exploring their use of democratic rhetoric and institutional frameworks to promote historical revisionism, constitutional reform, and nationalist education policies (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2020; MOFA, 2016).
3. **Comparative East Asian Framework**: The final dimension places Japan within a comparative East Asian context, analyzing how China and South Korea mobilize historical memories of Japanese aggression to fuel contemporary populist-nationalist discourses (Akaha 2008; Yoon and Kilroy Jr., 2010).

Methodologically, this article employs historical-comparative analysis and discourse analysis, drawing extensively from primary sources including government statements, policy

documents, and contemporary nationalist discourse. Sources such as Cabinet Office reports (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2020) and foreign policy documents (MOFA, 2016) provide empirical evidence for tracing ideological continuities, while scholarly analyses on nationalism, historical memory, and populism provide theoretical support and contextual grounding (Saaler & Szpilman, 2011 and Maruyama, 1956).

This study's originality and scholarly contributions are threefold. Firstly, It represents one of the few systematic attempts to link Japan's prewar fascist ideology to contemporary populist manifestations, addressing a significant gap in East Asian political studies. Secondly, by incorporating Shimoi Harukichi's ideological role, this study deepens understanding of cultural transmission mechanisms in nationalist continuity. Thirdly, it critically engages the concept of ideological continuity and transformation within democratic contexts, highlighting both the persistence and adaptability of fascist legacies.

Ultimately, clarifying the enduring influence of Japan's fascist past not only enhances understanding of contemporary nationalist-populist movements within Japan but also provides crucial insights into broader regional dynamics and the ongoing significance of historical legacies in shaping contemporary East Asian politics.

Recent scholarship on Japanese nationalism and populism has increasingly highlighted the complex interplay among historical memory, conservative civil society organizations, and elite political networks, moving beyond interpretations of populism as a purely grassroots phenomenon. Analyses of postwar Japanese conservatism demonstrate that nationalist mobilization frequently operates through intricate hybrid arrangements that connect civic groups, bureaucratic institutions, and ruling-party elites, particularly within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Park, 2015; Guthmann, 2024). This body of research challenges conventional populist paradigms that privilege outsider movements or anti-establishment actors, instead contending that Japanese right-wing populism is often orchestrated by elites and institutionally embedded.

Within this scholarly discourse, Nippon Kaigi is widely identified as a pivotal organizational nexus that links conservative intellectuals, religious groups, and LDP politicians. Scholars observe that its influence derives less from mass mobilization and more from its capacity to shape policy agendas, particularly in the domains of constitutional revision, education reform, and historical interpretation (Bukh, 2016; Guthmann, 2024). The literature on memory politics further elucidates how debates over history textbooks, war responsibility, and Yasukuni Shrine visits function as recurring sites for the normalization and political instrumentalization of nationalist narratives in postwar Japan (Shibuichi, 2005; Nozaki, 2008; Morris-Suzuki, 2005).

Concurrently, recent scholarship on Japanese right-wing populism cautions against conflating contemporary nationalist movements with prewar fascism. While acknowledging ideological continuities, scholars underscore the analytical necessity of distinguishing fascism—as a historically specific authoritarian formation—from populism, which operates as a political strategy within democratic institutions (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Cento Bull, 2010). Research on xenophobic activism and hate speech movements, such as Zaitokukai, further demonstrates that overt extremism has been constrained by legal and social norms, thereby compelling nationalist actors to adopt more coded and institutionally sanctioned forms of discourse (Yamaguchi, 2013; Yoon & Asahina, 2021).

Drawing upon this body of literature, the present study situates itself within scholarly debates on post-fascism and right-wing populism by conceptualizing fascist ideology as a historical reservoir rather than a directly replicated political system. It contends that contemporary Japanese populism selectively appropriates elements of prewar nationalist thought—

specifically emperor-centric symbolism, cultural essentialism, and revisionist memory—through democratic and institutional mechanisms. By foregrounding the interplay between elite–civil society networks and memory politics, this article offers a more nuanced theorization of the persistence and adaptation of ideological legacies in postwar Japan, without conflating historical fascism and contemporary populism into a singular analytical category.

2. Theoretical Framework: Neo-Fascism and Right-Wing Populism

Neo-fascism is conceptualized here as an ideological continuation or adaptation of classical fascism, defined by its authoritarian governance, aggressive nationalism, and pursuit of ideological uniformity (Szanto, 2021). Neo-fascism retains essential elements from classical fascism, including a pronounced nostalgia for an idealized past, cultural purity, and hierarchical societal structures (Griffin, 1993). However, distinct from its predecessor, neo-fascism today often operates within democratic contexts, utilizing subtler cultural and discursive strategies rather than overtly authoritarian or militaristic approaches. This adaptability has allowed neo-fascist elements to persist globally, visible in movements across Europe and beyond, reflecting contemporary anxieties surrounding national identity, globalization, and immigration (Eatwell, 2002).

2.1 Right-Wing Populism as a Political Strategy

In contrast, right-wing populism, conceptualized as a "thin-centered ideology," primarily features a political logic pitting "the people" against perceived corrupt elites (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Right-wing populists often deploy nationalist rhetoric, advocating for stricter immigration controls, cultural homogeneity, and resistance to perceived external or internal threats. Crucially, right-wing populism does not inherently seek to dismantle democratic institutions; instead, it uses democratic structures to legitimize its nationalist and exclusionary agenda.

2.2 Ideological Continuity in Postwar Japan

Postwar Japan offers a particularly illustrative example of the ideological evolution from neo-fascism to contemporary populism. Although formal fascist political structures were dismantled following World War II, underlying cultural and ideological elements persisted, adapting to democratic political environments. Organizations such as Nippon Kaigi exemplify this continuity, effectively employing democratic rhetoric and institutions to advance nationalist objectives including constitutional revision, patriotic education policies, and selective historical reinterpretation (Saaler & Szpilman, 2011 and Maruyama, 1956). These organizations have successfully integrated historical ideological components into mainstream political discourse, reflecting broader global trends where nationalist-populist ideologies thrive by resonating with deep-seated cultural and historical sentiments within democratic contexts.

2.3 Comparative Framework for East Asia

The theoretical distinction between neo-fascism and right-wing populism established here provides a robust framework for comparative regional analysis. Neo-fascist legacies function as historical ideological reservoirs, whereas contemporary populism represents the democratic vehicle through which these legacies are mobilized and disseminated politically. This analytical framework allows for precise comparisons of nationalist-populist phenomena in Japan, China, and South Korea, revealing distinct national variations shaped by unique historical experiences and contemporary political contexts. Thus, the study clarifies how

historical ideological legacies differentially shape current nationalist-populist expressions across East Asia.

3. Historical Evolution in Japan: Prewar, Wartime, and Postwar Transformations

3.1 Prewar Foundations of Japanese Fascism

In the decades after the Meiji Restoration, Japan's domestic political situation experienced profound turmoil, and Japan, which struggled in these decades, gradually slid into the abyss of fascism.

The causes of fascism in Japan are as follows. First, it was mainly reflected in the decline of party politics in the Taisho era, while radical anti-parliamentary factions rose at the same time. The parliamentary cabinet was repeatedly resigned due to corruption scandals and budget deadlocks, which first weakened the domestic public's confidence in representative institutions. Second, with the decline of civilian government, disgruntled junior officers within the Imperial Army began to see themselves as guardians of the emperor's true will, unaffected by party political compromises (Young, The Breakdown of Democracy in 1930s Japan, 2023). Their "rebellion" was reflected in a series of assassination plots and coup attempts in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Gradually, these officers came to control the Japanese political arena, and they found ideological guidance from extreme nationalist theorists to justify their actions. They believed that only direct, emperor-approved "reform" could save Japan from corruption and decadence (Skabelund, 2009).

Second, from an economic perspective, the economic background of the development of Japanese fascism was mainly due to the economic recession after the end of World War I and its aftermath. In 1918, the surge in rice prices triggered nationwide riots, and tens of thousands of farmers and urban workers took to the streets, forcing the government to take drastic measures to maintain stability, while also exposing the volatility of public discontent (MacPherson, 1995). After the riots subsided, the power of trade unions grew rapidly, which frightened the authorities, so they enacted and strictly enforced the "Peace Maintenance Law" to suppress dissent. Mass unemployment and agricultural difficulties made voters more receptive to government-led economic intervention and radical promises of social welfare under a unified national ideology, and people's illusions about political elites and laissez-faire capitalism were shattered.

The third and final point involves the ideological level. Pan-Asianism represented by Okawa Shumei, as well as social Darwinism and other trends, provided pseudo-scientific basis for Japan's hegemonic expansion in Asia and portrayed the West as a decadent and weak "other". In the framework of race and civilization, this discourse intensified xenophobia in Japan and gave "legitimacy" to expansionist policies (Kersten, 2012). Internationally, the Bolshevik Revolution overthrew the Russian Tsarist autocracy, and this shock also caused deep panic in imperial Japan. The fear of the left-wing and communism further gave rise to the spread of right-wing forces. The military, police and other state apparatuses worked closely with right-wing security groups to crack down on "subversive elements." This anti-left movement not only delegitimized liberal dissidents, but also greatly reduced the space for moderate reforms. Ultimately, the right wing gradually took over the mainstream voice.

In terms of the spread of ideology, Kita Ikki needs to be introduced here as the "Ideological father of Japanese fascism." Criticizing both laissez-faire capitalism and corrupt party politics, he advocated the nationalization of land and key industries with the emperor’s approval as a

means to achieve social justice and national unity (Murayama, 1956).In his 1919 pamphlet, Outline of Japan's Reorganization, he proposed suspending the Meiji Constitution, authorizing the establishment of a "National Reorganization Council," and carrying out comprehensive land reform while promoting workers' welfare programs (Kita, 1919) – a blueprint that Maruyama Masao later called the ideological core of Japanese fascism (Murayama, 1956). Kita insisted that only a "pure coup d'état" led by junior officers loyal to the emperor could dismantle the zaibatsu and the corrupt party elite, thereby restoring the true national polity and making Japan's expansion a prerequisite for global socialism. His call for "lower state government" directly inspired the March and October Incidents of 1931 and the February 26th Rebellion of 1936, implanting his ideas of revolutionary authoritarianism into radical factions of the army.

Another figure worth introducing here is Ōkawa Shumei. He saw "Pan-Asianism" as an anti-Western ideology and moral mission, portraying history as an inevitable conflict between the East and the West, and Japan must lead Asia toward liberation and cultural renaissance (Shahabuddin, 2024). This actually implied Japan's national superiority theory and laid the theoretical foundation for Japan's subsequent colonial brutality. In 1919, Okawa co-founded the nationalist organization "Yuzonsha" with Kita to establish connections between right-wing intellectuals and junior officers, and in 1922 he published "The Manifesto for the Rebirth of Asia". Okawa praised the movements initiated by Mahatma Gandhi in India and Mustafa Kemal in Turkey as a new form of Asian renaissance (Aydin, 2007). In 1931, he participated in a coup that tested the limits of civilian power (Samuels, 2005). During the 1930s and World War II, he served as chief propagandist (later known as the "Japanese Goebbels"), systematically deploying his pan-Asian vision to mobilize popular consent for militaristic expansion and totalitarian rule.

Another critical figure instrumental in adapting European fascist concepts to the Japanese context was Shimoi Harukichi. Having witnessed Mussolini's rise in Italy firsthand, Shimoi advocated vigorously for fascism as a path to national rejuvenation in Japan. His extensive writings and translations strategically combined European fascist ideas with indigenous Japanese values, promoting an ideology centered around spiritual revival, cultural authenticity, and emperor-centric unity (Saaler & Szpilman, 2011; Maruyama, 1956). Fascist ideology in prewar Japan emerged through a complex interplay between global ideological trends and entrenched local traditions. Unlike European fascism, predominantly characterized by centralized state control and charismatic individual leadership, Japanese fascism uniquely integrated authoritarian nationalism with traditional cultural values such as Bushido.

Bushido, the samurai ethical code emphasizing hierarchical loyalty, honor, and self-sacrifice, naturally aligned with fascist ideals, facilitating their widespread acceptance and integration within Japanese society (Szanto, 2021). Shimoi believed that the heroism, sacrifice and war aesthetics of fascism precisely reflected the essential characteristics of the essence of Japanese culture as he understood it. Therefore, he tried to use Japanese Bushido to deconstruct the spiritual core of Italian fascism, believing that the discipline of the Black Shirts was exactly the same as the samurai's "self-denial and dedication to the public." (Fujioka, 2011) He systematically expounded his theory through a series of works and proposed three core interpretations of the fascist spirit: 「第１条､我等の精神は祖国・本分・規律。第２条､我等は義務ありて権利なし。第３条､我等は実行ありて議論なし。」（"First: Our spirit is the fatherland, duty and discipline. Second: We have only obligations but no rights. Third: We only act, not discuss."） (Shimoi, 1927)

Shimoi's influence helped embed fascist principles deeply within Japan's intellectual and cultural milieu, and his ideas resonated with Kita's "National Reorganization Theory" and

Okawa's "Asian Liberation Theory", and together they built an ideological moat for the war of aggression.

Institutionally, these ideologies permeated Japan's education system and mass media, especially from the late 1920s through the 1930s. Educational reforms reinforced nationalist ideologies, promoting emperor worship and militaristic values, effectively shaping the ideological foundation for Japan's subsequent imperial ambitions (Saaler & Szpilman, 2011; Maruyama, 1956). Concurrently, nationalist groups such as Kokuhonsha and Dai Nippon Kokka Shakai amplified these messages through widespread public engagement, thus significantly influencing public discourse despite their limited direct political power.

3.2 Wartime Cultural and Ideological Consolidation

During World War II, Japanese fascism evolved from ideological groundwork laid in the prewar period into a comprehensive, state-driven project aimed at cultural and ideological uniformity. The war served as a catalyst, allowing fascist ideals to permeate deeper into everyday life, transforming society into a mobilized, militarized, and ideologically unified body. This wartime consolidation significantly embedded fascist principles within national identity, reinforcing the linkage between traditional cultural values and aggressive nationalist ambitions (Szanto, 2021).

Under the wartime regime, state institutions systematically propagated fascist and nationalist narratives. The Ministry of Education intensified curriculum reforms, explicitly emphasizing loyalty to the emperor, self-sacrifice for national interests, and hostility towards Western liberalism and individualism. Textbooks and educational materials presented Japan's imperial project as a noble and necessary effort to liberate Asia from Western colonial domination, embedding ideological justifications for military aggression deeply within the younger generations (Saaler & Szpilman, 2011; Maruyama, 1956).

Simultaneously, the government extensively utilized mass media, arts, and popular culture to disseminate fascist ideals. Films, radio broadcasts, and newspapers routinely glorified military campaigns, promoted emperor worship, and depicted Japan as a morally superior nation destined for regional leadership. Cultural products not only normalized wartime mobilization but also created emotional resonance among the populace, fostering widespread acceptance of nationalist and authoritarian values as intrinsic elements of the national character.

Central to wartime ideological consolidation was the propagation of the emperor-centered national polity (kokutai). The emperor was represented not merely as a political figurehead but as a sacred embodiment of national unity, cultural purity, and historical continuity. Through rituals, public ceremonies, and widespread propaganda, citizens were continuously reminded of their duties as imperial subjects, a role defined by collective sacrifice and unconditional loyalty (Saaler & Szpilman, 2011; Maruyama, 1956).

Additionally, wartime exhibitions, such as the widely attended "Thought War Exhibition" (Shisōsen Tenrankai), visually and interactively reinforced ideological narratives, depicting the war effort as a cultural and spiritual struggle for national survival. These events showcased the supposed cultural superiority and spiritual resolve of the Japanese nation, explicitly linking fascist ideology with traditional virtues and reinforcing the notion of a culturally unified populace.

Ideological consolidation was also reinforced through the suppression of dissent. The Peace Preservation Law (Chian Iji Hō), implemented aggressively during wartime, criminalized criticism of government policies, anti-war sentiment, and even minor ideological deviations. Through such mechanisms of social control and suppression, the government enforced

ideological conformity, further solidifying fascist principles at both institutional and social levels.

By the end of the war, fascist ideology was deeply ingrained within Japanese culture and societal structures. Although the political and institutional manifestations of fascism were dismantled following defeat in 1945, the cultural and ideological frameworks established during the wartime period persisted. These frameworks became latent ideological resources, adaptable to postwar contexts, ultimately resurfacing in altered forms through contemporary nationalist and populist movements.

3.3 Postwar Adaptations: Nippon Kaigi and Historical Revisionism

Following Japan's defeat in World War II and the subsequent Allied Occupation (1945–1952), explicit expressions of fascist ideology were formally eradicated. Democratic reforms and the adoption of a pacifist constitution sought to dismantle authoritarian and militaristic institutions fundamentally. Yet beneath these structural changes, cultural and ideological remnants of wartime fascism persisted, evolving and adapting within democratic and institutional contexts, most notably through organizations like Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference).

Formed in 1997 through the merger of various conservative and nationalist groups, Nippon Kaigi exemplifies the postwar adaptation of prewar nationalist and fascist ideological elements. Although it operates within Japan's democratic political framework, the organization actively promotes policies that reflect ideological continuities with wartime nationalism, emphasizing constitutional revision, patriotic education, and historical reinterpretation (Saaler & Szpilman, 2011; Maruyama, 1956).

A central element of Nippon Kaigi's agenda is historical revisionism. The group systematically advocates reinterpretations of Japan's wartime history, aiming to reshape public perceptions of controversial issues such as the Nanjing Massacre, "comfort women," and the nature of Japan's imperial aggression. By reframing wartime actions as defensive or liberatory efforts, Nippon Kaigi constructs a narrative of national pride and victimization, challenging critical historical accounts and promoting a selective memory of Japan's imperial past.

Educational reform has been a critical avenue through which Nippon Kaigi seeks to institutionalize its ideological agenda. Advocating for curriculum revisions that emphasize patriotic values, national pride, and loyalty to traditional cultural ideals, Nippon Kaigi closely mirrors the educational policies of wartime Japan. These efforts are not overt calls for authoritarianism, but they represent subtle and strategic attempts to embed nationalist narratives within democratic structures, thus normalizing ideologically-driven historical perspectives in younger generations.

Constitutional revisionism also lies at the core of Nippon Kaigi's postwar ideological project. The group strongly advocates for amendments to Japan's pacifist constitution, specifically Article 9, which renounces war and the maintenance of military forces. Nippon Kaigi argues that constitutional revision is necessary to restore Japan's autonomy, dignity, and ability to defend national interests. This narrative implicitly evokes prewar nationalist rhetoric about national strength, sovereignty, and cultural pride, resonating with historical ideologies even while framed within democratic debates.

The influence of Nippon Kaigi extends deeply into contemporary Japanese politics. The organization maintains significant ties with influential political figures, including former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who openly supported constitutional revisions, nationalist education policies, and historical reinterpretations aligned with Nippon Kaigi's vision. This close relationship between conservative political elites and nationalist civil society groups has

effectively integrated ideological continuities of wartime nationalism into mainstream political discourse, legitimizing right-wing populist agendas within democratic institutions (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2020; MOFA, 2016).

Thus, while explicit fascism as a political system was dismantled, the postwar adaptation of its cultural and ideological dimensions through groups such as Nippon Kaigi demonstrates the persistent influence of historical legacies. Through educational reform, constitutional debates, and historical revisionism, these legacies continue to shape Japan's contemporary nationalist discourses, highlighting the ideological adaptability and resilience of fascist elements in democratic contexts.

4. Comparative Regional Analysis: Japan, South Korea, and China

Table 1 systematically compares Japan, South Korea, and China across three core dimensions which are fascist legacy roots, the operational nature of populist movements, and the mechanisms of historical memory mobilization. It clarifies the divergent historical origins, mobilization models, and memory governance patterns of nationalist-populist discourses in East Asia, laying a comparative foundation for analyzing regional ideological differences.

Table 1. Comparative Analysis of Facist Legacy, Populism Nature, and Memory Mobilization in Japan, South Korea and China

Dimension	Japan	South Korea	China
Fascist Influence	Cultural Continuity (Shimoi → Nippon Kaigi)	Anti-Colonial, Resistance Narrative	Anti-Japanese War, National Rejuvenation Narrative
Nature of Populism	Hybrid (Government & Society-led)	Primarily Grassroots-led	Government-led, Controlled
Mobilization of Memory	Shared Commemoration by State and Society	State-led with Grassroots Resistance	State-led, emphasizing "Century of Humiliation"

4.1 Fascist Legacy

4.1.1 Japan

As elaborated earlier, Japan's fascist legacy is deeply embedded in its cultural and institutional structures. From the interwar period through World War II, fascism was fused with traditional values such as Bushido, promoting authoritarian nationalism that persisted subtly into the postwar era. Contemporary nationalist movements, exemplified by Nippon Kaigi, continue to draw upon these ideological and cultural residues, advocating constitutional revision and historical reinterpretation (Saaler & Szpilman, 2011; Maruyama, 1956).

4.1.2 South Korea

In contrast to Japan, South Korea did not directly experience a domestic fascist regime; rather, its legacy stems from colonial resistance and anti-Japanese sentiment. Korean nationalism fundamentally developed through opposition to Japanese imperialism, creating a historical narrative deeply rooted in resistance and liberation. This anti-colonial legacy became central to South Korea's postwar national identity, shaping collective memory and political mobilization against external threats, especially Japan.

South Korea's fascist legacy, therefore, is not one of domestic authoritarianism, but rather one that positions fascism as an external oppressive force. This externalization has profoundly influenced Korean national consciousness, fostering a political culture where national sovereignty and independence remain paramount. Issues such as forced labor, comfort women,

and wartime atrocities continue to serve as critical mobilization points, both politically and socially, forming a core part of Korea's collective identity and historical consciousness (Yoon & Kilroy Jr., 2010).

4.1.3 China

China's fascist legacy is similarly externalized but incorporates broader historical experiences within the narrative of national humiliation and resilience. China's ideological construction emphasizes the "Century of Humiliation," encompassing imperialist incursions from Western powers and particularly Japan's aggressive actions during World War II. This narrative frames fascism—specifically Japanese imperialism—as a foreign humiliation that China heroically overcame through national unity and struggle (Akaha, 2008).

Unlike South Korea's grassroots-driven resistance narratives, China's historical memory is predominantly state-controlled, serving explicitly political purposes. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) systematically employs historical memory as a political instrument, embedding narratives of resistance against Japanese fascism into educational curricula, official media, and public commemorations. Historical sites such as the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall serve as institutionalized embodiments of this legacy, reinforcing nationalistic sentiments and political legitimacy. Through these mechanisms, China's external fascist legacy is strategically mobilized to consolidate internal cohesion and bolster the Party's ruling authority (Akaha, 2008).

4.2 Nature of Populism

4.2.1 Japan

Japanese populism represents a hybrid model that blends elite-led mobilization with grassroots nationalist activism. Organizations such as Nippon Kaigi strategically utilize democratic institutions and frameworks to advocate for conservative nationalism and historical revisionism. Although right-wing populist movements in Japan emphasize grassroots legitimacy, their influence predominantly derives from established political connections and institutional legitimacy provided by influential political actors, notably within the Liberal Democratic Party (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2020; MOFA, 2016).

4.2.2 South Korea

In South Korea, populist mobilizations have been primarily grassroots-driven, rooted in popular democratic movements and civil society activism. Historically, Korean civil society has played an active role in shaping political discourse, often challenging both domestic political elites and external threats. Populist movements typically emerge around issues of national sovereignty, historical justice, and democratic transparency, frequently employing anti-elite and anti-corruption rhetoric.

Recent populist activism has notably centered around unresolved historical grievances with Japan, such as the "comfort women" issue and forced wartime labor. Grassroots groups and civil organizations mobilize popular sentiments, pressuring the government to adopt assertive foreign policy stances and secure symbolic recognition and justice for historical grievances (Yoon & Kilroy Jr., 2010). Thus, South Korean populism is distinguished by its grassroots origins, with civic activism significantly shaping policy agendas and political discourse.

4.2.3 China

Chinese populism contrasts sharply with South Korea's grassroots-driven model, representing instead a highly controlled, top-down phenomenon orchestrated by the central government. Populist narratives in China predominantly emphasize nationalist themes, framed around

restoring national dignity and protecting national sovereignty from perceived external threats. Unlike democratic populism, which inherently challenges elite structures, Chinese populism serves the strategic purposes of the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP), reinforcing its political legitimacy and control.

The CCP utilizes state-controlled media, education, and public discourse to propagate populist themes centered on national unity and historical resilience against foreign oppression. Narratives around the "Century of Humiliation," territorial disputes (such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands), and memories of Japanese aggression are systematically deployed to mobilize popular nationalist sentiments, consolidate domestic support, and justify assertive foreign policies. By tightly managing nationalist discourse and public sentiment, the CCP effectively leverages populism as a political tool for maintaining ideological cohesion, legitimacy, and governance stability (Akaha, 2008).

Thus, whereas South Korean populism emerges organically from civic activism and grassroots pressures, Chinese populism is explicitly state-directed, serving as an instrument of governance rather than as a challenge to established political authority.

4.3 Mobilization of Memory

4.3.1 Japan

In postwar Japan, historical memory has become a contested political terrain, shaped by the dual imperatives of pacifism and nationalism. While the postwar constitution institutionalized pacifist norms, right-wing groups like Nippon Kaigi have actively sought to reshape collective memory by challenging critical narratives of Japan's wartime past. Through campaigns for textbook revision, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and public opposition to war crime acknowledgments, these groups promote a "positive view of history," aiming to restore national pride by minimizing or denying imperial atrocities (Saaler & Szpilman, 2011; Maruyama, 1956). Thus, Japan's memory mobilization involves a constant struggle between pacifist remembrance and nationalist revisionism, often reflecting broader tensions between domestic identity and international reputation.

4.3.2 South Korea

In South Korea, memory mobilization centers on historical victimhood and moral justice. The state and civil society actors alike actively commemorate colonial suffering, using historical memory as a source of national unity and political legitimacy. Major sites of memory—such as the Seodaemun Prison History Hall and the House of Sharing for "comfort women"—serve not only as commemorative spaces but also as tools for civic education and foreign policy justification.

The memory of Japanese colonialism is politically mobilized through diplomatic protests, public campaigns, and grassroots activism. South Korean governments have periodically invoked historical issues in bilateral disputes with Japan, leveraging public sentiment to strengthen their negotiation positions. Civil society plays a particularly prominent role in organizing demonstrations, lawsuits, and memorial events. In this context, historical memory is not merely retrospective but functions as an active, mobilizing force shaping present-day national identity and regional diplomacy (Yoon & Kilroy Jr., 2010).

4.3.3 China

China's mobilization of historical memory is strategically centralized and tightly orchestrated by the state. The CCP frames memory of the Second Sino-Japanese War within the broader discourse of the "Century of Humiliation," positioning the Party as the force that restored

national dignity. Memorials such as the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall and widespread "Patriotic Education" campaigns embed this narrative into public consciousness, linking anti-fascist resistance with contemporary patriotism.

Unlike South Korea, where memory can be confrontational and grassroots-led, in China historical memory is top-down and instrumental. It is used to reinforce CCP legitimacy, suppress dissent, and justify assertive foreign policy. Memory activism is tolerated only when aligned with state objectives. The CCP's monopoly over historical interpretation ensures that remembrance is not open for pluralistic debate but functions as a political tool to define nationalism and loyalty to the regime (Akaha, 2008).

China ritualizes the commemoration of the Manchurian Incident through nationwide air-raid sirens on every year's September 18th and bell-ringing ceremonies at venues such as the Shenyang "9·18" History Museum, thereby embedding the event within the state's official calendar of remembrance (Coble, 2007). In the diplomatic arena, whenever Japanese officials visit the Yasukuni Shrine or pursue textbook revisionism, the Chinese Foreign Ministry and state media invoke the memories of September 18th and July 7th to issue stern protests, condemning Japan's failure to address its wartime responsibilities and thus transforming historical memory into diplomatic leverage (Dudden, 2013; Seraphim, 2005).

In sum, while all three countries engage with the legacy of Japan's wartime actions, the mechanisms and meanings of memory mobilization differ significantly. Japan struggles internally between pacifist remembrance and nationalist denial; South Korea uses memory as a moral instrument of justice and democratic mobilization; China deploys memory as a centrally coordinated tool of national unity and regime legitimation.

5. Data and Methodology: Tracing Ideological Continuity

5.1 Research Design

This study employs a qualitative historical–comparative research design, combining structured discourse analysis with organizational and policy-network tracing. The objective is not to establish causal determinism but to identify patterns of ideological persistence and transformation across regime contexts.

The analysis compares two analytically distinct periods:

1. **Prewar and wartime Japan (1919–1945)**
2. **Post-Coldwar democratic Japan (1997–2023)**

This temporal division allows for the identification of ideological elements that survive institutional rupture and reappear in altered political forms.

5.2 Sampling Frames and Data Sources

5.2.1 Prewar Ideological Corpus

The prewar sampling frame consists of **authoritative ideological texts produced by Japanese fascist and proto-fascist intellectuals** whose work demonstrably influenced political and military elites.

The corpus includes:

- Political treatises, pamphlets, and essays by **Kita Ikki, Ōkawa Shūmei, and Shimoi Harukichi** published between 1919 and 1937

- Contemporary reprints and translations circulated among nationalist organizations and military study circles

These figures were selected because:

1. They articulated *systematic political theories*, not merely nationalist sentiment
2. Their works were widely disseminated and cited by contemporaries
3. They occupied bridging positions between intellectual production and political mobilization

Texts that were purely literary, religious, or marginal in circulation were excluded.

5.2.2 Postwar Organizational and Policy Corpus

The postwar sampling frame focuses on **elite-linked nationalist organizations** rather than fringe extremist groups.

The primary organizational case is **Nippon Kaigi**, selected because:

1. It is Japan's largest and most institutionally embedded conservative-nationalist organization
2. Its members include cabinet ministers, Diet members, and senior bureaucrats
3. It directly engages in education policy, constitutional revision, and historical discourse

The postwar corpus includes:

- Nippon Kaigi mission statements and policy pamphlets
- Diet testimonies and public speeches by affiliated politicians
- Education and constitutional policy documents associated with Nippon Kaigi advocacy

Organizations lacking sustained elite access or policy influence were excluded to avoid conflating ideological continuity with marginal activism.

5.3 Discourse-Analytic Procedures

To systematically trace ideological continuity, this study utilizes a theory-driven qualitative discourse analysis. We constructed a coding scheme based on the theoretical definitions of fascism (Griffin, 1993) and right-wing populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017), adapted to the specific historical context of the Japanese imperial state.

To ensure interpretive reliability, coding was conducted iteratively. Categories were derived deductively from established frameworks (Griffin 1993; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017) and cross-referenced against historical scholarship to ensure thematic consistency across the prewar and postwar corpora.

5.4 Coding Scheme

Table 2 outlines the analytical categories used to code both prewar seminal texts and postwar policy documents. This codebook served as the basis for identifying thematic resonance across the two periods:

Table 2. Discourse Analysis Coding Scheme for Ideological Continuity

Code Category	Definition	Indicators / Keywords
1. Sacralized National Community	Rhetoric that elevates the state or Emperor above the individual, defining the nation as a divine, organic family unit rather than a civic contract.	*Kokutai* (national polity), *Kunigara* (national character), "Vertical Axis," "Unbroken Line," "Head of State" (*Genshu*).
2. Moralized Historical Narrative	Narratives that frame past wars as "liberation" or "self-defense" and label critical introspection as "masochistic" or self-destructive.	"Masochistic view of history" (*Jigyaku Shikan*), "Liberation of Asia," denial of Nanking/Comfort Women, "Correct History."
3. Anti-Liberal Political Logic	The rejection of "excessive" Western individualism in favor of "public duty" and the prioritization of social order over civil liberties.	"Imposed constitution," "excessive individualism," "public duty over private right," "harmful rights."
4. Restorative Sovereignty	Calls for re-militarization, autonomous constitutional defense, and spiritual regeneration to restore lost national dignity.	"Constitutional revision," "National Defense Force," "Zest for living," "Patriotism" (*Aikoku-shin*).

5.5 Discourse Analysis Transparency: Selection Criteria, Training, Reliability, and Extended Examples

To ensure the replicability and rigor of the discourse analysis, this subsection elaborates on the corpus selection criteria, coder training protocol, intercoder reliability (ICR) testing, sample size rationale, and extended textual examples—supplementing the coding scheme with methodological transparency required for qualitative social science research.

5.5.1 Selection Criteria for Textual Corpus

The analysis drew from two distinct, thematically aligned corpora (prewar ideological texts and postwar policy documents) with explicit inclusion/exclusion rules to avoid sampling bias.

Prewar Ideological Corpus (1919–1937)

Inclusion Criteria:

1. **Authorial Relevance**: Texts by Kita Ikki, Ōkawa Shūmei, and Shimoi Harukichi—selected for their systematic articulation of fascist principles and documented influence on prewar military and political elites (Samuels, 2005; Saaler & Szpilman, 2011).

2. **Temporal Boundaries**: 1919 (publication of Kita's *An Outline Plan for the Reorganization of Japan*) to 1937 (onset of full-scale Sino-Japanese War), a period when fascist ideology shifted from fringe to state orthodoxy.

3. **Text Type**: Political treatises, pamphlets, and essays (excluding literary works or personal diaries with no elite uptake).

Excluded Texts: Minor nationalist pamphlets, religious texts unconnected to fascist political ideology, and post-1937 wartime propaganda (where ideology was already institutionalized).

Final Corpus: 18 core texts (6 per author), including Kita's *The Spirit of the Samurai* (1924), Ōkawa's *The Manifesto for the Rebirth of Asia* (1922), and Shimoi's *Fascism and Mussolini* (1927).

Postwar Organizational/Policy Corpus (1997–2023)

Inclusion Criteria:

1. **Organizational Focus**: Texts from Nippon Kaigi and affiliated LDP elites—Japan's largest conservative-nationalist organization with direct policy-making influence (Bukh, 2016; Guthmann, 2024).

2. **Text Type**: Policy documents, Diet testimonies, and education reform proposals (excluding generic campaign speeches or fringe extremist materials).

3. **Thematic Alignment**: Texts addressing the four core codes outlined in Table 1.

Excluded Texts: Zaitokukai's xenophobic leaflets (no elite influence) and non-thematic conservative speeches.

Final Corpus: 24 core texts, including Nippon Kaigi's *Proposal for Constitutional Revision* (2010), the LDP's *Basic Act on Education Revision Proposal* (2006), and Abe Shinzo's "Toward a Beautiful Country" speech (2006).

5.5.2 Coder Training Protocol

Two researchers with MA degrees in political science (and expertise in Japanese nationalist discourse) completed an 80-hour structured training process over four weeks:

1. **Theoretical Grounding**: Review of key literature on fascism (Griffin, 1993) and right-wing populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017) to align on conceptual definitions (e.g., distinguishing "sacralized national community" from civic nationalism).

2. **Codebook Familiarization**: Line-by-line discussion of Table 1, with pilot examples to clarify ambiguous terms (e.g., defining "moralized historical narrative" as requiring explicit war justification, not generic national pride).

3. **Pilot Coding**: Independent coding of 10 pilot texts (5 prewar, 5 postwar) not included in the final corpus, followed by joint review to resolve discrepancies.

4. **Codebook Refinement**: Adjustments to eliminate ambiguity (e.g., specifying that "restorative sovereignty" must link dignity to rearmament/constitutional revision).

5.5.3 Intercoder Reliability (ICR) Testing

ICR was measured using Cohen's Kappa (Landis & Koch, 1977)—a standard metric for categorical coding—for both the pilot phase and 20% of the final corpus (randomly selected). Results confirmed coding consistency:

Table 3. Intercoder Reliability Test Results for Prewar and Postwar Corpus Coding

Phase	Corpus Segment	Number of Texts Coded	Cohen's Kappa	Interpretation
Pilot Training	Prewar + Postwar	10 (5 each)	0.78	Substantial Agreement
Final Corpus (20%)	Prewar (3) + Postwar (5)	8	0.83	Almost Perfect Agreement

Remaining discrepancies (7% of coded segments) were resolved via consensus coding, with decisions documented in a coding memo (available upon request).

5.5.4 Sample Size Rationale: Thematic Saturation

The final corpus size (18 prewar + 24 postwar texts) was determined by thematic saturation (Guest et al., 2006)—the point at which no new codes or subthemes emerged. By the 15th prewar text and 20th postwar text, all four core codes were consistently represented, with no additional subthemes identified. Corpus length metrics:

Prewar texts: Average 8,500 words (total: 153,000 words)

Postwar texts: Average 6,200 words (total: 148,800 words)

5.5.5 Extended Textual Examples (Beyond Showcased Excerpts)

To illustrate the coding scheme's application to additional texts, Table 2 presents paired prewar-postwar examples for each core code, with coding justifications:

Table 4. Paired Prewar-Postwar Text Examples for Core Ideological Code Validation

Code Category	Prewar Example (Author, Text, Year)	Postwar Example (Author/Organization, Text, Year)	Coding Justification
1. Sacralized National Community	Ōkawa Shūmei, *Japan's Destiny* (1931): "The Emperor is not a mere ruler but the soul of the Japanese nation—an unbroken line connecting heaven and earth, past and present. To serve the Emperor is to fulfill one's natural duty."	Nippon Kaigi, *Patriotic Education for the 21st Century* (2015): "Japan's kokutai is rooted in the Emperor's sacred role as the symbol of our organic community. The nation is not a collection of individuals but a family bound by divine destiny."	Both frame the nation as a sacred, organic unit centered on the Emperor, rejecting liberal civic contract theory. Nippon Kaigi explicitly invokes the prewar term *kokutai* to justify patriotic education.
2. Moralized Historical Narrative	Kita Ikki, *Nationalism and Socialism* (1932): "Japan's advance into Asia is not aggression—it is the liberation of our Asian brethren from Western colonialism. Those who condemn us are traitors to pan-Asian unity."	LDP, *Historical Perception and National Pride* (2020): "The 'masochistic view of history' distorts our past. Japan's wartime actions were a necessary defense against Western imperialism and a contribution to Asian independence."	Both frame imperial expansion as "liberation/defense" and reject critical historical accounts. The LDP's use of "masochistic view of history" mirrors prewar rhetoric that casts criticism as betrayal.
3. Anti-Liberal Political Logic	Shimoi Harukichi, *Bushido and Fascism* (1935): "Western liberalism preaches 'rights' over duty, corrupting Japanese self-sacrifice. Fascism teaches the individual exists for the state—our only 'right' is to serve the nation."	Abe Shinzo, Speech to Nippon Kaigi (2013): "Japan's 1947 Constitution imposed Western individualism, eroding our traditions of public duty. We must revise it to prioritize the common good over harmful rights that divide our community."	Both reject liberal "rights" discourse in favor of collective duty. Abe's framing of the 1947 Constitution as "imposed" echoes Shimoi's critique of Western liberalism as a foreign corrupting force.

Code Category	Prewar Example (Author, Text, Year)	Postwar Example (Author/Organization, Text, Year)	Coding Justification
4. Restorative Sovereignty	Ōkawa Shūmei, *Pan-Asianism and World Peace* (1936): "Japan must cast off the Washington Naval Treaty's shackles and rearm to fulfill its destiny as Asia's leader. Only strength can restore our national dignity."	Nippon Kaigi, *Proposal for Constitutional Revision* (2010): "Article 9 denies Japan the right to defend itself, humiliating our nation. Revising Article 9 to establish a National Defense Force is essential to reclaiming our status as a normal nation."	Both link rearmament/ treaty revision to restoring national dignity. Ōkawa targets the Washington Naval Treaty (a Western-imposed constraint), while Nippon Kaigi targets Article 9 (a U.S.-imposed provision)—framing both as threats to sovereignty.

These categories were derived deductively from established definitions of fascist ideology (Griffin 1993; Szanto 2021) and adapted to the Japanese context.

5.5.6 Limitations and Mitigations

Coder Subjectivity: Mitigated via rigorous training, ICR testing, and consensus coding (all decisions documented in a memo).

Sample Scope: Focus on elite texts reflects the study's emphasis on institutional ideological continuity; grassroots texts (e.g., Zaitokukai leaflets) were excluded to avoid conflating fringe extremism with elite-driven populism.

Cultural Context: Japanese terms (e.g., *kokutai*, *jigyaku shikan*) were coded using original Japanese and authoritative translations (Saaler & Szpilman, 2011) to avoid misinterpretation.

5.6 Statistical Trends of Japan's Right-wing Mobilization Data Related to China (2018–2023)

Metadata & Reproducibility Notes

Units: All variables are counts (n = number of distinct entities).

- "Mobilized Groups": Distinct organized right-wing groups participating in China-focused demonstrations (e.g., territorial disputes, historical memory controversies).
- "Mobilized Participants": Police-estimated total individuals in demonstrations (conservative undercounts, per original note).
- "Mobilized Propaganda Vehicles": Number of mobile loudspeaker vehicles used for ideological messaging (systematically recorded by police).

Time Period: 2018–2023 (annual aggregates).

Source: National Police Agency of Japan (NPA). (2023). *Right-Wing Mobilization Statistics White Paper (Heisei 30–Reiwa 5)*. Retrieved from https://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/r02/honbun/html/w6633000.html (Accessed: Mar 27, 2025)

Limitations: Excludes informal/small gatherings and online mobilization; police estimates may undercount participants.

Reproducibility: Data extracted directly from NPA's annual white paper table on "China-related right-wing events." Cross-verify with NPA's raw data portal for 2018–2023.



Figure 1: Right-wing Mobilization Data Related to China (2018–2023)

Source: National Police Agency of Japan (2018-2023), https://www.npa.go.jp/

5.7 Statistical Trends of Japan's Right-wing Mobilization Data Related to South Korea (2018–2023)

Metadata & Reproducibility Notes

Units: Identical to Figure 1 (counts of groups, participants, vehicles).

Focus: South Korea-related issues (e.g., forced labor rulings, "comfort women" disputes, textbook controversies).

Time Period: 2018–2023 (annual aggregates).

Source: National Police Agency of Japan (NPA). (2023). *Right-Wing Mobilization Statistics White Paper (Heisei 30–Reiwa 5)*. Retrieved from https://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/r02/honbun/html/w6633000.html (Accessed: Mar 27, 2025)

Limitations: Some events may be categorized under "general foreign issues" (reducing precision); police categorization standards may vary annually.

Reproducibility: Data extracted from NPA's table on "South Korea-related right-wing events." Cross-reference with NPA's annual press releases on right-wing activity for consistency.



Figure 2: Right-wing Mobilization Data Related to South Korea (2018–2023)

Source: National Police Agency of Japan (2018-2023), https://www.npa.go.jp/

5.8 Activity Volume Trends of Zaitokukai and its Affiliated Groups (2012–2023)

Metadata & Reproducibility Notes

Units: Count (n = number of distinct demonstrations).

Definition: Demonstrations organized by Zaitokukai (a xenophobic right-wing group) and its splinter/successor organizations.

Time Period: 2012–2023 (annual estimates).

Source: National Police Agency of Japan (NPA). (2023). *Right-Wing Mobilization Statistics White Paper (Heisei 30–Reiwa 5)*; supplemented with independent monitoring data (per original note). Retrieved from https://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/r02/honbun/html/w6633000.html (Accessed: Mar 27, 2025)

Estimation Methodology: Post-2016 data combines official NPA counts with independent observer estimates (due to legal reclassification of hate speech events under Japan's 2016 *Hate Speech Elimination Act*). Estimates represent lower bounds.

Limitations: Excludes online hate speech and coded in-person gatherings; independent monitoring data may vary by source.

Reproducibility: Cross-verify with third-party reports (e.g., Japan Times hate speech surveys) and NPA's pre-2016 raw data for consistency.



*After Year 2016 are all estimated number, thus dotted line is used to distinguish.

Figure 3: Estimated Number of Zaitokukai Demonstrations (2012–2023)

Source: National Police Agency of Japan (2012-2023), https://www.npa.go.jp/

5.9 Japanese Public Favourable Attitude Trends Toward China and South Korea (2018–2023)

Metadata & Reproducibility Notes

Units: Proportion (decimal + percentage) of survey respondents reporting "favorable" or "somewhat favorable" attitudes.

Survey Methodology: Nationally representative samples with consistent questionnaire wording (annual cross-sectional surveys).

Time Period: 2018–2023 (annual aggregates).

Source: Genron NPO. (2018–2023). *Japan-China Joint Opinion Survey* (2018); *16th Japan-China Public Opinion Survey* (2020); *Japan-South Korea Public Opinion Survey* (2021–2023). Retrieved from https://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/ (Accessed: Mar 27, 2025)

Specific 2023 source: Genron NPO. (2023). *Japan-South Korea Public Opinion Survey 2023*. Retrieved from https://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5628.html

Limitations: Responses may be influenced by short-term media events; "favorability" does not capture issue-specific attitudes (e.g., historical disputes).

Reproducibility: Download raw survey data (where available) from Genron NPO's archive; confirm sampling frame (e.g., age, region) and response rates for transparency.



Figure 4: Japanese Public Sentiment Toward China and South Korea (2018–2023)

Source: Genron NPO, https://www.genron-npo.net/

6. Conclusion: Reinterpreting Fascist Legacies and Contemporary Populism in East Asia

To address potential critiques of excessive interpretivism, this subsection clarifies the empirical pathways through which prewar ideological frameworks are reconfigured within postwar policy networks and political outcomes. Rather than presuming direct institutional continuity, the article identifies the discursive and organizational mechanisms that enable selective ideological transmission across historical ruptures (Cento Bull, 2010; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).



Figure 5: Ideological Transmission Pathwayhs: Prewar Fascist Thinkers, Core Themes, Postwar Networks, and Policy Outcomes

First, Kita Ikki's advocacy of national reorganization through executive authority and moral unity functions as a conceptual precursor to postwar constitutional revisionism. While contemporary actors do not replicate Kita's revolutionary authoritarianism, his critique of parliamentary inefficiency and endorsement of a strong, value-oriented state remain salient in postwar debates concerning Article 9, state authority, and executive autonomy (Kita, 1919; Murayama, 1956). Organizations such as Nippon Kaigi strategically mobilize these motifs through the language of democratic restoration, framing constitutional revision as the recuperation of national dignity and political "normalcy" rather than as an explicit repudiation of democratic norms (Bukh, 2016; Guthmann, 2024). This translation illustrates how radical prewar critiques can be domesticated and reframed into institutionally legitimate reform agendas within postwar democratic politics (Park, 2015).

Second, Ōkawa Shūmei's Pan-Asianist discourse—particularly his portrayal of Japan as a moral vanguard resisting Western decadence—reverberates in postwar historical narratives promoted by conservative networks (Aydin, 2007; Shahabuddin, 2024). Contemporary memory politics regarding Japan's wartime conduct, including textbook revision and reinterpretations of imperial expansion, echo this civilizational framing, albeit without the explicit imperial ambition that characterized interwar Pan-Asianism (Morris-Suzuki, 2005; Nozaki, 2008). These narratives are further institutionalized through education-policy debates and commemorative practices, embedding ideological motifs within concrete policy arenas rather than leaving them at the level of abstract cultural discourse (Shibuichi, 2005; Nozaki, 2008).

Third, Shimoi Harukichi's synthesis of European fascist concepts with Japanese traditional elements provides a template for the aesthetic and moral lexicon of postwar nationalism. His valorization of discipline, sacrifice, and cultural authenticity aligns with postwar conservative advocacy for patriotic education and moral instruction, where civic virtue is framed as cultural restoration rather than coercive political transformation (Fujioka, 2011; Shimoi, 1927). Civil society organizations and advisory networks affiliated with the LDP recast these cultural themes as non-coercive civic ideals, shaping curricular discourse and public narratives without recourse to overt authoritarian enforcement (Guthmann, 2024; Park, 2015).

Empirically, these processes of ideological translation are facilitated by intersecting elite and civil society networks rather than by mass mobilization alone. The alignment between Nippon Kaigi and LDP leadership—particularly visible during the Abe administration—illustrates how historical ideas are operationalized within contemporary policy-making processes through agenda-setting, coalition formation, and symbolic legitimation (Guthmann, 2024; Park, 2015). Constitutional debates, education reforms, and symbolic acts such as Yasukuni Shrine visits thus function as observable policy outcomes through which ideological continuity is enacted and contested in postwar Japan (Shibuichi, 2005; Bukh, 2016).

By tracing these pathways, the analysis demonstrates that ideological persistence in postwar Japan is neither purely abstract nor merely symbolic. Instead, it is instantiated through identifiable networks and policy arenas that enable prewar ideological elements to exert influence within contemporary democratic institutions (Bukh, 2016; Guthmann, 2024).

This article has examined the ideological and cultural continuities between Japan's prewar fascist tradition and its postwar right-wing populist manifestations. By tracing the trajectory from Shimoi Harukichi's cultural fascism through to Nippon Kaigi's contemporary nationalist agenda, it has demonstrated how fascist legacies persist not through institutional replication but through discursive and symbolic adaptation within democratic frameworks.

The study has shown that Japanese fascism, rooted in traditional values such as Bushido and emperor-centered nationalism, was never fully extinguished but rather transformed in the postwar era. Contemporary actors like Nippon Kaigi have repackaged these ideological residues into nationalist-populist narratives, using democratic tools to promote constitutional revision, patriotic education, and historical revisionism. This reconstitution of fascist elements within populist rhetoric supports the conceptualization of Japan's right-wing populism as possessing distinct "post-fascist" characteristics—where the past is not erased, but reinterpreted to suit present political purposes.

Comparative analysis with China and South Korea reveals that while these countries did not experience domestic fascist regimes, they have developed populist-nationalist discourses rooted in their historical experiences of Japanese imperialism. South Korea's memory politics is shaped by grassroots activism and civil society resistance, while China's is centrally orchestrated and strategically integrated into state propaganda and education. These differences reflect broader divergences in political structure and memory governance, yet all three states deploy history as a tool of contemporary political legitimacy.

The visual data included in this study further illustrates how memory politics, diplomatic tensions, and right-wing mobilization are intertwined. Figures tracking group mobilizations, public sentiment, and protest activity reveal that nationalist actors are highly responsive to historical disputes, and that such disputes remain central to public opinion and political legitimacy in East Asia.

This study's contributions are threefold. First, it introduces a cultural continuity framework for understanding the persistence of fascist ideology in Japan. Second, it demonstrates how historical memory functions as both a constraint and a resource for populist movements. Third, it provides a structured comparative approach to analyze how different East Asian states mobilize historical legacies in distinct ways.

Ultimately, understanding the legacy of fascism in East Asia requires more than identifying ideological artifacts—it demands an exploration of how memory, nationalism, and populism interact in contemporary democratic and authoritarian contexts. This article offers such an account, revealing that while fascist regimes may be politically obsolete, their cultural and symbolic power remains an enduring force in East Asian political life.

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