Several Notes on the Phenomenological Analysis of Hatred in Íngrid Vendrell Ferran

Abstract

This study investigates the affective phenomenon of hatred through the lens of philosophical anthropology and existential phenomenology, with particular attention to the work of Vendel Feran. Drawing on Feran’s conceptualisation of affective structures and moral sensitivity, the inquiry explores whether hatred can be understood merely as a chronic, generalised form of anger or whether it constitutes a distinct existential and evaluative stance towards the world. Building on Feran's thesis that moral emotions are not simply reactive but deeply rooted in the structure of human existence, the study juxtaposes hatred and anger in terms of their temporality, intentionality, and moral orientation. As Feran suggests, hatred is more entrenched—it discloses the world through a sustained, morally charged aversion. This investigation further aligns Feran’s insights with Heidegger’s analysis of moods (Stimmungen), proposing that hatred, like anxiety, may serve an existential function by revealing value-laden aspects of the world. However, unlike anxiety, which opens the self to authentic existence, hatred appears to seal the self off from Mitsein (being-with-others), replacing openness with exclusion and moral rigidity. By interpreting hatred as both a moral and existential mood, the study extends Feran’s affective anthropology to account for the ways in which negative emotions structure our relation to others and to moral reality. The findings suggest that hatred is not simply the absence of love, but an active opposition to perceived forms of being deemed unworthy, and that this aversive mood may obscure one’s capacity for authentic moral engagement.